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The orthodox view that states have no role in U.S. foreign relations
is not only inconsistent with their place in the modern global economy, but the constitutional basis for a “dormant” bar on state participation—that is, absent a controlling federal statute or treaty—is obscure. Revisionist scholarship and recent Supreme Court case law
suggest that Congress alone should decide when the states must stay
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Treaty Clause, enforced through the dormant treaty power. The text,
structure, and original understanding of the treaty power establish two
important principles of continuing validity. First, the President was to
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of the United States, the better to secure advantageous treaties and
avoid perilous entanglements. Second, state interference with this negotiating authority, even prior to the conclusive adoption of a federal
treaty or statute, was unlawful.

† Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Jack Goldsmith, Eric Orts, Richard Shell, Peter Spiro, and
Alan Strudler for their generous suggestions and constructive criticism, as well as Elena Bojilova, Charisa Tak, and Scott Wilson for their research assistance.

1127

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

1128

09/21/00 12:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

Treaty Clause exclusivity is best maintained by a judicially enforced dormant treaty power barring the states from bargaining with
foreign powers, including indirect bargaining through measures that
are contingent on foreign government policies—such as the Massachusetts law targeting companies doing business with Burma. However, state activities that incidentally have effects overseas would not
be precluded, and the jurisprudence must be informed by the original
rationales for federal exclusivity and by the President’s discretion to
exempt state activities posing no threat to federal functions.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone used to agree that state and local governments had no
1
role to play in U.S. foreign relations. The Constitution may have
been unclear about the precise responsibilities given to the President,
the House, and the Senate, but together, somehow, they held a federal monopoly on foreign relations2—or, as the Supreme Court occasionally put the matter, there was “one voice” in U.S. foreign rela1. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150
(2d ed. 1996) (“At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards
U.S. foreign relations, the states ‘do not exist’.”); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 230 (2d ed. 1988) (“[S]tate action, whether or not consistent with current federal foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void . . . .”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1632 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (noting “a remarkable consensus about the legitimacy of the federal common law of
foreign relations”); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83
AM. J. INT’L L. 832, 832-33 (1989) (“The consensus today is that the central Government alone
may directly exercise power in foreign affairs. Most current controversy about the foreign affairs
power concerns its distribution among the federal branches, not whether it resides in the nation
rather than the states.”). Of course, saying “everyone” invariably sounds like hyperbole. But see
infra note 320 (quoting John C. Calhoun’s endorsement of treaty power exclusivity).
For brevity’s sake, I will often refer solely to “states” as a shorthand for both states and
subordinate political entities like counties and municipalities.
2. Thus, when Edward Corwin famously described a constitutional “invitation to struggle
for the privilege of directing American foreign policy,” he assumed that only the Congress and
the President were invited. Compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT] (“[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American
foreign policy.”), with EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS.
STATE POWER passim (1913) [hereinafter CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY] (describing the
supremacy of national treaty authority).
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tions, and it was the reassuring bass of Uncle Sam.
But there were always two nagging problems with the orthodoxy
of a federal monopoly: it never really existed, and it was never clear
why it should. States have always had an effect on U.S. foreign rela4
tions, and they are now bolder than ever. Some state activities sound
exactly like diplomacy. In addition to symbolic political ties5 and rou6
tine economic transactions, states establish offices overseas, launch
trade and investment missions, sign bilateral and multilateral agreements, and participate in international summits.7 Even ostensibly local
3. For modern canonical expressions of this view, see Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (noting “the Framers’ overriding concern that ‘the Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments’” (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (finding unconstitutional “state involvement in foreign affairs
and international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”); id. at 441 (“[E]ven in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign relations.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) (“The Framers’
Convention was called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the
states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were one.”). For prior cases, see infra note 331.
4. See generally JOHN M. KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 16-19 (1983) (providing an historical overview of state participation in foreign affairs); Dennis James Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations
296-98 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author)
(suggesting that state influence in foreign relations has remained relatively constant since the
nation’s founding).
5. See, e.g., Sister Cities International, Welcome to Sister Cities International (visited Feb.
15, 2000) <http://www.sister-cities.org> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (cataloging sistercity relationships). Such relationships are not wholly devoid of substance: for example, several
city councils forged ties with Nicaraguan cities as a means of dissenting from federal policy, see
EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 90 (1998), while over two dozen cities and communities declared themselves sanctuaries for Central American refugees, see Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 821, 822 (1989).
6. Sometimes even the purchase and sale of goods proved controversial, as in the decision
by a Texas official to ship tons of hormone-free beef to England in the midst of highly contentious negotiations between the United States and the European Community (“EC”) over the
latter’s barriers to hormone-treated beef. The federal government, incensed, initially withheld
the health certifications necessary for shipment, and it also threatened to prosecute the official
for negotiating with EC officials in violation of the Logan Act. See Earl H. Fry, States in the International Economy: An American Overview, in STATES AND PROVINCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 23, 37 (Douglas M. Brown & Earl H. Fry eds., 1993) [hereinafter STATES
AND PROVINCES] (describing Texas’s beef shipment to England and the federal government’s
initial opposition to that shipment); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 515 (1994) (same); see also infra text accompanying notes 325-28, 434-36 (discussing the Logan Act).
7. See FRY, supra note 5, at 67-75 (describing states’ international activities); id. at 92 (describing Idaho trade missions to and from Libya); STATES AND PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 3435 (describing annual summits between U.S. governors and their Canadian and Mexican coun-
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acts can have serious effects abroad. In the 1960s, some states tar8
geted Eastern Bloc countries through trade boycotts and reciprocal
inheritance laws;9 in the 1970s, they shunned firms supporting the
Arab boycott of Israel;10 in the 1980s, they used their economic clout
11
to attack South African apartheid; in the 1990s, they campaigned
against European banks holding Holocaust-related assets12 and
terparts on regional trade and environmental matters); John M. Kline, United States’ Federalism
and Foreign Policy, in STATES AND PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 201, 221-22 [hereinafter Kline,
Federalism and Foreign Policy] (describing attempts by oil-rich states to cozy up to OPEC);
Martin Lubin, The Routinization of Cross-Border Interactions: An Overview of NEG/ECP
Structures and Activities, in STATES AND PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 145 (describing the structure and activities of the Annual Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian
Premiers); Scott Baldauf, Foreign Policy Goes Local, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 1999,
at 1 (describing regular meetings between officials from Texas and Mexico concerning implementation of NAFTA).
8. See Richard B. Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union,
State and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 882-84 (1970) (discussing the enactment of local laws that discouraged sales of goods from Communist nations).
Other actions followed episodically:
Fifteen states pulled Soviet vodka from state liquor store shelves after the downing of
a Korean passenger plane in 1983, while the governors of New York and New Jersey
moved to deny the Soviet foreign minister’s plane the right to land in their states
during the United Nations’ debate on the incident. Oregon’s Health Division sought
to bill the Soviet Union for costs associated with their response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, and California’s governor appealed directly to the Soviet leadership regarding its handling of protests in the Armenian Republic in 1988.
Kline, Federalism and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, at 223.
9. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430 n.1 (1968); William B. Wong, Comment,
Iron Curtain Statutes, Communist China, and the Right to Devise, 32 UCLA L. REV. 643 (1985).
10. The states were at least successful in encouraging preemptive national legislation. See
Eric L. Hirschhorn & Howard N. Fenton, III, States’ Rights and the Antiboycott Provisions of the
Export Administration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 517, 522-26 (1981); see also Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1994) (preempting state foreign boycott laws).
11. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 822 (noting that a number of states, counties, and cities enacted divestment or procurement laws targeting South Africa’s apartheid policy); Howard N.
Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade
Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 563-68 (1993) (discussing state and local sanctions
against South Africa); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti–South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 816-24 (1986) (examining anti–South Africa divestment measures taken by state and local governments). Lower court
cases resolving challenges to these measures were not of one piece. Compare Board of Trustees
of the Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 730-57 (Md. 1989)
(upholding Baltimore ordinances requiring city pension funds to divest their holdings from
companies engaged in business in South Africa), with New York Times Co. v. City of New York
Comm’n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 966-69 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that New York City
anti-discrimination laws did not prohibit the New York Times from carrying an advertisement
for South African employment opportunities), and Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v.
Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986) (invalidating an Illinois statute excluding South African
coins from state tax exemptions available to other foreign coins).
12. A conference of nine hundred state officials threatened sanctions against Swiss banks
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against repressive regimes in Burma (Myanmar) and elsewhere, and
increasingly adopted “Buy American” laws, notwithstanding interna14
tional procurement reform.
Matters have come to a head with Massachusetts’s selective pur15
chasing law, which was among the first to target Burma. The European Union and Japan filed complaints before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) alleging that the law violated the Uruguay
Round.16 Those proceedings were suspended after the Massachusetts
law was enjoined,17 but the Supreme Court is now reviewing the matnotwithstanding the express objections of U.S. officials. See John Authers et al., Banks Pay a
High Price for Putting the Past Behind Them, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 4. According to one
estimate, “[e]very important breakthrough in the negotiations [with Swiss banks] came soon
after threats from U.S. local government officials to impose sanctions.” John Authers & Richard
Wolfe, When Sanctions Work, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 22. New York City’s comptroller also
spearheaded a campaign to impose sanctions on Deutsche Bank, and to oppose its merger with
Bankers Trust, until eventually prevailed upon by the State Department. See Marilyn Henry,
Deutsche Bank Gets Approval for $10 B. U.S. Takeover, JERUSALEM POST, May 23, 1999, at 4;
Fed Clears a Planned U.S.-German Bank Merger, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at C22.
13. See generally USA Engage, State & Local Sanctions Watch List (last modified July 27,
1999) <www.usaengage.org/news/status.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (compiling a
“watch list” of pending proposals, failed or inactive proposals, and enacted divestment, selective
purchasing, and other sanctions laws relating to over one dozen foreign countries); John M.
Kline, Continuing Controversies over State and Local Foreign Policy Sanctions in the United
States, PUBLIUS, Spring 1999, at 111 passim [hereinafter Kline, Continuing Controversies].
14. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 227-28 (2d ed. 1997) (noting the proliferation of state
“Buy American” laws, despite the terms of the Uruguay Round); Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity: The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and
U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 321-22 (1999) (same). Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (Ct. App. 1969) (invalidating the California Buy American Act as unconstitutionally infringing on the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs powers), with Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d
903, 906-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding Pennsylvania’s “Buy American” statute), and K.S.B. Tech.
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 789 (N.J. 1977) (upholding the New Jersey “Buy American” statute).
15. The law establishes a restricted purchase list of all companies “doing business” with
Burma—expansively construed—and bars the Commonwealth from procuring goods or services
from those companies, unless procurement is essential and there is no other bid or offer, certain
medical supplies are involved, or the bid or offer in question is more than 10% below the nextlowest alternative. See M
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18

ter in Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council. The international
attention paid to these and like measures makes the nostrum that
19
states are “unknown to foreign nations” sound surreal, like the doctrine that excludable aliens have not “entered” the United States
even if they are standing in Wrigley Field.20 The precarious position of
the executive branch, which was compelled to defend itself before the
WTO (while futilely lobbying Massachusetts to repeal the law21), conaff’d sub nom., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
18. 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (granting certiorari). The Massachusetts law, and the district court
and court of appeals’ decisions in Natsios, have been the subject of extensive commentary discussing preemption, the Foreign Commerce Clause, foreign affairs power, and even free speech
issues involved. See, e.g., Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the
Burmese Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 373, 375 (1999) (concluding that selective purchasing laws are not preempted by federal
law and do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the federal government’s exclusive
foreign affairs power); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and
Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999)
(postulating that some types of state and local foreign policy sanctions are protected by both the
Tenth and the First Amendments); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of
United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 447 (1998) (arguing that local
economic sanctions infringe upon powers reserved exclusively to the federal government);
David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 175, 179 (1997) (asserting that state initiatives to punish businesses engaged in activity in Burma are preempted, as
well as violating the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and possibly the Due
Process Clause).
19. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
20. See Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN
POL’Y 154, 162 (1987) [hereinafter Shuman, Local Foreign Policies] (noting “[t]he discrepancy
between constitutional theory and practice”). See generally FRY, supra note 5, passim (detailing
the growth of state and local activities); Fry, supra note 6, passim (same); Michael H. Shuman,
Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FOREIGN POL’Y 158 passim (1992)
[hereinafter, Shuman, Courts] (same). Cf. Ethan A. Klingsberg, Note, Penetrating the Entry
Doctrine: Excludable Aliens’ Constitutional Rights in Immigration Processes, 98 YALE L.J. 639,
639-40 (1989) (describing the entry doctrine).
21. The Clinton Administration conducted a “fierce internal debate” about whether to participate in the legal challenge to the Massachusetts law, which involved reconciling State Department condemnation of Burma, defense of the Massachusetts law as the named party in the
WTO proceedings, and its well-understood opposition to the state law on grounds of principle
and politics. Michael S. Lelyveld, Clinton Refrains from Intervening in Myanmar Case, J. COM.,
Mar. 11, 1999, at 3A; see also Fred Hiatt, Boston’s Stand on Human Rights, WASH. POST, Aug.
25, 1997, at A19; Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S. May Defend, Oppose State’s Sanctions Law, J. COM.,
Feb. 3, 1999, at 3A; Dierdre Shesgreen, Can States Set Trade Policy?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 17,
1998, at 4. Although the federal government declined to participate in the lower courts or at the
certiorari stage in the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General recently filed an amicus brief in
support of the private respondents. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council (No. 99-474), 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999)
(granting certiorari), available in 2000 WL 194805; David G. Savage, Lawyers for U.S. Seek End
to Myanmar Boycott, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at A3.
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firms that the federal government is not wholly in charge of the na22
tion’s foreign policy —and the manner in which Massachusetts assumed its role scarcely makes one sanguine about the alternatives.23
This profound dissonance between theory and practice has only
accentuated the second problem with the federal monopoly—no one
This clash between the President’s international interests and domestic capabilities is by
no means unique. See, e.g., Richard Wolffe, Sanctions Against Swiss Put Washington on Spot,
FIN. TIMES, July 4, 1998, at 2 (noting threats by the Swiss government to initiate WTO proceedings concerning state and city sanctions against Swiss banks and the Clinton administration’s opposition both to international proceedings and to sanctions).
22. In the Massachusetts matter, then–Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat was reportedly informed by European allies that they would not cooperate further on multilateral action until the controversy was resolved. The controversy also occasioned a February 1998 negotiation between EU, United Kingdom, and Massachusetts officials, with a State Department
official as a bystander, in which state representative Byron Rushing was petitioned to amend the
law—and he replied that he would only do so if the EU imposed new sanctions against Burma.
See Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling Business
Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20; see also USA Engage, Testimony
of Deputy Assistant Secretary David Marchick Before the Maryland House of Delegates Committee on Commerce and Government Matters, March 25, 1998 (visited Feb. 18, 2000)
<http://usaengage.org/legislative/marchick.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reprinting testimony that such laws might make U.S. policy preferences inconsistent and confusing,
impair negotiation with foreign governments, and give rise to ancillary disputes over their consistency with international legal obligations, having “the practical effect of interfering with the
President’s ability to conduct our foreign policy”); Lee H. Hamilton, Editorial, Local Interference with Foreign Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1998, at A23 (arguing that state and local
sanctions may “diminish the leverage of our diplomatic institutions” and “interfere with the
ability of the president and Congress to pursue a coherent, united foreign policy,” so that “[t]o
allow state and local governments to pursue their own foreign policies would create dangerous
confusion in the way the United States interacts with other nations, and [it] would severely
weaken our ability to protect U.S. national interests”); Steven Spear, 50 Different Departments
of State, THE EXPORT PRAC., July 15, 1997, at 8 (describing efforts by the State Department and
the Office of the United States Trade Representative to change the Massachusetts Burma law,
as well as a visit to Massachusetts by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia to dissuade state lawmakers from passing new sanctions legislation, and concluding that such efforts have generally
met with “indifference”); Kevin Whitelaw, The Very Long Arm of the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 57 (“Trying to monitor the foreign policy of 50 states and 7,284
municipalities is, to put it simply, a nightmare for companies and national governments alike.
‘There’s no way we can keep track of all the individual actions,’ admits one State Department
official.”).
23. This Article does not consider whether, apart from constitutional considerations, the
Massachusetts Burma law is an appropriate instrument for encouraging change in Burma’s profoundly antidemocratic and repressive regime. But the means by which the Massachusetts legislation was crafted (an anti-apartheid sanctions bill was adapted by removing the words “South
Africa” and substituting “Burma (Myanmar)”), the attention paid to the international consequences (the bill’s sponsor, Representative Byron Rushing, volunteered, “I had no idea we were
party to the Government Procurement blah-blah”), and the preliminary understanding of its
constitutional legitimacy (Representative Rushing commented, “Our constitution is older than
the country’s. We can do these things.”) give one pause. A State’s Foreign Policy: The Mass That
Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32-33.
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has explained satisfactorily why it exists in the first place. The Constitution does not speak of foreign affairs, let alone a federal monop24
oly. Unsurprisingly, then, leading cases either go outside the Constitution for support,25 cite no textual support whatsoever,26 or rely on
27
judicially created doctrines of uncertain pedigree and scope. The
case law also fails to justify any role for the judiciary, leaving it vulnerable to suggestions that congressional tolerance of state activities
should be enough to excuse state activity having foreign repercussions
of the most significant kind.28
Stressing the persistence of state practices, and the lack of any
apparent constitutional basis for a federal monopoly, an important
recent wave of scholarship suggests doing away with the monopoly altogether—that is, abandoning the notion that the courts should enforce a “dormant” foreign relations preemption of state activities, absent intervention by the political branches.29 Revisionist scholars
24. See Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at 162 (“Most people—and not a few legal scholars—would be surprised to learn that the Constitution nowhere contains the terms ‘foreign relations,’ ‘foreign policy,’ or ‘international affairs.’”). Indeed, as explained further below, it appears
to contemplate certain foreign affairs functions for the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
(providing that the states may enter into agreements or compacts with foreign powers so long as
there is congressional consent); infra text accompanying notes 244-46, 333-58.
25. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) (proposing an extra-constitutional theory of the federal monopoly over foreign affairs); infra text
accompanying notes 45-47 (discussing Curtiss-Wright).
26. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (holding that state regulations “must
give way if they impair the efficient exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy”); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875) (reasoning that a California immigration statute was impermissible
because it gave a considerable amount of power to a state official who did not accordingly bear
the risk for claims of action brought under the statute); infra text accompanying notes 48-57,
368-75 (discussing Zschernig).
27. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir.) (enjoining a Massachusetts law on the grounds that it (1) violated the foreign affairs power; (2) violated
Foreign Commerce Clause doctrines prohibiting facial discrimination against foreign commerce,
interference with “one voice” in commercial matters, and extraterritorial regulation; and (3) was
preempted by federal legislation), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
28. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that the
Constitution permits application of California’s corporate franchise tax to a multinational
banking enterprise).
29. For remarks on this renaissance, see Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1090-1106 (1999) (describing the components of, and
recent shift away from, “foreign affairs exceptionalism”); G. Edward White, Observations on the
Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1120-25 (1999) (exploring
the impact of the emerging international order on foreign affairs law). For exemplars, see Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 860-70 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law] (questioning the legitimacy and continuing validity of
dormant foreign relations preemption); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1624 (pro-
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depict dormant foreign relations preemption as both a departure from
the original understanding and a relic of the past. To their lights, the
30
doctrine emerged full-grown in Zschernig v. Miller, a 1968 Supreme
Court decision striking down an Oregon reciprocal inheritance statute,31 before being reduced by Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
posing the renunciation of dormant foreign relations preemption); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1410-24 (1999)
[hereinafter Goldsmith, The New Formalism] (rejecting the foreign relations effects approach in
political question, act of state, and dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines); Peter J. Spiro,
Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Foreign Relations] (concluding that, in light of new participation by states in global affairs, “there is
no justification for the courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face
of contrary state-level preferences”); Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2
HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 19, 20 (1997) (attributing the need for a reexamination of traditional international affairs law to the dilution of the primacy of the nation-state); Peter J. Spiro,
The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (1994)
[hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties] (arguing that “the presumption of national uniformity
and control over foreign relations matters . . . no longer prevails in a post-national world order”); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 20-27 (1995) (criticizing “broad federal common law of foreign relations” as inconsistent and
lacking in authority).
In a recent contribution along similar lines, which appeared as this Article was being
readied for publication, Michael Ramsey concludes that, based on the original understanding,
“there is no constitutional limit upon state power beyond the express or implied limitations directed at particular subjects such as war and treatymaking and the general preemptive power.”
Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of
Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 348 (1999). Though conceptually distinguishable, the revisionist view of dormant foreign relations preemption is closely affiliated
with other work challenging the scope of positive political authority in the realm of foreign relations. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.
390, 395 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley, The Treaty Power] (arguing that the federal treaty power
should be subject to the same federalism limitations as are Congress’s legislative powers); John
C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism] (arguing that congressional consent was originally considered indispensable before treaties would have domestic legislative effect). Like Professor Ramsey’s recent piece, John Yoo’s article on self-execution came
to my attention shortly before this piece was to be published, making it impossible to address his
arguments or those of his commentators with the care they deserve. See also Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law
of the Land”, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999) (responding to Professor Yoo’s Globalism); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM L. REV. 2154 (1999) (same); John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (replying to Professors Vázquez and Flaherty).
30. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
31. See id. at 441; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1630 (describing Zschernig as
relying on dormant foreign relations preemption); Joel P. Trachtman, Nonactor States in U.S.
Foreign Relations?: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 350, 357
(1998) (describing Zschernig as “[d]ormant foreign relations power preemption”); see also infra
text accompanying note 51 (attributing the debut of dormant foreign relations preemption to
Zschernig).
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Board to little more than what the dormant Commerce Clause
would otherwise provide.
Taking Barclays Bank one step further, the new scholarship proposes getting rid of such preemption altogether, but not on the pre33
dictable basis of states’ rights. Instead, it is claimed, globalization
makes confining the states to purely internal matters entirely untenable.34 Cabining the states is also thought to be an inappropriate function for the courts, since Congress—not the judiciary—is in charge of
federal law and the nation’s foreign policy.35 Such arguments may well
appeal to a Court sympathetic to state sovereignty and suspicious of
36
constitutional common law.
The revisionist account is compelling if one accepts the premises
of the federal monopoly orthodoxy—namely, that foreign relations
effects must be the touchstone for any judicially imposed limit on
state activities, and that any constitutional doctrine must speak in
broad terms to all activities having the requisite effects. Such an approach, I would concede, has serious deficiencies, including its lack of
32. 512 U.S. 298 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 58-62, 75-76 (describing the
premises and subsequent treatment of Zschernig).
33. Federalism’s values are invoked more indirectly, either based on appeals to consistent
treatment, see Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 394 (arguing against “treaty power exceptionalism”), or tradition, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1714 (noting critically that “[t]hese new foreign relations issues are much more closely tied to traditional state
prerogatives than traditional foreign relations issues, and decentralization of these matters often
serves salutary ends”). But see Porterfield, supra note 18, at 23-48 (expressly emphasizing the
speech and political participation functions of federalism). This Article does not seek to address
the normative case for or against state participation in any depth, except to the extent of explicating the original warrant for the federal treaty power and considering whether that warrant
has been unsettled by subsequent developments. See infra Part II. But cf. Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906-08
(1994) (questioning the United States’ preoccupation with federalism).
34. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1670-80 (positing that the blurring
of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs discredits the theory that states lack a
legitimate interest in foreign affairs); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1246-52, 1259-75
(identifying the weaknesses and impracticality of federal exclusivity).
35. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1692-95 (explaining the tendency
of courts to err in attempting to create a federal common law in foreign affairs); Goldsmith, The
New Formalism, supra note 29, at 1420 (describing the discrepant response of the political
branches to judicial overprotection, as opposed to underprotection, of U.S. foreign relations
interests).
36. In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 525 (1999), the First Circuit noted recent criticisms of the federal monopoly and contentions
that Barclays undermined prior case law but observed that lower courts lack the power to depart even from weakened Supreme Court precedent—leaving to the Supreme Court “‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” Id. at 59 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997))).
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any apparent basis in the Constitution. If those premises are wrong,
however, perhaps both the orthodoxy and the revisionists are mistaken. The key, it seems, lies in locating a “new” constitutional principle, one recovered from a Constitution that still speaks to the modern world.
That principle, I argue, is the “dormant treaty power”—the
Treaty Clause’s preemption of state authority even in the absence of
37
any ratified treaty. The dormant treaty power does not preclude all
state activities affecting foreign relations. Instead, it proscribes a relatively well-defined class of state foreign affairs activities: those involving direct or indirect negotiating—put less formally, bargaining—
with foreign powers on matters of national concern. The bargaining
approach acknowledges, for example, a state’s presumed authority to
engage in ordinary contractual relations with foreign corporations
and governments, to tax foreign corporations, and to denounce foreign governments in the strongest terms, regardless of the effects.38 At
the same time, a state cannot negotiate with a foreign power in order
to secure concessions. Moreover, the state cannot indirectly negotiate
(for example, by imposing higher taxes on corporations domiciled in
the country in question) in pursuit of the same end.
The dormant treaty power’s bargaining-oriented approach offers
concrete advantages over both the federal monopoly orthodoxy and
the revisionist critique. For one, it is founded on a clear grant of con37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring the treaty power on the President and the
Senate); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation). Describing the treaty power as “dormant” does not, of course, mean that the Senate
and President need be inert, any more than congressional authority under the dormant Commerce Clause is dissipated when the House or Senate considers legislation. To the contrary, the
principle reflects a constitutional judgment that the treaty power is never truly dormant, but
may be exercised by engaging or failing to engage foreign powers in negotiations toward the
conclusion of a treaty. The point of the label, instead, is to differentiate between “dormant”
federal preemption by virtue of the Treaty Clause and federal preemption by a ratified treaty
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. See id. art. VI, cl. 2; infra text accompanying note 264 (considering the relationship between Article VI and the dormant treaty power).
38. It should be noted, however, that the dormant treaty power is not exclusive of other
non–foreign relations preemption doctrines, such as might be raised by state laws discriminating
against foreign commerce. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625 (making a
similar caveat); Edward T. Swaine, The Triumph of Local Politics?, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 247 (1999) (considering statutory preemption and dormant Commerce Clause objections
to the Massachusetts Burma legislation); infra Part I.B (briefly summarizing the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine). State activities might also conflict with specific Article I
grants of authority other than the Commerce Clause—for example, by touching on matters of
defense policy. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 353-54 (1990) (noting that,
even while the Militia Clauses permit organized state militia, those militia are subject to federal
limitations).

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

2000]

09/21/00 12:58 PM

NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM

1139

stitutional authority to the federal government and a parallel bar of
state authority, rather than vaguer propositions concerning the desirability of exclusive federal authority (or, for that matter, the desirability of preserving state authority). Focusing on treaty-related functions also allows us to recognize the similarity between direct
negotiations with a foreign government and indirect bargaining
through unilateral changes in state law, without licensing a judicially
unmanageable inquiry into foreign relations effects (or, for that matter, turning a blind eye toward those effects). Finally, the dormant
treaty power provides a coherent justification for not passing the buck
to Congress—namely, the judiciary’s mandate to provide the President with the freedom necessary to exercise the treaty functions conferred on the executive branch by the Constitution.
Part I of this Article briefly evaluates the approach of present
foreign affairs doctrines to the problem of state-conducted activities
touching on foreign relations. As critics have suggested, prevailing
foreign affairs doctrine is objectionable because it lacks any clear basis in the Constitution, and because it further requires the judiciary to
engage in complex assessments concerning the foreign effects of state
activities. As a result, current foreign affairs doctrine substitutes the
judicial appraisal of foreign relations for the more considered judgment of Congress—or, at best, defers to executive judgment without
any constitutional basis for doing so, to the apparent disadvantage of
state interests. If recent case law has not abandoned this approach,
perhaps it should.
Part II then examines the horizontal and vertical distribution of
the constitutional power to negotiate international agreements. The
original understanding is important here not only for the usual rea39
sons, but also to rebut the suggestion by revisionists that the entire
notion of federal foreign relations exclusivity is ahistorical. This view
is mistaken, at least to the extent that it impugns the exclusivity of
39. Those reasons are varied—and contested—but most scholars still assume that the
original understanding is highly pertinent. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on
the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 104-24 (1997) (appraising
critically the ubiquity of appeals to original understanding in legal scholarship); Larry D.
Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616 (1999) (“[P]ractically everyone who
deals with the Constitution treats the Founding as special and privileged in some sense.”). But
cf. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 394-412 (1997) (critiquing halfway
adherence to originalism). For a recent discussion of whether and how the original understanding of the treaty power may be determinative, compare Yoo, Globalism, supra note 29, at 198285 (defending the historical approach), with Vázquez, supra note 29, at 2158-68 (noting limits to
narrow historical methods).

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

1140

09/21/00 12:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

40

treaty-related functions. Without attempting to divine the outer perimeters of executive authority over foreign affairs, I argue that the
constitutional text and early history of the Treaty Clause, as well as
subsequent practice and case law, establish that the President is invested with an independent and substantive (if not necessarily plenary) authority to negotiate international agreements. The President
was enlisted, I argue, both to facilitate effective negotiation and to
reinforce federal barriers against unwise foreign entanglements. It is
this power, not Congress’s authority over commerce, that is at stake
when states attempt to conduct foreign relations. It is absolutely clear,
moreover, that both the Framers and their successors regarded state
interference with this presidential power as unlawful.
The kernel of the dormant treaty power is evident in the abun41
dant dicta and commentary supporting the federal monopoly, and in
Chief Justice Taney’s extraordinary opinion in Holmes v. Jennison.42
But this has not left us with a full-fledged doctrine to apply, particularly given the intervening confusion caused by cases like Zschernig
and Barclays Bank. Accordingly, Part III develops a doctrine for judicial application. I first examine arguments to the effect that the Framers’ approach is antiquated, or that positive political authority—that
is, affirmative steps taken by the political branches to protect their
prerogatives—renders judicial intervention unnecessary. I conclude,
however, that neither line of argument comes to grips with the defensible (and constitutional) judgment as to the necessity of preserving
40. To be clear, however, the dormant treaty power has evolved over time. As explained
below, nineteenth-century state activities touching on foreign relations may have been tolerated
because of contemporary doubts about the scope of the federal government’s power under the
Treaty Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 303-32. Consequently, one might argue that
preempting state activity based on the dormant treaty doctrine is somewhat asynchronous, in
that it permits expanding federal power (via judicial enforcement of the now-limitless Treaty
Clause) without any structural compensation. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 130 (defending, in principle, the “translation”
of federalism limits to counterbalance the expansion of federal power under the Commerce
Clause).
The significance of the objection in this particular context turns, among other things, on
whether nineteenth-century uncertainties about the treaty power really amounted to a shared
understanding about its limits, a matter generally beyond the scope of this Article. But see, e.g.,
infra notes 313-19 (highlighting the diversity of opinion on subject-matter limits). While translating the federal system en masse has undoubted virtues, I hope to demonstrate that the commitment to federal exclusivity in negotiating treaties, whatever the substantive reach of the
Treaty Clause, has been a consistent constitutional objective—and is intellectually coherent in
its own right.
41. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3; infra Part I.A and notes 320, 330-31.
42. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

2000]

09/21/00 12:58 PM

NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM

1141

the President’s authority to negotiate treaties in the national interest.
The final part then argues that a judicially enforced prohibition
on state bargaining with foreign powers is the most practical and the
most principled means of fleshing out the dormant treaty power. The
bargaining approach naturally proscribes certain forms of state conduct, such as state measures contingent on the policies of foreign
powers, that occupy an uncertain position under prevailing doctrine,
while just as plainly permitting other measures of otherwise uncertain
legality—such as purely unilateral state conduct and state relations
with foreign private parties. Incidental instances of state bargaining
should also be permitted on grounds consistent with the treaty
power’s externality and collective action rationales. Finally, while the
bargaining approach vests considerable authority in the judiciary, its
basis in the Treaty Clause warrants inviting the executive branch to
exempt unproblematic classes or instances of state conduct, substituting its judgment on foreign affairs matters that rest ultimately—if
not solely—with the political branches.
I. THE DORMANT DOCTRINES OF THE FEDERAL MONOPOLY
State and local measures touching on foreign affairs clearly cannot be maintained in the teeth of enacted federal law—including, at a
minimum, federal statutes, treaties, and congressionally authorized
43
regulations. But state and local measures may also be preempted by
one or more principles of dormant federal power arising directly from
the Constitution—primarily, the foreign affairs power doctrine and
the “one voice” component of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. Understanding these existing doctrines is critical to understanding the revisionist critique and the need for alternatives.

43. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]
(describing international law and international agreements of the United States as supreme over
state law); id. § 303 (broadly construing international agreements as including treaties and other
measures within congressional and presidential authority under the Constitution); id. § 302 cmts.
c, d (explaining that U.S. authority to make international agreements, including by means other
than treaties, is not limited by the Tenth Amendment); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 191, 197 (explaining that the treaty power is not limited by powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment). But see, e.g., Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 391-95 (outlining disagreement with the “nationalist” view). For discussion of whether other executive policies, such
as executive agreements, preempt state law, see infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
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A. The Federal Foreign Affairs Power
The most general expression of the federal monopoly of international relations is commonly referred to as the federal foreign affairs
power. The standard version posits that the United States, by its nature as an independent sovereign, possesses powers appropriate to
nationhood and sovereignty—powers implicitly vested by the Constitution in the federal government, without reservation under the
Tenth Amendment.44 Justice Sutherland’s variant, essayed in dicta in
Curtiss-Wright, suggests that “external sovereignty” passed directly
from Great Britain to the Union of States, therefore obviating any
need for federal powers to be spelled out, either in the Articles of
Confederation or subsequently in the Constitution.45
46
Few today subscribe to Justice Sutherland’s views, and any distinctive influence of his Curtiss-Wright dicta on the vertical distribu47
tion of foreign affairs authority has been more apparent than real.
44. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the
several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433 (1920) (stating that the federal government’s authority under the Treaty Clause may be
broader than Article I authority).
45. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). Justice
Sutherland did not expressly claim any extra-constitutional assignment of power—the closest he
came was in asserting that “the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and that the
powers, even if not detailed in the Constitution, “would have vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality,” id. at 318—which by itself is consistent with a theory
of implicit authority. The opinion also cited, if only incidentally, more traditional authority, like
The Chinese Exclusion Case. See id. at 317. Nevertheless, many distinguish his explanation from
the more conventional claims of implicit constitutional authority. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at
18-19.
46. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (summarizing “withering criticism” of
Curtiss-Wright); see also RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 21-47 (1987)
(discussing whether states were independent sovereignties before the adoption of the Constitution); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 57-61 (1995) (criticizing the practice of
drawing legal support for foreign affairs from Curtiss-Wright); MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 14-15 (1990) (addressing implied congressional will); David M.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE
L.J. 467 (1946).
47. Curtiss-Wright was a nondelegation case. Because President Roosevelt’s proclamation
of an embargo was directly authorized by a joint resolution of Congress, there was no conflict
between presidential and congressional authority; likewise, because the company challenged a
federal criminal prosecution, there was no issue of the residual authority remaining with the
states. Accordingly, all the Court needed to conclude was that foreign affairs were different for
nondelegation purposes. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 20 n.**. The case has since been cited
extensively in support of construing executive authority liberally, especially as to statutory ques-
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The more general notion of federal exclusivity, however, has had epi48
sodic bite. In Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court considered an
Oregon statute conditioning inheritance by a nonresident alien upon
proof that U.S. citizens possessed a nondiscriminatory right of inheritance in the alien’s home country, that U.S. citizens had the right to
receive payments from the estates of persons dying in that country,
and that Oregon proceeds would not be confiscated by the foreign
government—a standard that barred a citizen of East Germany from
inheriting personal property.49 Eschewing the Curtiss-Wright theory
(and, indeed, any discernible theory at all), Justice Douglas wrote that
“the history and operation of this Oregon statute make clear that [it]
is an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”50 The Court
accordingly struck down the Oregon statute, notwithstanding the lack
of conflict with any demonstrable federal activity. To many, this was
the debut of the dormant federal foreign affairs power.51
Precisely what state activities Zschernig precludes is notoriously
unclear. The Court suggested at some points in Zschernig itself that
the gravamen of its complaint lay with Oregon’s arrogation of the

tions, see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981); KOH, supra note 46, at 93-95, 134-41, but
it has been of virtually no significance in aggregating federal power. But see Charles Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J.
1, 5 (1973) (arguing that while Curtiss-Wright is often dismissed as dicta, it continues to be available as precedent).
48. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
49. See id. at 430-32.
50. See id. at 432 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941)).
51. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 825 (“Zschernig is a unique case—the only one in which the
Supreme Court has clearly stated such a doctrine of ‘dormant’ foreign relations power.”); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625-30, 1649-58 (“Sabbatino and Zschernig were viewed
at the time of their announcement to mark a significant break with prior law.”); see also
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 162 (concluding, after describing general principle of foreign relations
preemption, that “[u]ntil 1968 there was no hint of such a principle”); id. at 163 (saying, of
Zschernig, that “[t]his was new constitutional doctrine”); Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller
and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT. L. 704, 704 (acquiescing in Bilder’s description); Hans A.
Linde, A New Foreign-Relations Restraint on American States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 594, 601-03
(1968) (describing Zschernig as “without precedent”); Maier, supra note 1, at 835-36 (describing
Sabbatino and Zschernig as novel applications of “a structural analysis to find that state authority may be found to be preempted even when there is no actual interference with the national
conduct of foreign affairs”). But see Harold G. Maier, Cooperative Federalism in International
Trade: Its Constitutional Parameters, 27 MERCER L. REV. 391, 403 (1976) (“Zschernig, however,
does not represent a new doctrine. In fact, it represents only a more explicit verbalization of an
approach to constitutional interpretaion [sic] in foreign affairs cases which has been implicit
and, sometimes, explicit for almost 200 years.”).
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52

authority to conduct foreign relations. For the most part, though, the
Court suggested that the state’s activities interfered with federal
power to conduct foreign relations simply because they had an undue
53
effect on foreign nations. Distinguishing Clark v. Allen, which upheld a California statute having only an “incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries,” Justice Douglas claimed that the Oregon statute
created more than a mere “diplomatic bagatelle” and had “great po54
tential for disruption or embarrassment,” such that it might “well
[have] adversely affect[ed] the power of the central government to
deal with those problems.”55 The type of “problems” at issue and
which branch of the central government retained responsibility were
not made clear. But the Court’s refusal to accept the executive
branch’s submission that Oregon’s policy did not interfere with for56
eign relations, coupled with the Court’s references to powers “en52. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437-38 (“As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that
foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the Federal Government, not for local probate
courts.”); see also id. at 439 (explaining that the purpose of one provision of the Oregon statute
“was to serve as ‘an inducement to foreign nations to so frame the inheritance laws of their respective countries in a manner which would insure to Oregonians the same opportunities to inherit and take personal property abroad that they enjoy in the state of Oregon.’” (quoting Closterman v. Schmidt, 332 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Or. 1958)); id. at 441 (highlighting the need to avoid
interfering with “the power of the central government to deal with [foreign relations]”); infra
text accompanying notes 84-90.
53. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). In Clark, the Supreme Court dismissed a facial challenge to a California reciprocal inheritance statute as “far-fetched,” considering the law to be among the many
state laws having “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries” that “none would
claim cross the forbidden line” protecting the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 517; see also
infra text accompanying notes 363-67 (discussing Clark). Only four of the eight Justices participating in Zschernig thought the Court’s results could be reconciled. Compare Zschernig, 389
U.S. at 433-35 (refusing the invitation to reexamine the Court’s ruling in Clark v. Allen), with id.
at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To the extent that Clark v. Allen is inconsistent with these
views, I would overrule that decision.” (citation omitted)), and id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“It seems to me impossible to distinguish the present case from Clark v. Allen in this respect in
any convincing way.”), and id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting) (indicating agreement with the relevant portion of Justice Harlan’s concurrence).
54. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435; see also id. at 436 (describing inquiries as entailing a “kind
of state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”).
55. Id. at 441; see also infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
56. Justice Stewart put the matter bluntly in his separate opinion:
The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, says that the Government does not “contend
that the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case
unduly interferes with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations.” But that is not
the point. We deal here with the basic allocation of power between the States and the
Nation. Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary from day to
day with the shifting winds at the State Department. Today, we are told, Oregon’s
statute does not conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may. But, however
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57

trust[ed] to the President and Congress,” suggests at a minimum that
the doctrine in question was not rooted in Article II.
Whatever the Court’s original intention, it has since neglected
58
Zschernig. Consequently, some believe that Zschernig is confined to
its facts, and only proscribes state-directed inquiries, particularly by
courts, into the nature or operation of foreign governments.59 If so,
why? Perhaps the Court felt that the states could be trusted to apply
60
the principle, or came to regard Zschernig as a period piece driven
by Cold War anxieties.61 Perhaps instead the Court wanted to continue to maintain the federal monopoly as a judicial rule, but decided
to emphasize instead the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and its
62
“one voice” component. If so, that decision may just as effectively
have sealed the federal monopoly’s doom.

that may be, the fact remains that the conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under
the Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the several
States.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the Solicitor General’s amicus
brief).
57. See supra text accompanying note 50.
58. As Frederic Kirgis recently observed, “[t]he Supreme Court has never squarely relied
on it in the thirty years it has been on the books.” Kirgis, supra note 51, at 705; see also infra text
accompanying notes 75-76 (discussing the effects of Barclays Bank).
59. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 825 n.27 (stating that later opinions suggest that Zschernig
can be “narrowly interpreted as proscribing only state or local statutes”); see also Kirgis, supra
note 51, at 706 (noting that “[t]his interpretation limits Zschernig to its facts”). The Restatement,
in contrast, suggests that Zschernig more broadly bars states “from ‘intruding’ on the exclusive
national authority in foreign affairs”—without describing what actions might intrude, or where
the exclusive national authority lies. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 402 reporter’s
note 5 (1987) (stating that an “exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe by states is governed by the
same principles whether the exercise of jurisdiction has international or inter-state implications.”).
60. After Zschernig, the Court summarily disposed of two cases, having been assured that
the state courts would themselves apply the decision. See Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398, 398 (1969)
(per curiam); id. at 398-99 (Douglas, J., concurring); Ioannou v. New York, 391 U.S. 604, 604-05
(1968) (per curiam); see also Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in
Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133, 141-45 (1971) (citing and analyzing lower-court cases involving state inheritance statutes); Wong, supra note 9, at 675-85 (same).
61. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 165 n.** (“One would be bold to predict that [Zschernig]
has a future life; might it remain on the Supreme Court’s pages, a relic of the Cold War?”); see
also id. at 165.
62. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979) (citing
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) and requiring that courts first inquire
whether a proposed tax on a foreign instrumentality prevents the federal government from
speaking with one voice).
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B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is hardly a promising
alternative to Zschernig.63 State laws touching on foreign commerce
may be found unconstitutional for reasons wholly familiar from the
64
interstate commerce context. Notwithstanding the similarity of the
constitutional text conferring authority over foreign and interstate
commerce,65 potential interference with foreign commerce must sur-

63. See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s ever-changing approach); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982) (promoting a new model for judicial
scrutiny grounded in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV); Paul E. McGreal, The
Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998).
64. Laws facially discriminating against foreign commerce are “virtually per se invalid.”
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); accord Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997); id. at 596 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996). But even facially discriminatory
measures may survive this “strictest scrutiny,” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979), if
they are not protectionist, see, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (defining “discrimination”
as “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter”). It is unclear whether discrimination against a particular foreign country’s commerce, as opposed to discrimination against all foreign commerce, is covered. See New
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-76 (1988); cf. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of
Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1992) (noting that, if a state tax law “does not favor business activity in the United States generally over business activity abroad,” “this would indeed
suggest that the statute does not discriminate against foreign commerce”). In Natsios, the First
Circuit assessed a less-direct form of foreign discrimination—by the state of Massachusetts
against all companies doing business in Burma (not just against Burmese companies)—in a
fashion indistinguishable from “one voice” analysis. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 67-68 (1st Cir.) (citing Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 194 (1983); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
Nondiscriminatory state measures may also be held unconstitutional if “the burden imposed on [foreign] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 571-72 (1996) (holding that a state can protect its own consumers but may not use punitive
damages to impose its own regulatory policies on other states); Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at
99; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989) (stating that the Commerce Clause
prohibits the application of a state statue to conduct that takes place “wholly outside of the
state’s borders” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982))); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986) (holding that a New
York law requiring wholesale alcohol prices in New York not to exceed the lowest prices
charged by sellers elsewhere unconstitutionally controlled liquor prices in other states). In Natsios, the First Circuit held that the same principle applied to attempts by states to exercise control outside the United States, though presumably the case could also have been made based on
the effects of the Massachusetts law elsewhere within the United States. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at
46.
65. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”).
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vive additional hurdles.66 States probably cannot defend themselves
on the ground that they are acting more as market participants than
67
as regulators. More important, at least until recently, state laws
66. See, e.g., Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79 (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against state taxation
of foreign commerce is broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce . . . in part
because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated.”); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980) (noting “that Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous
when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged”); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446 (“When construing Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”); id. at 448 (citations omitted):
Although the Constitution . . . grants Congress power to regulate commerce “with
foreign Nations” and “among the several States” in parallel phrases, there is evidence
that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the
greater. Cases of this Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other
nations, echo this distinction.
Accord Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888):
It may be argued . . . [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation
by Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign
nations more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which
concern the exterior relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative
authority of the nation.
67. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437-38 & n.9 (1980) (noting that “[w]e have no occasion to explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the ‘foreign commerce’ Clause,” but
that “scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged”); see
also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984) (plurality opinion)
(citing this reservation in Reeves); id. at 100 (concluding, after finding that a protectionist state
restriction did not qualify for the market-participant exception and that the restriction violated
ordinary Commerce Clause restrictions, that “[w]e are buttressed in our conclusion that the restriction is invalid by the fact that foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction”). Some of
the defense’s stated rationales—including “evenhandedness” relative to private market participant and the lower risk that states will favor their own citizens when buying and selling, see
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 223031 (1999)—may not apply as well in the foreign context. The erosion of the sovereignty basis for
the market participant defense may also make the Court reluctant to extend it further. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528. 531 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39 (citing sovereignty considerations); Japan Line, 441
U.S. at 449 n.13 (“In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court noted that Congress’ power
to regulate interstate commerce may be restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty. It has never been suggested that Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce could
be so limited.” (citation omitted)); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 822 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The absence of any articulated principle justifying this summary conclusion leads me to infer that the newly announced ‘state sovereignty’ doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery . . . is also the motivating rationale behind this holding.” (citing
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976))). But cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of
the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, U.
ILL. L. REV. 727, 727 (1995) (contending that Garcia supports, rather than undermines, the
market-participant exception). Even if there is a market-participant defense, matters going beyond “merely choosing [the state’s] trading partners” to “attempting to govern the private,
separate economic relationships of its trading partners,” may not qualify. South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95-96, 99 (1984) (plurality opinion). Finally, states would
obtain little comfort unless there were also a market-participant exception to Zschernig. See
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could violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause if they impaired
the federal government’s ability to “speak with one voice” in foreign
68
commercial matters. That test originated in the Import-Export
Clause, which involved a power that was both conferred on the federal government and expressly denied to the states.69 Perhaps because
the states are less clearly prohibited from regulating foreign commerce, the Court has cautioned that the merest deviation from national uniformity will not invalidate a state policy. Instead, the “one
voice” doctrine requires distinguishing matters “merely [having] foreign resonances” from those “implicat[ing] foreign affairs.”70 The
“one voice” test thus appears “functionally identical” to the dormant
foreign relations preemption indicated by Zschernig, because “[i]t requires courts to analyze the extent to which state law will ‘offend’ for71
eign nations and provoke foreign retaliation.”
The two doctrines are at least equally toothless. Japan Line remains the only Supreme Court case holding that a state policy vio72
lated the “one voice” requirement. In Barclays Bank, the Supreme
Court gave short shrift to a claim that California’s use of a “worldwide combined reporting” method to determine corporate franchise
tax owed by multinationals violated the “one voice” doctrine, notNatsios, 181 F.3d at 60 (rejecting such an exception). But see Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
742 F. Supp. 900, 903 (M.D. Pa.) (describing the incidental effect of a “Buy American” law as
owing to state “participation in the market place and not to any effort to control or regulate
commerce with foreign countries”), aff’d, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990); Amarel v. Connell, 202
Cal. App. 3d 137, 139 (1988) (distinguishing, for purposes of a Zschernig challenge, the “purely
commercial” nature of alleged below-cost sales by the defendant of milled California rice to the
Republic of Korea).
68. See generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320-30 (1994);
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
448-49, 451-53; Container Corp. of Amer. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 193 (1983).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” for certain general purposes, provided “Duties, Imposts and Exercises shall be uniform throughout the United States”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “[n]o
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,” save under narrowly defined circumstances). For brief accounts of the background, see,
for example, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (discussing the Framers’
three main concerns with committing this power to the federal government); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556-58 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same).
70. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194. The Court noted, however, that a state law might still
violate the “one voice” doctrine if it conflicted with a “clear federal directive,” apparently for
reasons familiar from the preemption context. Id.
71. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1637; see also Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties,
supra note 29, at 164-65 (criticizing the application of the “one voice” test in Barclays Bank on
the ground that the Court failed to take foreign repercussions into account).
72. See Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1997).
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withstanding the serious diplomatic controversy produced by Califor73
nia’s policy. Central to the Court’s reasoning was the idea that Congress—which, as the branch tasked with the “active” Commerce
Clause, was better placed than a court to determine what was compatible with the federal voice—had failed to override the California
tax in question.74 Some read Barclays Bank as the death-knell for the
“one voice” doctrine,75 and further consider the Court’s apparent disdain for Zschernig as definitively indicating that there was no longer
76
any general foreign affairs power. Particularly to those skeptical of
federal judicial power, Barclays Bank was not unlike a powerful gen73. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324. As the Court noted, 20 countries supported amici briefs
against California’s position. Then–Secretary of State George Schultz noted in 1986 that “[t]he
Department of State has received diplomatic notes complaining about state use of the worldwide unitary method of taxation from virtually every developed country in the world.” Id. at 324
n.22. Also, the British Parliament enacted legislation that would, if implemented, tax U.S. corporations. See id.
74. See id. at 320-31.
75. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1705 (“As for the one-voice test in
dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases: Barclays Bank effectively eliminated it.”). For
(slightly) milder assessments, see Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 447 (describing
Barclays Bank as having “largely repudiated the strong ‘one voice’ doctrine suggested in some
of [the Court’s] earlier foreign commerce clause decisions”); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra
note 29, at 164 (describing Barclays Bank as “a highly significant retreat” in the “one voice”
doctrine); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 45, 53 (1998) (claiming that Barclays Bank “all but ended the era of the Japan Line ‘one
voice’ doctrine”); Trachtman, supra note 31, at 356 (noting “a shift toward greater deference to
state law” in “one voice” doctrine and other aspects of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence). But see National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 68-69 (applying
“one voice” doctrine), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 560 n.189 (1999) (claiming that Barclays Bank “rejected
dormant preemption in the international taxation context”); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary
International Law, supra note 29, at 865 (citing Barclays Bank as one of the “reasons to think
that Zschernig’s dormant foreign relations preemption retains little, if any, validity”); Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 675, 678 n.23 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Abiding Relevance]
(claiming that Barclays Bank “may have eliminated the remnants of the dormant foreign affairs
preemption announced in [Zschernig]”); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1700 (“The
Court rejected the [plaintiffs’] challenge and in the process gutted the essential components of
the federal common law of foreign relations.”); Goldsmith, The New Formalism, supra note 29,
at 1426 (same); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1266 (“[T]he Barclays Bank decision
bodes ill for the ‘one-voice’ jurisprudence, most obviously with respect to the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause. But the same reasoning could be deployed to reverse the rules of Zschernig
and Sabbatino as well.”). But see Natsios, 181 F.3d at 49-59 (applying Zschernig to the Massachusetts Burma law); Kirgis, supra note 51, at 706-08 (considering the application of Zschernig
to the Breard controversy, and noting that “on the few occasions when the Supreme Court has
characterized its own holding in Zschernig, it has done so broadly” (citing Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.))).
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eral-purpose pesticide: whatever the foreign relations doctrines were,
it killed them.
C. Why the Dormant Doctrines Are . . . Dormant
If a legal doctrine’s success lies in its ability to resolve controversies in a predictable fashion, then neither the foreign affairs power
nor the “one voice” doctrine has been terribly successful. One problem is that neither has much support in the constitutional text. As
noted previously, the Constitution does not speak in general terms of
foreign relations or foreign affairs, nor does the mélange of more specific federal authority in Articles I and II necessarily exclude all state
77
authority. It is not unprecedented, of course, for the Supreme Court
78
to resolve issues of governmental authority extra-textually. But there
is a bias against creating extra-constitutional federal authority, particularly where parallel state authority is excluded.79 The dormant
doctrines also failed to articulate any coherent theory about which
part, if any, of the federal government possessed the requisite
authority. The result, in practice, is that the federal courts have been
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I (authorizing Congress to raise and support military forces, to
declare war by a majority vote of both houses, to borrow money, to regulate immigration and
naturalization, to punish piracy and felonies on the high seas, as well as offenses against the law
of nations, and to regulate tariffs and foreign commerce); id. art. II (assigning the President the
general “executive Power,” designating the President as Commander-in-Chief, assigning the
President at least part of the power to make treaties and to select “ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls,” authorizing the President to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers,” and generally entrusting the power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”). While these powers may authorize the federal government to accomplish whatever it
may need, they do not exhaust the potential for foreign relations. For example, as explored below, states enjoy the power of forming agreements or compacts with foreign powers. See infra
text accompanying notes 244-46, 333-58. As the First Circuit observed, “Zschernig makes clear
that, by necessary implication, the federal government’s foreign affairs power exceeds the power
expressly granted in the text of the Constitution . . . .” Natsios, 181 F.3d at 60.
78. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (explaining that “[b]ecause
there is no constitutional text speaking to th[e] precise question” of the constitutionality of federal commandeering of state officers, “the answer . . . must be sought in historical understanding
and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court”). See
generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1089 (1997) (defending the Rehnquist court’s reliance on penumbral readings).
79. As Louis Henkin noted of attempts to articulate a federal foreign affairs power: “That
the new United States government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not
intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records of the Convention, in the Federalist Papers, or
in contemporary debates.” HENKIN, supra note 1, at 19-20. Moreover, as Justice Scalia observed
in the dormant Commerce Clause context, the Framers not only knew how to deny authority to
the states, but also how to vest exclusive authority in the federal government, rather than leaving the matter for inference. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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left in charge—a result that many find less acceptable than enduring
the occasional excesses of state activity.
1. The Problematic Role of the Judiciary. For as many allusions
as one can find to the incompetence of states in the arena of foreign
80
affairs, there may be just as many adverting to the incompetence of
the judiciary. In Barclays Bank, for example, the Court declared, in a
coda to its “one voice” analysis, that “[t]he Constitution does ‘not
make the judiciary the overseer of our government,’” and concluded
that “we leave it to Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the
Nation’s—to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by
tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”81 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,82 a contemporary of Zschernig that likewise emphasized
the preemptive effect of federal law, the Court nonetheless stressed
80. See infra note 331 (collecting cases).
81. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330-31 (1994) (quoting Youngtown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); accord Bradley & Goldsmith, Abiding Relevance, supra note 76, at 678; Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 1, at 1643 (criticizing the “judicially enforceable, self-executing realm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs”); cf. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328 (“The judiciary is not
vested with power to decide ‘how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign
right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.’” (quoting Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 (justifying
the market participant doctrine on grounds that “the competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess. . . .[, which is] a task better suited for Congress than this Court.”). Prior to Barclays Bank,
at least, the Court also evidenced concern about encroaching on matters better entrusted to the
President. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948):
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret . . . . [T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They
are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 517
n.135 (1987) (noting application of Justice Jackson’s reasoning in a constitutional context). The
incompetence of courts in foreign affairs matters is not, of course, universally acknowledged.
See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 46-48, 126-55 (1992) (recognizing that “cases turning on
foreign facts present unusual evidenciary [sic] problems for judges” but arguing that problems of
competence and proof may be overcome); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1257 n.140
(arguing that whether a state measure is likely to disrupt national foreign policy is readily susceptible of judicial analysis).
82. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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the judiciary’s relative incompetence at foreign relations questions,
not to mention the risks that court judgments might “seriously
interfere with negotations being carried on by the Executive
83
Branch.”
The perils of involving courts in foreign affairs have been accentuated by the pivotal importance to the dormant doctrines of discerning the foreign effects of state activities. Even prior to Barclays
Bank, the Court indicated its reluctance to conduct such inquiries. As
previously discussed, Zschernig went the farthest in espousing an effects approach, but the Court may also have been emboldened in that
instance by the fact that its immediate rivals in foreign-effects
prophesizing were state probate courts, bodies equally ill schooled in
foreign relations (and likely more parochial to boot).
Zschernig and other cases otherwise struggled without success to
frame the issue of dormant foreign relations preemption in noneffects terms. Sometimes the test invoked highly legalistic considerations—such as whether the contested state policy set a precedent for
other polities to follow,84 conflicted with a legally cognizable national
policy,85 or simulated a federal function86—but invariably the test required distinguishing between permissible and impermissible impacts.
Alternatively, the Court tried to look for some threshold effect of the
83. Id. at 430-33 (explaining that judicial evaluation of exceptions to the “act of state” doctrine would interfere with policy judgments best conducted by the executive branch).
84. In Zschernig, for example, the Court seemed to be concerned with the prospect that
similar “foreign policy attitudes” by other jurisdictions would impair the ability of the federal
government to manage national affairs. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.8 (1968);
Kirgis, supra note 51, at 705 (noting multiple-jurisdiction emphasis). Japan Line, too, emphasized the risks presented by copycat laws, observing:
If other States follow California’s example (Oregon already has done so), foreignowned containers will be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending
on which American ports they enter. This result, obviously, would make “speaking
with one voice” impossible. California, by its unilateral act, cannot be permitted to
place these impediments before this Nation’s conduct of its foreign relations and its
foreign trade.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted).
85. The Court emphasized that the asymmetric taxation of Japanese cargo containers occurred in the shadow of a treaty evidencing “a national policy to remove impediments to the use
of containers as ‘instruments of international traffic.’” Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (quoting 19
U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1994)); see also id. at 452 (“California’s tax prevents this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign trade. The desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce is evidenced by the Customs Convention on Containers, which the United States and Japan have signed.”). While the Court also cited the risk of
retaliation against the entire nation, it did so in part because such retaliation appeared nearly
automatic. See id. at 453 & n.18 (acknowledging an “acute” risk of retaliation from Japan and a
German statutory mechanism for automatic reprisal).
86. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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state policy on foreign nations—usually, an affront that risked retalia87
tion —from which it could infer an effect on U.S. foreign relations.
Such an approach may have seemed more objective, and less intrusive, than asking the judiciary to determine whether a particular state
initiative was consistent with the nation’s foreign policy.88 But providing foreign nations with what amounts to a “heckler’s veto” over
state policies sits uncomfortably,89 particularly when the loudest
heckler is likely to be the very target of often-legitimate state con90
demnation.
The bottom line, almost unavoidably, was whether the state
regulations in question interfered with federal authority where it mat-

87. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (distinguishing matters merely having “foreign resonances” from those also “implicat[ing] foreign affairs”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964) (predicting that judicial
invalidity of foreign acts of state would “likely . . . give offense to the expropriating country”).
88. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 19, Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (Nos. 92-1384 & 92-1839) [hereinafter Barclays Bank Amicus Brief]:
The factual question whether a particular state tax will precipitate foreign complaints,
although far more expertly addressed by the political branches, is not wholly insusceptible of resolution through judicial proceedings. Questions concerning the federal
government’s proper response to such complaints, however, raise issues of foreign
policy falling entirely outside the judicial ken.
Thus, Zschernig identified the state law in question as having had more than an “incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries,” from which the Court concluded that there was a “direct
impact upon foreign relations” without attempting to determine whether Oregon was in sync
with an overall national policy. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441; see also id. at 440 (“It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way.” (emphasis added)). As if to contrast its approach, the Court noted that
Oregon probate courts had “launched inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations,” id. at 434, leading to “minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law, into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and into speculation
whether the fact that some received delivery of funds should not preclude wonderment as to
how many may have been denied the right to receive,” id. at 435 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
89. See Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 18 (“Threats of retaliation by foreign
governments, however, cannot be sufficient in themselves to render a state tax invalid. Such a
legal rule would in essence give foreign governments a ‘heckler’s veto’ over state taxing authorities.”).
90. In Zschernig, the Supreme Court cited Bulgaria’s protests to substantiate the claim that
foreign relations had been affected. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437 n.7. In Natsios, the First Circuit, citing that example, held that “foreign government views . . . are one factor to consider in
determining whether a law impermissibly interferes with the federal government’s foreign affairs powers” and noted the objections by fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”) members to the treatment of Burma—but did not, for whatever reason, note
Burma’s objections. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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91

tered, or genuinely “impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation’s
92
foreign policy.” Yet even in Zschernig, where the precedent of Clark
placed a premium on identifying distinctive foreign effects, the Court
failed to advert to any evidence that Oregon’s judicial practices were
of concern to anyone outside the state other than the plaintiffs.93
Small wonder, then, that the Barclays Bank Court came to stress that
even the most basic assessments of overseas effects were within the
competence of the federal political branches.94
2. The Problematic Role of the Political Branches. Given these
considerations, it may seem that the better part of valor would have
been to defer to the coordinate branches, particularly where the
inquiry focused on the consistency of states with the federal
government’s “voice.” Indeed, the federal government’s position was
95
sometimes portrayed as dispositive. But the Court relied on political
91. The Japan Line Court, for example, claimed the objective of preserving “federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential,” but it quickly turned its inquiry to the
foreign impacts. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1976). Similarly,
in Container Corp., the Court explained that “if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but
does not implicate foreign affairs,” it will not violate the “one voice” doctrine and that “a state
tax at variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it . . . implicates foreign
policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government.” Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
As became clear in Barclays Bank, the Court had no preordained notion of what matters “must
be left to the Federal Government.”
92. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440; see also Ramsey, supra note 29, at 361 (concluding, after
reviewing case law, that “the momentum in the lower courts seems to be toward a reading that
looks broadly to the degree of state ‘interference’ or ‘impairment,’ in keeping with the broad
language of the foundational Supreme Court cases and contrary to some commentary’s attempt
to limit Zschernig to its facts”).
93. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (asserting that Oregon’s statute had a “direct impact
upon foreign relations” and speculating that “it may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems”). As Justice Harlan argued in his concurring
opinion, the majority’s result was “based almost entirely on speculation”: “[T]he Court does not
mention, nor does the record reveal, any instance in which such an occurrence has been the occasion for a diplomatic protest, or, indeed, has had any foreign relations consequence whatsoever.” Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing representations
by the U.S. government as to the lack of consequences). Justice Harlan noted the majority’s citation of a complaint by Bulgaria, but he attributed the complaint to the “very existence of state
statutes which result in the denial of inheritance of inheritance rights to Bulgarians,” rather than
to inflammatory judicial opinions. Id. at 460 n.27 (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, Bulgaria’s
complaint as excerpted indicated little more than that the denial of proceeds was ill received.
See id. at 437 n.7.
94. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1994).
95. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (construing the “one voice” analysis in Itel Containers as giving to the executive branch “the power to determine the constitutionality of a state
law”); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(comparing the majority opinion to Japan Line and concluding that “it thus appears that a ruling

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

2000]

09/21/00 12:58 PM

NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM

1155

branch views almost solely to buttress findings that state measures
were not problematic. Where the Court struck down state laws as
unconstitutional, it did so with little regard to the expert opinion of
the executive branch: the State Department’s input was considered
96
irrelevant in Zschernig, and it was consulted solely on the operation
of foreign law in Japan Line.97 Rejecting the “one voice” claim in
Container Corp. of American v. Franchise Tax Board,98 on the other
hand, the Court held up the executive branch’s failure to file in
opposition to the California tax as proof that U.S. foreign policy “is
99
not seriously threatened.” Informal congressional input has been
treated similarly: acquiescence has been read not merely as permitting
state action (and, thereby, abnegating the need for any enhanced
100
but as indicating that
dormant Commerce Clause analysis),
Congress found no fault with, or approved of, the state policy in

on the constitutionality of a state law ultimately turns on the position of the Executive Branch”);
Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at 160 (speculating that a Baltimore anti-apartheid ordinance
“surely” would have been found to disrupt foreign relations “had the Justice Department joined
the case”).
96. See supra text accompanying note 56.
97. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 n.17 (1976) (citing attestations by the Solicitor General and the State Department that Japan taxed containers at full
value, thereby giving rise to double taxation).
98. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 195-96 (1983) (noting
that “unlike Japan Line, the Executive Branch has decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in
opposition to the state tax. The lack of such a submission is by no means dispositive.”).
99. Id. at 196; see also Opusunju v. Giuliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting,
in rejecting a Zschernig-based challenge to a decision by the city of New York to rename a city
street near the Nigerian consulate after a jailed Nigerian rebel, that the “State Department has
claimed no interference by New York City with foreign policy, and has elected not to participate
in this matter”). In distinguishing Japan Line on these grounds, Container Corp. plainly attributed greater significance to the executive branch’s submission in the former case than had the
original decision. The Solicitor General had submitted pertinent views in another case before
the Court in the very same Term as Container Corp., but the majority discounted that. Compare
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195 n.33 (noting the absence of any indication that the Solicitor
General intended a previous memorandum to govern Container Corp.), with id. at 204 (Powell,
J., dissenting) (concluding that absent any indication to the contrary, views submitted in connection with another case may be pertinent).
100. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323. The Court found the premises of both Wardair
Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), and Container Corp. to be that
Congress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not “impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential”[;]. . . it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that
discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete
Auto inspection.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448)).
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101
question. The United States, it would appear, is just another
heckler, conspicuous mainly when silent.
This asymmetric treatment of political branch input makes perfect sense given the doctrinal bases for the dormant federal monopoly. No state policy can really prevent the federal government from
speaking with one voice; Congress, should it so choose, can always
102
preempt the offending state policy. The real questions, instead, are
whether the federal government is entitled to maintain the nation’s
voice by lesser means—speaking at a softer volume, as it were—and
how interference with that authority can possibly be evidenced.103 For
Congress, the issue should never arise, since it speaks preemptively or
not at all.104 Treating nonauthoritative expression (for example, amici
briefs, committee reports, debates, and failed legislation) as preemptive would not only raise federalism problems, but would also exceed
congressional authority under Article I.105 Such concerns are not present, however, if the same means of expression are read merely to relieve states from burdens imposed by the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.106

101. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 326 (citing the history of Senate action as “reinforc[ing]
our conclusion that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined
reporting method”); id. at 327 (citing “indicia of Congress’ willingness to tolerate States’ worldwide combined reporting mandates”); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75
(1993) (citing an amicus brief by the United States and congressional acquiescence as indicating
that “[t]o the extent Itel is arguing that taxes like Tennessee’s engender foreign policy problems,
the United States disagrees”); Wardair Canada, 477 U.S. at 12 (“It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Government has
acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has
elected to follow.”); cf. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir.)
(citing divergence between Massachusetts law and federal policy as one factor in Zschernig
analysis), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
102. See Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 80-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. See Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 17 n.12 (“The danger, more precisely
stated, is that a State’s taxing scheme may prevent the federal government from implementing
its policies by methods other than statutes or treaties. That danger is particularly acute in the
realm of foreign relations, where important international understandings may for various reasons be less formalized.”).
104. See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 334 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT] (“[T]he Constitution makes clear that Congress can act only by the affirmative vote of both Houses.”).
105. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (holding that the “one-House veto” was
an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to usurp Article I’s “explicit and ambiguous provisions” relating to the legislative process).
106. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323-28 (construing congressional silence as sufficient to
resolve a “one voice” claim, whether or not it would be sufficient to satisfy fully other standards
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The executive branch is nominally more versatile in expressing
federal policy, but its authority for interfering with state activities is
less clear. As long as federal authority is rooted in the Foreign Commerce Clause, the President has precious little to say about it: absent
congressional delegation, any residual authority not exercised by
Congress or reserved to its use falls to the states, not to the executive
107
branch. The President has some rather hazy independent constitutional authority that, when definitively exercised, may preempt incon108
sistent state law. But this authority probably lacks the force of legimposed by the dormant Commerce Clause); id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (construing the
majority’s satisfaction with legislative inaction as similar to restrictive view of dormant Commerce Clause); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
614-15 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that existing dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence relies in part on the theory that congressional silence connotes preemption of state legislation, a proposition “rejected by this Court in virtually every analogous area of the law”). But
see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that, absent “express congressional authorization,” multiple taxation of foreign corporations violates the Foreign Commerce Clause).
107. See, e.g., Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The President]
is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he
nor we were to make that decision, but only Congress.”); see also Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990):
And while it is possible that sub-national government procurement restrictions may
become a topic of intense international scrutiny, and a target in international trade
negotiations, that possibility alone cannot justify this court’s invalidation of the
Commonwealth’s statute. This is especially true when Congress has recently directed
its attention to such restrictions and has taken no steps to preempt them through federal legislation. Indeed, in light of Congress’ evident concern with achieving freer
trade on a reciprocal basis, to strike Pennsylvania’s statute would amount to a judicial
redirection of established foreign trade policy—a quite inappropriate exercise of the
judicial power.
108. Nonplenary authority, at least, may have any of several bases. One is the “executive
Power.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926)
(citing “executive power” as its basis for permitting the President to remove the postmaster,
notwithstanding the statute), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (interpreting the Executive Power Clause as “an allocation to
the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated”). A second is the President’s duty
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (construing the Take Care clause to extend to the enforcement of “the
rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations,
and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution”). A
third is the unenumerated foreign affairs power. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (citing the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,”
together with congressional delegation, as a basis for presidential authority). Presidential
authority in this realm is commonly teased together from these or other specific constitutional
grants, or otherwise implied, but has never been the model of consistency or influence. See
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 40:
[T]he constitutional lawyer will have the hard choice between the theory that the
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islation, and so may be regarded as inferior to expressions of congres109
sional sentiment. Less definitive pronouncements, like executive
conduct of foreign affairs, undefined, was indeed “granted in bulk” to the President as
executive power, and the need to scrounge among, and stretch, spare constitutional
clauses to eke out full powers which the President has in fact commanded and many
of which he was probably intended to have.
See also id. at 13-62 (discussing the potential bases for presidential authority).
One recurring issue is whether independent executive authority has the same domestic legal effect as a formal preemptive enactment. See id. at 54 (“No one has suggested that under the
President’s ‘plenary’ foreign affairs power he can, by executive act or order, enact law directly
regulating persons or property in the United States.”); Ramsey, supra note 29, at 390-432 (considering, and rejecting, constitutional bases for executive preemption). Where the Court has
conceded such effect, it is often hard to determine whether the President’s authority was genuinely independent of Congress. Compare, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942)
(describing the executive’s “[p]ower to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement
of claims” as “a modest implied power of the President” from his authority as the “sole organ”),
and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (same), with Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 678-80 (1981) (requiring implicit congressional approval as a “crucial” element for
upholding executive action); cf. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations,
and the States, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 681-82 (1998) [hereinafter Henkin, Provisional Measures]
(construing Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 579 (1943), and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324
U.S. 30, 38 (1945), as indicating that “[t]he states are bound by U.S. foreign policy decisions
even if they do not take any formal form” and that such decisions have preemptive effect in
both federal and state courts); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty
Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 134, 145-59 (1998) [hereinafter Ramsey, Executive Agreements] (discussing claims settlement case law); Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement
Power: Constitutional Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 15763 (1985) (same). The same may be said of the President’s authority to negotiate foreign agreements outside the scope of the treaty power. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679-80 (relying, in
addition, on congressional approval to support presidential action); Pink, 315 U.S. at 222 (recognizing that the judiciary should not review the propriety of the President’s conduct of foreign
relations); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32 (holding that the President’s actions resulting in the recognition of the Soviet government did not require the advice and consent of the Senate);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 303(4) (“[T]he President, on his own authority, may
make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution.”); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 229 (citing, as agreements the President
can conclude “on his own authority,” “those related to establishing and maintaining diplomatic
relations, agreements settling international claims, and military agreements within the Presidential authority as Commander in Chief,” and “doubtless many other ‘sole’ agreements” are acceptable, “but which they are is hardly agreed”). But cf. Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra,
at 236-37 (arguing that original understanding would have denied any domestic effect to sole
executive agreements).
109. Consistent with the principle that executive authority is most precarious where it is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38
(Jackson, J., concurring), lower courts have held that executive agreements do not have the capacity to override congressional statutes enacted under the explicit authority of the Foreign
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir.
1953), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
43, § 303 cmt. j (explaining that, while sole executive agreements preempt state law, “[t]heir
status in relation to earlier Congressional legislation has not been authoritatively determined”);
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 66-68 (Comm.
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suggestions, are of even more controversial weight, and in the absence of congressional authorization might be regarded as attempts to
110
usurp either congressional or judicial authority.
The treatment of executive branch views in Barclays Bank is illuminating. The United States’ position on the legality of California’s
method of taxation was not the model of constancy. After steadily
supporting the taxpayers, the Justice Department changed its view at
the eleventh hour to oppose refunds, on the ground that California’s
tax had not conflicted with U.S. foreign economic policy during the
111
tax years in question. The Solicitor General’s brief did not, accordingly, emphasize the domestic and international fracas the tax had engendered,112 but nevertheless argued carefully for the relevance of executive branch views. As the brief explained, federal foreign policy “is
especially likely to take the form of informal agreements, understandings, long-term strategies, etc., that have not been codified in a
113
statute or treaty,” but which are nonetheless vital to the President’s
ability to deal effectively with foreign governments.114 At the same
time, the mere existence of foreign complaints should not be taken to
mean—in the absence of authoritative executive action—that a state
policy violates the Constitution.115 Absent a controlling treaty or statPrint. 1993) [hereinafter CRS] (discussing cases in which courts have voided sole executive
agreements that were incompatible with federal laws); 1 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1981-1988, § 5, at 1296-311 (Marian Nash Leich
ed., 1994) (same).
110. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1708-10 (proposing that the courts
should “create” foreign relations law only when the executive suggests). For representative
criticisms, see Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A
Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. REV. 1101, 1102-04 (1960) (arguing that courts
should not abdicate authority to the executive branch automatically, instead employing a
“pragmatic” technique to determine when to adjudicate foreign relations claims); John Norton
Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 277,
296-302 (1962) (concluding that courts should not always defer to executive determinations on
matters of international law).
111. For the United States’ account of its litigating position, see Barclays Bank Amicus
Brief, supra note 88, at 1-14.
112. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 342 n.22, 328 n.30 (1994);
supra text accompanying note 73.
113. Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 16.
114. See id. at 17. As the brief later put it, “[t]he danger of improper encroachment on the
President’s conduct of foreign affairs, as noted above, is not limited to the situation where a
State’s method of taxation conflicts with an international understanding agreed to by the President or otherwise undermines the nation’s international trade policies.” Id. at 20.
115. As the brief explained:
Executive power is also improperly diminished when a court strikes down a state law
on the basis of a foreign complaint that the President has determined to resist. . . . The
executive branch must be free in addition to adopt a middle ground: to acknowledge
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ute, the brief argued, “the courts must respect the judgments of the
President regarding matters of foreign policy both where the President has determined that state compliance with an international norm
is essential and where he has determined that foreign governments
116
should not be allowed to dictate the practices of the States.”
The Court plainly rejected this approach. One reason may have
been the difficulty in identifying executive branch policy. The government’s position in Barclays Bank suggested that even determining
whether a national policy exists is a matter of art, one that might require deferring to executive branch policy developed in the throes of
litigation—something the Solicitor General acknowledged to be
problematic, as if the shifts in the Barclays litigation itself were not
117
proof enough. And surely broadcasting U.S. negotiating positions,
and executive branch views on the complaints of foreign countries,
would scarcely be conducive to diplomacy.
The more intractable difficulty was the absence of a constitutional basis for deferring to the executive branch. California, the putative beneficiary of the executive’s revised views, argued that any
authority vested in the President was subsumed, in effect, by the dor118
mant Foreign Commerce Clause. The Court agreed. Foreign commerce, in the Court’s view, was entrusted to Congress, and if Conthe validity of foreign concerns, and to attempt to persuade state officials to respond
thereto, without insisting upon the States’ immediate conformity with the federal
norm. The courts therefore should not lightly infer a Foreign Commerce Clause violation from the mere fact that executive branch officials have attempted to persuade
state authorities to alter their policies. Such an approach not only risks undue impairment of legitimate state prerogatives; it may also reduce presidential power by
diminishing the executive’s ability to employ “jawboning” and informal negotiation
without invoking the specter of a constitutional confrontation.
Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 19 (“[T]he Court must ascertain the contours of
federal policies not codified in any statute or treaty; and in that process the statements of executive branch officials are entitled to substantial evidentiary weight.”).
117. See id. at 21.
118. According to California, this argument was
consistent with the rule that the Congress and the President share authority over foreign affairs. If a state tax affecting foreign commerce is valid either by way of congressional authorization or under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause tests
(which include the balancing of foreign policy considerations), it cannot be unconstitutional on the basis of infringement upon foreign affairs.
Brief for Respondent at 46-47, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)
(No. 92-1384) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Barclays Respondent’s Brief]. “[C]onstru[ing] Executive Branch foreign policy aspirations as authoritative federal policy,” California argued,
would disable Congress and the Constitution’s requirement that treaties become law only upon
Senate ratification. Id. at 47. Any other indication from the executive branch would merely be
“thwarted aspirations.” Id.
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gress had tolerated the state’s conduct, “Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot
render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally
119
condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.”
Given its premises, the Court’s conclusions seem perfectly valid.
If the federal government’s powers derive from an Article I clause, it
is hard to perceive why the President’s quasi-evidentiary submissions
should determine whether a foreign or state government should prevail. The executive’s assumption of such authority would seem to be
an affront not only to the states, but also to Congress. However, if
those premises are invalid, perhaps the President’s authority does not
live or die with the “one voice” test. Another possible foundation—
120
the Article II treaty power—has routinely been neglected.
119. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330; see also id. at 328-29 (distinguishing between the “one
voice” of the “Federal Government” and “[t]he Executive statements to which Colgate refers”);
id. at 329-30 (describing cited executive branch actions as “merely precatory”). At oral argument, a member of the Court responded to the suggestion that the executive branch evidenced
federal policy by noting that foreign commerce “is in fact entrusted to Congress.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 12, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (Nos. 921384 & 92-1839); see also id. at 18 (quoting one Justice as replying to the originalist argument
that the President required the ability to constrain states in order credibly to bargain for advantages for U.S. business by stating, “I thought Mr. Hamilton was arguing that in support of giving
Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce . . . .”).
Harold Koh, responding to arguments that Barclays Bank spelled the end to the federal
foreign affairs monopoly, claims that the decision “reveals less about the Supreme Court’s view
of federalism than about the Court’s traditional judicial deference to the executive branch in
foreign affairs.” Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary: Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1848 (1998); see also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 58 n.13 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). While Barclays Bank’s holding may
indeed be exaggerated, see infra text accompanying note 523, it is hard to conclude that the
Court was deferring to the executive branch. The Court’s explanation that the judiciary should
be loathe to intervene in matters “‘more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress’”
absent proof of a serious threat, see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 327 (quoting Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983)), does not say how such a threat might be determined. Indeed, the Court expressly disregarded the Solicitor General’s views in upholding the
state tax, see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330 n.32, and entertained no opinion concerning his
submission that courts must respect “‘the judgments of the President regarding matters of foreign policy,’” Koh, supra, at 1849 (quoting Barclays Respondent’s Brief, supra note 118, at 20).
120. Michael Ramsey’s recent article is somewhat of an exception. Professor Ramsey also
finds the Article I case for dormant foreign relations preemption wanting, see Ramsey, supra
note 29, at 369-90, prompting him to consider—and ultimately reject—the Executive Power
Clause as an alternative basis. See id. at 391-432. Although he notes the potential preemptive
effect of the Treaty Clause, it is primarily as a standard against which broader theories might be
measured and ultimately dismissed. See, e.g., id. at 384 n.157 (citing evidence of the original understanding); id. at 393-94 & n.192 (citing textual evidence and case law); id. at 406-07 (citing
textual evidence); id. at 404-06 (arguing that dormant foreign relations preemption is contraindicated by Article VI supremacy of treaties). Otherwise, he appears to view the Executive
Power Clause as the only legitimate basis for any substantial preclusion of state foreign relations
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II. THE DORMANT TREATY POWER
The seemingly simple vesting of the “Power . . . to make Treaties” raises more than its share of intractable constitutional questions.
Fortunately for present purposes, the dormant treaty power rests on
several discrete propositions. The first concerns the scope of the
President’s power to negotiate. At least in the absence of Senate instruction, the President’s negotiating authority is substantive, not
merely communicative, and is coextensive with the federal government’s authority. This is obviously so in practice. Contrary readings of
the original understanding begrudge the President such a role largely
because they suppose that the horizontal distribution of authority was
zero-sum. In fact, the President’s role was introduced in the expectation that his service as the Senate’s surrogate would in some respects
augment, rather than diminish, legislative authority, by permitting the
Senate to change the U.S. course and to decline to endorse flawed
treaties. Involving the President would also advance extrinsic interests
by facilitating the negotiation of superior treaties and checking inferior ones.
The President’s constitutional prerogative to forge American
foreign relations, and to stymie them, is accordingly of great significance for construing the authority left to the states in the absence of a
treaty or statute. Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution demonstrated hostility toward state activities tending to interfere with the dormant treaty power. Here, the Framers were quite
clear in supposing that the vertical distribution of authority was zerosum, and that permitting the states to simulate the international bargaining powers of the national government would disserve the interests of all concerned. The rationale and scope of any broader federal
monopoly was occasionally obscured, but prior to the Supreme
Court’s inconsistent decisions in Clark and Zschernig, both political
practice and case law clearly proscribed state activities that amounted
to bargaining with foreign powers.
A. The President’s Treaty Power
Contemporary disputes over the horizontal allocation of treaty

activities. See id. at 391 (concluding that “the appropriate way to view the exclusion of states
from interference in foreign policy is as a consequence of the executive power in foreign affairs,
and that a constitutional exclusion of the states can be defended—if at all—only on this
ground.”).
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powers—for example, over alternatives to treaties and executive
122
treaty reinterpretation —typically concern the end-game of agreements, rather than how they are made. Aside from a few pitched battles dully familiar to constitutional scholars,123 negotiating treaties has
been relatively pacific. Practice has consistently and unswervingly accorded the President primary and complete (if not necessarily ple124
nary) authority over treaty negotiation. At the same time, the Sen121. The controversy appeared to be resolved by mid-century, before its revival among academics—but not politicians—during the debates over NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
801, 820-32 (1995) (defending congressional-executive agreements), with Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1228-35 (1995) (suggesting alternatives to treaty-making are
unconstitutional).
122. Compare, e.g., David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1396-401 (1989) (attacking the executive power to reinterpret treaties), with Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate’s Pie-in-the-Sky
Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1481,
1483-92 (1989) (defending same).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 214 (discussing the treaty with the Creek Indians),
220 (discussing the neutrality proclamation of 1793), 221 (discussing the Jonathan Robbins incident).
124. The consistency of this view over time bears emphasis. See, e.g., Howard R. Sklamberg,
The Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18
MICH. J. INT’L L. 445, 474 (1997) (“Nowadays, the Senate plays no part in treaty-making other
than to consider agreements that the President has already signed.”); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The President alone has the authority to negotiate treaties with foreign countries.”); CRS, supra note 109, at 69 (1993) (“[T]he actual negotiation of
treaties and other international agreements is widely recognized as being within the power of
the President.”); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 579 (1991) (“Since
the founding of the republic, it has been accepted practice that the President initiates and conducts the negotiation of treaties, bringing a signed or otherwise final draft to the Senate for its
advice and consent.”); GLENNON, supra note 46, at 164 (1990) (“Participation by the Senate (or
Congress) in certain [aspects of the treaty-making] process is not constitutionally permitted. The
core presidential power, perhaps, is negotiation.” (citations omitted)); CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 214 (1984) (“[T]here is no more securely established principle of
Constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary
in its dealings with other nations.”); Aris Gloves v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1393 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (“The making of treaties is a power delegated to the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The negotiation of treaties is a matter solely within the discretion of the
President.”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pt. 1), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 203
(1945) (“No one today doubts that the President has complete control of the actual conduct of
negotiations in the making of all international agreements or that he is the appropriate authority
to make final utterance of an agreement as the international obligation of the United States.”);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[The President] alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.”); ALBERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 293
(1908) (“Throughout the whole history of the country the share of the Senate in treaties has
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ate has set negotiating objectives and inserted itself or its members
into negotiations without provoking substantial debate over its pre125
rogatives.
The difficult question is whether these practices are simply the
bad habits of institutions more attuned to politics than to the Constitution, each secure in the knowledge that it has a further opportunity
126
to veto any errant treaty that may result. Some think that the President has compromised his authority by permitting Senate intervention.127 Many more feel that practice deviates from the original underconsisted in ratifying treaties already negotiated.”); WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1908):
The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction
whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely. . . . [H]e may guide every
step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be
made, if the faith and prestige of the government are to be maintained.
Accord 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 739, at 179 (1906)
(“The negotiation and modification of treaties is a prerogative of the Executive, with which the
courts cannot interfere.”); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 139, at 75 (2d ed. 1887) (“The negotiation and modification of treaties is
a prerogative of the Executive, with which the courts cannot interfere.”); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1517, at 370 (1833):
The question was, whether the agency of the Senate was admissible previous to the
negotiation, . . . or was limited to the exercise of the power of advise and consent, after the treaty was formed . . . . The practical exposition . . . which seems to have occurred in President Washington’s administration, was, that the option belonged to the
executive to adopt either mode . . . .
Accord Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States,
One Hundred Fifth Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 104-272, § 554, at 298-99 (2d Sess. 1997) (“By the
Constitution of the United States this department of legislation is confined to two branches only
of the ordinary legislature—the President originating and the Senate having a negative. . . .
[T]he negotiations are carried on by the Executive alone . . . .”); Jefferson’s Opinion on the
Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 The Papers
Of Thomas Jefferson, 1789-1790, at 379 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961) (“The transaction of
business with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of that department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are
to be construed strictly.”).
125. For a good discussion of such initiatives, see CRS, supra note 109, at 69-81 (considering
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements).
126. See, e.g., PUTNEY, supra note 124, at 292 (“The system of checks and balances, so often
referred to, hinders the establishment of a vigorous foreign policy.”); cf. Dennis J. Mahoney,
Advice and Consent, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that the present practices of consulting influential Senators,
party leaders, and prominent committee members “are better understood as political devices to
improve the chances of obtaining consent than as deference to the constitutional mandate to
obtain advice”).
127. Among leading contemporary authorities, Phillip Trimble seems to fall within this category. See Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 756
(1989) (“Congress and individual members have induced the Executive to advance claims of
present positions of particular interest to the member.”); accord Phillip R. Trimble & Alexander
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standing of the President as merely an agent—the nation’s negotiator
and “sole organ of foreign relations,” perhaps, but only in the sense of
128
relaying the Senate’s will to foreign countries. Permitting the President to determine the message, in this view, is more in the nature of a
lapse than an entitlement.
The original understanding, and the nation’s early practices, are
certainly more equivocal than the settled routines of today. And neither provides clear answers to the issues that might be raised by a
death match over constitutional authority—were the President, for
example, to flout clear negotiating instructions from the Senate. But if
we focus on the scope of presidential authority in the absence of such
a struggle, the original understanding of the treaty power is quite in
keeping with modern practice. The best evidence indicates that where
the Senate’s power to involve itself in treaty preliminaries (whatever
that power’s potential scope) lay unexercised, the President was to
have full authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States, including complete latitude either to conduct and conclude negotiations
or to avoid them altogether.
The federal separation of powers under the Treaty Clause may at
first seem unrelated to the proper role of the states in foreign affairs.
But understanding what amounts to the President’s dormant authority to control the negotiation of treaties is indispensable, not only to
understanding where Zschernig and Barclays Bank erred, but also to
articulating the constitutional basis for withholding from the states
authority left unexercised by Congress.
1. Text and Structure. As indicated above, the Treaty Clause
does not assign clear roles to the President or to the Senate, leaving
the President’s authority in the absence of Senate instruction rather
129
unclear. The design of the two branches seems to give the President
W. Koff, All Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 55, 58 (1998) (noting that members of Congress can have a “practical impact” on foreign
policymaking by the executive).
128. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1471-72 nn.2-3 (1999) [hereinafter Powell, The
Founders] (listing authorities subscribing to the “congressional-primacy” theory of the foreign
affairs power).
129. That the Treaty Clause resides in Article II says nothing about the nature of the
authority vested in the President, nor does it suggest that some aspect of that power is his alone.
Compare Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (concluding,
from the location of the Treaty Clause, that “[i]t is the President as Chief Executive who is given
the constitutional authority to enter into a treaty”), vacated, 444 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1979), with
Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1
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decided advantages in initiating negotiations, but the Framers
scarcely anticipated the modern presidency, and may equally have
had a different understanding of the Senate’s power to provide
131
“advice” than we do today.
Indeed, Arthur Bestor’s leading studies of the original understanding of the Treaty Clause concluded that Senate advice was a pre132
requisite for presidential action. In his view, the Senate was obliged
PERSP. IN AM. HIST. (n.s.) 233, 278-79 (1984) (concluding that the “placement of the treaty
clause within Article II was an act with editorial significance, not an editorial quirk,” but noting
that the precise significance is elusive), and Sklamberg, supra note 124, at 457 (suggesting that
the location of the Treaty Clause is inconsistent with strong claims of Senate dominance, but
noting that the veto power is located in Article I).
The text permits various means of reconciling the power to “make” treaties and the Senate’s prerogative to render “advice and consent.” Perhaps the President is empowered to do
everything, and the Senate is entitled only to react to a fully negotiated treaty. (Although such
an interpretation tends to eliminate the function of “advice.”) Perhaps, as is often casually asserted, the treaty power is shared in every respect. (But this simply resigns to Corwin’s “struggle,” and assumes no attempt to differentiate the roles of very different institutions.) Finally, it
is possible, though uncommon, to argue that the presidential role is separable but wholly modest: the power to “make” treaties could mean just the power to ratify, following Senate consent.
See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 41 (1988)
(“‘Make,’ however, might have signified merely that no treaty had been executed until signed by
the President.”). If so, however, the means by which treaties are “made” in ordinary parlance is
left mysterious, as are the matters on which the Senate provides “advice.”
130. See, e.g., HENRY CABOT LODGE, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate, in A
FIGHTING FRIGATE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 219, 232 (1902) (“The Senate . . .
cannot in the nature of things initiate a negotiation with another nation, for they have no
authority to appoint or to receive ambassadors or ministers.”); TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-4, at 219
(“[T]he Constitution plainly grants the President the initiative in matters directly involved in the
conduct of diplomatic and military affairs.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292
(1988) (“Congress is poorly structured for initiative and leadership . . . . The Presidency, in contrast, is ideally structured for the receipt and exercise of power . . . .”).
131. Compare Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for
Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (1992) (defining “advice” in
purely contemporary terms), with Sklamberg, supra note 124, at 448 (criticizing Reynolds’s approach).
132. See Arthur Bestor, “Advice” from the Very Beginning, “Consent” When the End is
Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 718, 725-27 (1989) [hereinafter Bestor, Advice]; Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original
Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-17
(1979) [hereinafter Bestor, Respective Roles]; Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON
HALL L. REV. 527, 534-41 (1974) [hereinafter Bestor, Separation of Powers]. Bruce Ackerman
and David Golove consider Bestor’s writings, with Rakove’s, to be “[t]he best modern account[]
of the Founders’ deliberations on treaty-making.” Ackerman & Golove, supra note 121, at 809
n.21. And Rakove characterizes Bestor’s as “[t]he most careful analysis of the evolution of the
treaty clause.” Rakove, supra note 129, at 235 n.5; see also Charles A. Lofgren, War Powers,
Treaties, and the Constitution [hereinafter Lofgren, War Powers], in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 242, 254 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds.,
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to determine “the policy to be pursued in a treaty negotiation” and to
“formally approv[e] the diplomatic instructions embodying this policy,” while the President was to seek advice and to justify any deviations in terms of “some more fundamental aim of the agreed-upon
133
policy.” “Advice” thus meant permission, making the Senate an indispensable participant in the negotiation of treaties.134 Were this view
correct, the President’s function under the dormant treaty power
would seem just as meager as under the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.
The permission hypothesis, however, is hardly dictated by the
text. Nothing in the term “advice” specifies the timing of Senate
counsel. It might, as subsequent practice suggested, relate to the postnegotiation phase, perhaps including such authoritative actions as at135
taching reservations, amendments, or demands for renegotiation.
1987) (describing Bestor as “a most careful student of the subject”).
133. Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 112; see also Bestor, Advice, supra note 132,
at 726:
[T]he phrase ‘by and with the advice and consent of the Senate’ constituted a requirement that in performing the executive segment of the task of conducting foreign
relations, the President is to seek the formal advice of the Senate . . . concerning the
policy to be pursued and the ends to be sought.
Accord Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 540-41:
[T]he self-evident meaning of the treaty clause is that the Senate is to reach through
discussion a consensus as to the policy to be embodied in a projected treaty; that the
President, acting through the nation’s diplomatic agents, is to take charge of negotiations designed to realize that policy; and that when an international agreement is negotiated (with concessions necessarily given and received), the Senate is to decide
whether its final terms are acceptable.
134. Bestor is not alone in this view, but he is its most thorough proponent. See, e.g., LOUIS
HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50 (1990) (“The framers
had probably intended that the President and a small Senate would deliberate together, prior to
and during negotiations, leading to treaties acceptable to both.”); TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-4, at
221 (citing the requirement of Senate advice and consent as an example of where “the Constitution’s text . . . expressly forecloses unilateral presidential conduct of foreign policy.”); Richard
E. Webb, Treaty-Making and the President’s Obligation to Seek the Advice and Consent of the
Senate with Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 490, 490
(1970) (“[T]he President must seek the advice of the Senate both before entering substantive
treaty negotiations and also during their course, and the consent of the Senate when specific
agreements are to be pursued.”).
135. See Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 540 (acknowledging that the Senate’s advisory function has “dwindle[d] away” into postnegotiating advice). Even the first treaty
ratified by the Senate, the French Consular Convention of 1788, provides a ready example. The
Continental Congress had directed Franklin to conclude a treaty along agreed lines, but Franklin came back with some different terms, causing the treaty to be rejected. Jefferson later took
up the negotiations, and Washington sent the fully negotiated treaty to the Senate “for your
consideration and advice.” RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817, at 4-5
(1920); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 22-23 (1997) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS]

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

1168

09/21/00 12:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

The contemplated advice might also be nonbinding, such as offering
counsel to the President about how to improve prospects for Senate
136
approval, or about whether ratification is advisable. More important, nothing in the text suggests that it is the President’s task to solicit such advice, let alone suspend his activities until it is rendered.
Nor is the parallel usage in state constitutions decisive on this
point. As Professor Bestor recounts, nearly half of the state constitutions had councils providing “advice and consent” in areas of concur137
rent authority, examples that were surely familiar to the Framers.
But there are obvious reasons to doubt the Framers’ intention to import such meanings unchanged—particularly since the President was
created largely in abreaction to the state executive model.138 Hamilton, as Publius, freely “admitted that in this instance [of treatymaking] the power of the federal executive would exceed that of any
State executive.”139
Finally, the suggestion that the Senate’s power to render “ad(discussing the Consular Convention).
136. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 134, at 48 (“[B]ut what is ‘advice,’ when and by whom is it to be
given, and must it be heeded?”).
137. See Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 726; Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note
132, at 644-45 & n.430; cf. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 218 (1996) (stressing the interpretive significance of state constitutions). Not all such clauses were alike. For example, the Framers and their contemporaries saw substantial differences between the relative autonomy accorded the executive in the New York and Massachusetts constitutions and the executive’s
subjugation to the legislature elsewhere. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE A
NATION? THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 56, 61, 173 (1987); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:
THE GRAND CONVENTION 65-66 (1966).
138. Even the Articles of Confederation rejected an analogous national Council of State, see
Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 49-52, and the Constitutional Convention ignored
calls for councils, see Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 647-52. It is generally
thought that the Framers consciously modeled the President after the more independent state
chief executives of the New York and Massachusetts constitutions. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra
note 137, at 173. As Charles Thach explained,
[s]tate experience thus contributed, nothing more strongly, to discredit the whole idea
of the sovereign legislature . . . . The majority of the delegates [to the Constitutional
Convention] brought with them no far-reaching distrust of executive power, but
rather a sobering consciousness that, if their new plan should succeed, it was necessary for them to put forth their best efforts to secure a strong, albeit safe, national executive.
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1774-1789, at 53 (1969); see also
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 35 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s notes) (statement of Madison) (“The Executives of
the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual
check be devised for restraining the instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of
some kind or other would be inevitable.”).
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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vice” translates into a presidential duty to secure permission entails
serious structural deficiencies. The permission hypothesis suggests
that the Senate could disable negotiating by stonewalling—paralyzing
140
the President’s supposed advantage of initiative. This interpretation
of advice would also make it the functional equivalent of consent,
though Bestor and others hew to the conventional view that consent
per se (including the two-thirds requirement) refers solely to the Senate’s decision concerning a fully negotiated treaty. Therefore, the
permission hypothesis should persuade us only if we find supporting
evidence elsewhere.
2. Understanding at the Founding. Indicia of the original
understanding may help us understand what the constitutional text
leaves unclear. If we follow Madison’s counsel that the best guides are
“the evils which were to be cured or the benefits to be obtained,”141
further doubt is cast on the notion that the Senate’s permission is
required before the President assumes responsibility for negotiating
with foreign nations.
a. The formal evolution from the Articles. The changed
structure of American treaty-making, by itself, makes a compelling
case against the permission hypothesis and in favor of the President’s
dormant power. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was
the repository for all national authority, and had the exclusive
authority to send and receive ambassadors and to enter into treaties
and alliances.142 Congress could appoint a quasi-executive
“Committee of the States” to manage certain national affairs during
its recesses, but it could not delegate any committee matters requiring
approval by a supermajority of nine states, such as the entry into
140. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05. The result would differ considerably from
stonewalling during the consent process, when the public at least would be given an opportunity
to judge the merits of the negotiated treaty. The analogous risk posed by executive-oriented interpretations, of course, is that the President might disable advice-rendering by concealing the
fact of a negotiation until it has been concluded. See Sklamberg, supra note 124, at 473-74 (proposing a presidential obligation to satisfy Senate requests for information concerning policy
goals to be pursued). There, however, the Senate is not equally defenseless, since it still has the
recourse of rendering advice afterward (and, more importantly, of withholding consent).
141. See Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Oct. 30, 1828) (Madison’s annotations), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 323 n.4 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter
MADISON WRITINGS].
142. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI (restricting the authority of the states), IX
(detailing congressional authority); infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
division of authority under the Articles on treaty-related powers).
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143

treaties and alliances. When actually created for what proved to be
a brief period in 1784, the Committee was specifically precluded from
“transact[ing] business” with foreign ministers “unless authorized
144
thereto by particular acts of Congress.” Congress seems to have
145
delegated no more authority to its presidents or to the succession of
committees established to address foreign affairs during its sessions.146
Against this background, the creation of the presidency, and the
vesting in that President of the power to make treaties, is clearly significant. The Treaty Clause involved the President in matters that the
Articles of Confederation confined to a legislative supermajority.
And unlike the Committee of the States as finally constituted—let
alone the various congressional committees assigned to foreign affairs—the Constitution did not expressly require that the President
refrain from acting without prior specific authorization.
None of this was elaborated upon during the Convention. The
147
delegates began with a narrow view of the presidential role, and
143. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5.
144. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 476-77 (1904-1937 ed.) (May 29, 1784)
[hereinafter JCC], available in <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html>. As a result, the
Committee served as “little more than a message center.” Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note
132, at 52. According to Richard Morris, the Committee’s “ineffective efforts constitute one of
the most dismal chapters in the history of the Congress.” RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING
OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 97 (1987) [hereinafter MORRIS, FORGING]; accord FREDERICK W.
MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 153 (1973); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1772 n.260, (1996).
145. See MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 99-108.
146. The Committee of Correspondence was renamed the Committee of Secret Correspondence, and later became the Committee for Foreign Affairs, before being replaced by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1781. See EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 118 (1941); H. JAMES HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 270 (1974); MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 95. Congress gave little or no
authority to its committees, including those for foreign affairs. See 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE
CREATION OF A REPUBLIC EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 54-55 (1993); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 196 (1979); Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 52-60; Calvin C. Jillson &
Rick K. Wilson, A Social Choice Model of Politics: Insights into the Demise of the U.S. Continental Congress, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 9-10 (1987); see also MARKS, supra note 144, at 152-53
(noting the difficulties caused by overlapping committees). But see GAILLARD HUNT, THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS 53 (1914)
(claiming the gradual development of “a real foreign office”).
147. In a debate on June 1, for example, the delegates exhibited concern that the Virginia
Plan’s proposal to give the executive “Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation,” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 21 (Madison’s notes) (Resolution 7), might
contain the more legislative powers of making war and peace, and the delegates thus struck that
portion of the proposal. See Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 720-22; Bestor, Respective Roles,
supra note 132, at 79-81; Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 575-76.
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there was little mention of a treaty-making role for the President (or,
148
for that matter, for the Senate) through most of the Convention.
The first harbinger may have been James Madison’s remark on
August 23 that because the Senate “represented the States alone,”
and for “other obvious reasons,” “the President should be an agent in
Treaties”—thus “[a]llowing the President & Senate to make Treaties.”149 Contemporaneous discussion highlighted the traditional role
150
the Senate was expected to assume in instructing American envoys.
With little further consideration, the treaty power was transformed in
committee into something nearly identical to its final version151—and
152
was ultimately approved without significant controversy.
148. See Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 719. In June, Alexander Hamilton proposed, in
language quite similar to that ultimately adopted, that a chief executive was “to have with the
advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties.” 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 292 (Madison’s notes) (Article 4); accord id. (Article 6) (granting
to the Senate “the power of advising and approving all Treaties”). Bestor notes that Hamilton
did not offer his plan as a “proposition” because he “frankly conceded that neither the delegates
nor the people ‘out of doors’ were ready to adopt such a plan,” that no vote was taken, and that
subsequent consideration was minimal. Bestor concludes that this amounts, “in itself, to a refutation of the view that the framers were determined to create a powerful presidency for the purpose of giving it primary responsibility for foreign affairs.” Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra
note 132, at 590-91 (emphasis added). This seems hasty. Many proposals were made and abandoned in the course of the Convention, or at least abandoned so far as the records reflect. In the
case at hand, the issue of the executive’s authority for at least some of the matters proposed by
Hamilton was simply left to the Committee of Detail (as Bestor acknowledges in a note), not
dismissed out of hand (as Bestor intimates). See id. at 590 & n.231. Furthermore, Hamilton’s
tentativeness in presenting his non-“proposition” was professedly due to his desire to refine his
proposals and present them at a more opportune point. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
138, at 291 (Madison’s notes). Hamilton asserted that the populace would “[a]t present” adopt
neither his plan nor Randolph’s plan, but that eventually they would “be ready to go as far at
least as he proposes.” Id.
149. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 392, 394 (Madison’s notes).
150. See id. at 392-94 (concerning debate on whether requiring Senate ratification would
harm American diplomatic effectiveness).
151. The Treaty Clause was referred to the Committee of Detail, see id. at 394, and then to
the Committee of Postponed Parts (sometimes known as the Brearley Committee), see id. at
473, which reported back on September 4 with a clause providing that “[t]he President by and
with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties . . . . [b]ut no
Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present,” id. at 498-99.
152. Bestor notes that in the course of debate over the Senate’s powers relating to elections
and appointments, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris both adverted to the Senate’s power
“to make Treaties,” as did Gouverneur Morris. See Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at
121-23. Bestor concludes from Wilson’s remarks that the addition of the President to the Treaty
Clause “did not give that officer an independent, let alone a dominant, role in treatymaking,”
while Morris’s remark (and Madison’s failure to intercede) are read as indicating that the revised Treaty Clause “did not significantly increase the President’s involvement.” Id. It is hard to
attribute such significance to these stray remarks, or to the failure to correct them in the course
of debating another issue, and the variant conclusions Bestor draws from them are striking.
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Citing Madison’s remarks,153 a failed amendment,154 and the con155
trasting development of the Appointments Clause, Professor Bestor
argues that the authors of the Treaty Clause “assumed it was a legislative responsibility to determine the objectives of any contemplated
treaty negotiation.”156 By his reading, that responsibility mandated
legislative intervention at some point early in any treaty negotiation.157
The argument relies largely on the lack of fuss during the Treaty
Clause’s drafting. To Bestor and others, “[t]he absence of controversy
on the matter is almost conclusive proof that no radical change from
previously established practices was contemplated or appre158
hended.”
153. See Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 109 (arguing that Madison “was not
proposing a wholesale transfer of foreign-policy making from legislative to executive hands”);
Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 635. For Madison’s remarks, see 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 382-83 (Journal); id. at 392 (Madison’s notes).
154. Madison proposed that treaties of peace be exempted from the two-thirds rule, then
suggested that such treaties require only consent by two-thirds of the Senate “without the concurrence of the President,” who might be too enamored of wartime authority. See 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 540 (Madison’s notes). To Bestor, Madison must have assumed
“that the Senate would possess the authority and the means to force the continuance of treaty
negotiations along lines which the President opposed, and to take up for ratification a treaty
that he refused to recommend.” Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 129; accord Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 653-55. That interpretation is not inevitable—Madison
may have imagined a President changing his mind, receiving a disappointing accord from his
agents, or succeeding to a treaty negotiated by his predecessor. Witness, for example, Jay’s later
treaty with Great Britain, which Washington sat on for four months before forwarding to Congress. See Gaillard Hunt, Introduction to SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY: A STUDY IN
COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY xiii (1962).
155. The Treaty Clause, unlike the nominating power, does not confer upon the President
“any exclusive right to propose the course of action to be taken in foreign affairs,” nor “preclude[] the Senate from giving formal advice before the beginning or during the progress of any
treaty negotiation.” Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 117.
156. Id. at 118.
157. See id. Bestor contends that, under the Treaty Clause,
[p]olicy matters were to be considered, at the beginning as well as at the end of negotiations, by some kind of legislative body, in active collaboration with whatever executive officer might be charged with carrying through or superintending the face-toface bargaining with other foreign ministers. Though the executive might be called
upon to formulate the required instructions to diplomatic agents, the legislative body
would still be called upon to approve the formulation, thereby giving “advice” in a
formal mode.
Id.
158. Id. at 101. Again, Bestor is simply the most thorough expositor of this position. See
HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 50
(1929); Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11
(1972); William Whitwell Dewhurst, Does the Constitution Make the President Sole Negotiator of
Treaties?, 30 YALE L.J. 478, 483 (1921); Lofgren, War Powers, supra note 132, at 255. The point
is put more tentatively by Professor Rakove, who concludes that
[n]othing in this debate suggests that the framers viewed the president as the principal
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The methodological objections to this reasoning are powerful.
159
Assuming the Convention records have evidentiary significance, it
stretches them rather far to claim that their omissions positively demonstrate a shared point of view. Delegates may have already accepted
a more expansive presidential role before actively considering the
Treaty Clause,160 perhaps within the Committee on Postponed Parts.161
Moreover, even if the Convention did not sing the virtues of
presidential diplomacy, there are indications that the delegates de-

and independent author of foreign policy, or that they would have reduced the advice
and consent required of the Senate to the formal approval of treaties negotiated
solely at the initiative and discretion of the executive.
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 266-67 (1996).
159. As has been widely observed, the fact that such records were kept secret speaks volumes about the practical impact of the views expressed on ratification, as well as about the expectations of the participants. Hamilton was among those rejecting the relevance of decisions
made at the convention. See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a National Bank (1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS]. James Madison opined that state conventions were a better guide. See James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty (April 6, 1796), in 6
MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 263, 272. But see infra note 169 (noting the frailties in
state convention records). For modern expressions of skepticism as to the value of convention
records, see, for example, RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 16-18 (suggesting that records of the ratification debates are superior to those of the Convention); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1531-42 (1987) (“[T]he records of
the Constitution’s framing and ratification vary wildly in their reliability . . . .”); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903-04 (1985)
(arguing that the Framers expected that future interpreters would rely on the intrinsic language
of the Constitution, not extra-textual records). But cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s],
Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 139 (1996)
(“The Constitutional Convention is surely among the best places to begin an examination of
original understanding.”).
160. See Rakove, supra note 129, at 246.
161. The President’s role materialized in the Committee, which left no record of its proceedings. But subsequent discussions in the South Carolina assembly provide some insight into
its deliberations. General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been a delegate to the Convention (but not a Committee member), in seconding a point made by Major Pierce Butler (who
had served on the Committee), confirmed that, after a wide-ranging debate, the Committee
“agreed to give the President a power of proposing treaties, as he was the ostensible head of the
Union, and to vest the Senate (where each state had an equal voice) with the power of agreeing
or disagreeing to the terms proposed”—in part, apparently, to avoid vesting the Senate with
both the impeachment power and the responsibility for treaties. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 263-65
(Burt Franklin ed., 1968) (1888). It cannot be known whether these comments accurately reflected the prevailing views in the committee. See Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy—The
View from 1787, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 9-10 (Robert A. Goldwin &
Robert A. Licht eds., 1990); Rakove, supra note 129, at 242-43. The point remains, however,
that whatever meaning(s) the Committee attached to the Treaty Clause, it may have been thoroughly discussed, and hotly contested, in proceedings not reflected in surviving records.
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162

sired to temper the Senate. The evident concern for maintaining the
political independence of the President from the Senate also suggests
a strong role for the President in their shared undertakings. On balance, as Jack Rakove notes, it is difficult to read the Convention proceedings and conclude that the President was added to the Treaty
Clause “simply to serve as the agent of the Senate or to avoid violating the principle of the unitary executive.”163 Indeed, precisely contrary to any presumption of continuity, the President seems to have
been added to the mix largely because leaving treaties to the Senate
alone would too closely resemble the ineffective treaty regime administered by the Continental Congress.
b. Pre-constitutional experience and its diagnosis. As
discussed further below, some of the most common complaints
against the pre-constitutional conduct of foreign affairs focused on
state interference with federal treaty policy—not only their refusal to
abide by completed treaties, but also the dissipation of American
bargaining leverage through independent state foreign policies.164
There were also failings in the operation of the national legislature,
but these too could largely be traced to the influence of the federal
system. Dependent upon state concessions, the Continental Congress
was deprived of significant regulatory authority over trade matters, as
well as a stable income. The legislature’s operation was also impaired
by the inevitable parochialism of its delegates; the members
increasingly agreed on the need for centralization, but the persistent
regional divisions contributed to delay and outright inaction on
important foreign policy matters.165 As Professor Rakove has
162. See supra text accompanying note 149 (discussing Madison’s August 23 remarks). The
same concern for establishing a check on the Senate and the states was reflected in Gouverneur
Morris’s failed amendment, which would have made Senate-negotiated treaties binding only on
approval by both the House and Senate. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 382-83
(Madison’s notes) (“The Senate shall have power to treat with foreign nations, but no Treaty
shall be binding on the United States ‘which is not ratified by a Law.’”); Rakove, supra note 129,
at 240-41. Contrary to Bestor, see Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 109, 110; Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 635-36, their concern was precisely that Senate control
of treaties would too closely resemble the state-driven mechanism of the old Congress, see infra
text accompanying notes 187-93.
163. Rakove, supra note 129, at 250.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 261-302.
165. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 399-421 (1950); see also Frederick W. Marks III,
Power, Pride, and Purse: Diplomatic Origins of the Constitution, 11 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 303, 30304, 308 (1987) (suggesting that Jensen and other historians routinely underestimated the role of
foreign relations difficulties in spurring constitutional reform).
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concluded, “[n]othing contributed more directly to the calling of the
Constitutional Convention than the conviction that Congress was no
longer capable of managing external affairs in a satisfactory
166
manner.”
The potentially disastrous delays attending the peace with Great
Britain were a clear and embarrassing signal that post-Revolution
167
America would find it difficult to maintain a united front. But the
contemporary episode that loomed largest at the Convention concerned the unsettled rights to navigate the Mississippi River—an issue
the Framers tried to resolve through the two-thirds rule for Senate
consent,168 but which nonetheless threatened the Constitution’s ratification in Virginia and helped scotch it in North Carolina.169 By the
166. Rakove, supra note 129, at 268; accord REGINALD HORSMAN, THE DIPLOMACY OF
NEW REPUBLIC, 1776-1815, at 23-24 (1985) (describing congressional ineptness in foreign
relations); cf. ROSSITER, supra note 137, at 50 (noting sympathetically that “the years between
1774 and 1789 should be judged as a period of useful (if also nearly fatal) experiment rather
than of inglorious folly”).
167. Professor Rakove notes:
In 1779, Congress had needed seven months to set its peace terms, even though [the
French] had continually pressed for prompt action. For those members of Congress
who believed that the premier object of American foreign policy was the preservation
of a warm alliance with France, this deadlock had loomed as a threat to the nation’s
security as well as an embarrassing example of habitual congressional indecision.
THE

Rakove, supra note 129, at 275; see also ROSSITER, supra note 137, at 50 (citing as emblematic
the fact that the completed Treaty of Paris, “almost a ‘steal’ for the United States, lay unratified
[for nearly two months] before a Congress that could not muster the nine state delegations necessary for approval”). See generally HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 23-24 (citing routine delay
and inaction and concluding that “in the years from 1783 to 1789 Congress was to be inept in its
conduct of foreign policy”).
Given the Continental Congress’s obvious liabilities, and Jay’s departure from its instructions in negotiating peace with the British, the conclusion of Professors Ackerman and Golove
that Congress “had managed foreign relations with considerable skill”—and their citation of the
peace treaty as a leading example—begs elaboration. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 121,
at 808; see also Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 563-65 (describing the successes
of the Continental Congress).
168. See, e.g., SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 80
(1936); Eli Merritt, Sectional Conflict and Secret Compromise: The Mississippi River Question
and the United States Constitution, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 162 (1991); Charles Warren, The
Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 271-72
(1934); cf. Lofgren, supra note 132, at 254; Rakove, supra note 129, at 274-75. Even those in favor of tempering the two-thirds requirement spoke of vindicating U.S. interests on the issue.
Gouverneur Morris, for example, wanted to exempt treaties of peace so as to make it easier to
wage war on “account of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects of the Union.”
See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 548 (Madison’s notes).
169. It is dangerous to rely on the state convention records, particularly Virginia’s, for anything definitive. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1986). But the records indisputably show the
prominence of the navigation issue, of which there is abundant confirmation elsewhere. See, e.g.,
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time of the Convention, the United States had attempted for nearly a
170
decade to secure a guarantee of navigation rights from Spain. With
the exception of one period when the United States was desperately
seeking Spain’s assistance against Great Britain, American negotiator
John Jay’s orders had instructed him to insist on the American right
to free navigation.171 But negotiations went nowhere. Hemmed in, Jay
Warren, supra note 168, at 297 (estimating, through a page count, that the Mississippi issue consumed one-tenth of the Virginia convention); Letter of John Marshall to Arthur Lee (Mar. 5,
1787), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 205, 206 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974) (citing
Patrick Henry’s declaration of March 1787 that “he would rather part with the confederation
than relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi”); infra notes 174, 178, 187 (citing authorities).
Both conventions also had tangible results. The Virginia convention, reacting to what John
Dawson termed “a diabolical attempt . . . to surrender the navigation of a river,” 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1493 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], recommended to the first new
Congress that it consider an amendment providing in relevant respect that “no treaty, ceding,
contracting, restraining or suspending” rights in “navigating the American rivers, shall be made,
but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of the Members of both Houses respectively.” Id. at 1554. North Carolina proposed a substantively identical amendment. Both were
considered and rejected by the Senate on September 8, 1789. See Warren, supra note 168, at
299-300. The Mississippi dispute also played a role in generating opposition in Kentucky and
Tennessee. See, e.g., JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 245 (1961); Jon Kukla, Yes! No! And If . . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s “Federalists Who are For Amendments”, in ANTIFEDERALISM: THE
LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 43, 49 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992).
170. For excellent historical summaries, see Michael Allen, The Mississippi River Debate,
1785-1787, 36 TENN. HIST. Q. 447 (1977); Editor’s Note: The Debate in the Virginia Convention
on the Navigation of the Mississippi River, 12-13 June 1788, in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 169, at 1179. For thorough discussions of the legal import, see Merritt, supra note
168, and Warren, supra note 168.
171. Jay’s original instructions in 1779 required that he insist on unfettered American navigation rights. See Instructions from Congress to Jay (Oct. 4, 1780), in 1 CORRESPONDENCE AND
PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 434, 435 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1890) [hereinafter JAY PAPERS].
In 1781, Congress instructed John Jay to concede those rights if absolutely necessary to secure
Spanish assistance, see 19 JCC, supra note 144, at 151-54 (Feb. 15, 1781), and though the gambit
proved unsuccessful, Congress let those instructions linger long after the exigencies ceased. See
Editor’s Note: The Debate in the Virginia Convention on the Navigation of the Mississippi
River, 12-13 June 1788, in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1180-81. In 1784,
Congress reverted to its prior instructions, see 27 JCC, supra note 144, at 529-30 (June 3, 1784),
even as Spain upped the ante by closing the lower Mississippi to Americans. See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 35. Congress reiterated those instructions to Jay, now Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when Spain rekindled negotiations in 1785. See 29 JCC, supra note 144, at 658 (Aug. 25,
1785). Jay was told “particularly to stipulate the right of the United States to their territorial
bounds, and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from the source to the Ocean, as established
in their Treaties with Great Britain,” and reminded to “neither conclude nor sign any treaty,
compact or convention, with the said Encargado de Negocios, until he hath previously communicated it to Congress, and received their approbation.” Id.
The United States argued that it had inherited, via revolt, the navigation rights Great
Britain had established with France under the Treaty of Paris of 1763. See 18 JCC, supra note
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requested that a secret committee be appointed “with power to instruct and direct me on every point and Subject relative to the pro172
posed treaty with Spain.” Called instead before the full assembly, he
proposed that the United States seek advantageous commercial terms
with Spain by agreeing to forbear navigation on the Mississippi for a
period of twenty-five or thirty years.173
In the resulting furor,174 Congress voted 7-5, on strictly sectional
lines, to withdraw the portion of Jay’s instructions prohibiting nego175
tiation on Mississippi-related matters. Charles Pinckney protested
that the new instructions were unconstitutional, since they had drawn
less than the nine states necessary under the Articles to assent to treaties (and less than the nine states that had authorized the original in176
structions). Though Pinckney and his allies were unsuccessful, his
accompanying message was unmistakable: Congress might ordinarily
feel obliged to approve treaties consistent with its instructions, but
not if the instructions were approved or amended by a mere seven
states.177 Jay was formally left free to sacrifice the Mississippi until the

144, at 935-47 (Oct. 17, 1780) (final version of instructions to Jay); Draft of Letter to John Jay,
Explaining His Instructions (Oct. 17, 1780), in 2 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 127, 127-35 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1962) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. The
merits of this claim were far from certain; the Treaty of Peace of 1783 subsequently attempted
to claim free navigation for both Great Britain and the United States, but by then Great Britain
had complicated matters by returning Florida to Spain. Nevertheless, U.S. negotiators steadfastly maintained that Spain would merely be recognizing preexisting U.S. rights. See EDWARD
S. CORWIN, FRENCH POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF 1778, at 229-32, 281-83 (1916)
(discussing pre-1783 American claims); ARTHUR PRESTON WHITAKER, THE SPANISHAMERICAN FRONTIER: 1783-1795, at 9-13 (Bison Book 1969) (1927) (discussing post-1783
claims).
172. Letter of John Jay to the President of Congress (May 29, 1786), in 30 JCC, supra note
144, at 323 (May 31, 1786).
173. See 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 480 (Aug. 3, 1786). Jay submitted a more substantial report later that month. See id. at 537-52 (Aug. 22, 1786) (reprinting report of Aug. 17, 1786).
174. “A bomb tossed into the hall of Congress and about to explode would scarcely have
produced greater consternation.” BURNETT, supra note 146, at 655. Madison, writing to Jefferson shortly afterward, considered Jay’s proposal unlikely to succeed, but he worried that “an
unsuccessful attempt by six or seven [states] will favor the views of Spain and be fatal I fear to
an augmentation of the federal authority.” Letter of Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 93, 96-97. He echoed these concerns in a letter to his father later that year. See Letter of Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 171, at 153-54.
175. See 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 574-96 (Aug. 29, 1786).
176. See id. at 597 (Aug. 30, 1786).
177. See id. at 598, 598-600. Pinckney had earlier delivered a substantial speech on the merits of the Mississippi question, in response to Jay’s remarks before Congress. See Notes on Debates in the Continental Congress: Pinckney’s Speech, in 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 933-48.
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178

fall of 1788, but it is clear that any such treaty would have failed in
179
Congress. Jay eventually reported that Congress’s fracture impaired
his ability to negotiate with Spain and made it wisest not to conclude
a treaty.180
For some modern commentators, the Mississippi River episode is
thought to have demonstrated to Jay’s peers the importance of subordinating diplomatic agents to legislatures—particularly so as to secure minority interests—thus supporting a narrow interpretation of
181
the President’s role under the Treaty Clause. Many, indeed, blamed
178. The Virginia legislature, egged on by James Madison, continued to agitate. See Resolutions Reaffirming American Rights to Navigate the Mississippi (Nov. 29, 1786) (editorial note),
in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 181-82. In Congress, William Pierce successfully
moved that Jay be required to report on the state of negotiations. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at
147 (Apr. 4, 1787). Soon after, Madison unsuccessfully moved to transfer negotiations with
Spain to Madrid, where they would fall to Thomas Jefferson, the Minister at the Court of
France. See Resolution to Transfer Negotiations with Spain to Madrid (Apr. 18, 1787), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 388; Notes on Debates (Apr. 18, 1787), in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 171, at 389-90. And, on April 25, Madison moved that Jay be informed, in
essence, as to the legal nullity of the seven-state instruction. See Notes on Debates (Apr. 25,
1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 404. But there matters stood until September
1788, when Congress restated its dedication to maintaining free navigation and referred the
matter to the government taking office under the new Constitution. See 34 JCC, supra note 144,
at 530-35 (Sept. 16, 1788).
179. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 146, at 396 (“It was understood by all that, barring a
radical change of attitude in the South, the proposed treaty could never be consummated.”).
Even Madison accepted that a treaty was unlikely. See Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Mar.
19, 1787), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 1780-89, at
452-53:
The Spanish project sleeps. A perusal of the attempt of seven states to make a
new treaty by repealing an essential condition of the old satisfied me that Mr. Jay’s
caution would revolt at so irregular a sanction. . . . [I]t appears that the intended sacrifice of the Missisipi [sic] will not be made . . . .
Accord Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 3 EMERGING NATION, supra, at
258-59 (stating that a treaty would likely fail in Congress). His concerns, instead, stemmed principally from the risks posed to the constitutional movement. See id. Madison’s later efforts to
change negotiators and shift the negotiations abroad appear to have been designed largely to
keep at a remove discussions that might have imperiled a new Constitution, rather than designed to defend against actual concessions to the Spanish. See Merritt, supra note 168, at 14243. Southerners were also concerned that the Mississippi negotiations foreshadowed secession
by the commercially minded eastern and middle bloc, giving them independent reason to thwart
further attempts at division. See HENDERSON, supra note 146, at 394-96.
180. See Letter from Jay to the President of Congress (Apr. 11, 1787), in 3 JAY PAPERS, supra note 144, at 240, 243; 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 184, 187-88 (Apr. 13, 1787). Jay’s April 12
report, which focused on domestic conflicts between Americans and the Spanish, cautioned
“that a Treaty disagreeable to one half of the Nation had better not be made, for it would be
violated, and that a War disliked by the other half, would promise but little success, especially
under a Government so greatly influenced and affected by popular Opinion.” Id. at 204.
181. See, e.g., Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 619 (arguing that the 1786
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182

Jay for evading his prior instructions. It seems unlikely, however,
that they considered the episode as a caution against executive-led
diplomacy: Jay had earlier demonstrated the virtues of defying in183
structions, and even his own diplomatic career was not substantially
184
affected by the Mississippi imbroglio. It is also notable that nothing
negotiation crisis left the executive branch with little authority in independently determining the
content of foreign treaties).
182. See, e.g., HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 36 (claiming that westerners were enraged with
Jay because he advocated a treaty hostile to their interests); Allen, supra note 170, at 463 (stating that Jay was “denounced” by westerners). Monroe was particularly relentless in circulating
accusations. See, e.g., Letter from Monroe to Jefferson (June 16, 1786), in 3 EMERGING
NATION, supra note 179, at 203 (accusing Jay of “evading his instructions”); Letter from
Monroe to Jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 3 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 236 (stating his
“conviction . . . that Jay ha[d] manag’d this negociation [sic] dishonestly”). Monroe also led a
more public charge against Jay in the Virginia ratifying convention, albeit in a long speech excoriating Congress’s treatment of the issue. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at
1231-35 (statement of Monroe) (criticizing Jay); id. at 1236 (statement of William Grayson)
(same); id. at 1247 (statement of Patrick Henry) (same). But see id. at 1240 (statement of Madison) (defending Jay).
183. At Jay’s prompting, the American delegates to the Treaty of Paris negotiations had defied instructions that matters be cleared with the French before anything was signed. Jay seems
to have been warranted in suspecting that the French (and their American sympathizers in Congress) did not necessarily have America’s best interests at heart. See, e.g., RICHARD B. MORRIS,
THE PEACEMAKERS: THE GREAT POWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 204-05, 208-17
(1965) [hereinafter MORRIS, PEACEMAKERS]; RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 85-91 (1985) [hereinafter
MORRIS, WITNESSES]; JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 264-74, 321-22 (1979); Rakove, supra note 129, at 270-71, 275. Though Jay and the commissioners were subsequently criticized in
Congress and by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Livingston, they received private
demonstrations of support from some of the same persons criticizing them in public. See
MORRIS, PEACEMAKERS, supra, at 442-44.
It is difficult even to generalize about Jay’s conduct on the Mississippi question. In negotiating with the French, Jay had helped defend America’s right to western lands and the Mississippi. See HENDERSON, supra note 146, at 302-04, 322-23. Nor could his early negotiations with
the Spanish be faulted. Jay advised Congress against offering to concede on the Mississippi in
order to secure Spanish assistance. See Letter from Jay to the President of Congress (Nov. 6,
1780), in 4 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
112, 148 (Francis Wharton ed., 1889) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE] (advising that “we should endeavor to be as independent on the charity of our
friends as on the mercy of our enemies”). Afterward, Jay read the U.S. willingness to make such
a cession exceedingly narrowly. See MORRIS, WITNESSES, supra, at 81-82. He was commended
by Robert Livingston, on behalf of the Congress, for his tactics, see Letter from Robert R.
Livingston to Jay (Apr. 16, 1782), in 2 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 187, 188, and given increased latitude in his dealings with the Spanish, see Letter from Robert R. Livingston to Jay
(Apr. 27, 1782), in 2 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 202, 206.
184. As Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a position he held during the later negotiations with
the Spanish (and afterwards), Jay earned increased autonomy from congressional control. See
JENSEN, supra note 165, at 365-66; MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 194-95; HENRY
MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 21 (1929).
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more specific was done to reduce such risks under the Constitution.
Simply requiring the Senate’s “advice and consent” addressed none of
the South’s grievances. Congress’s decision in 1786 to relieve Jay of
responsibility for clearing every proposed negotiating term before
communicating it to Spain seemed equally permissible under the new
Constitution. The Senate also remained free to instruct negotiations
185
via a simple majority, a committee, or perhaps even something less.
The only hint of a solution to the problem of executive deviation appears outside the Treaty Clause, through the mechanism of impeachment.186
In the end, it was impossible to blame Jay without blaming the
187
Congress that had instructed him —and the Senate’s resemblance to
the Continental Congress made it seem part of the problem, rather

When Jay was later appointed as envoy to Great Britain, Republican opposition focused primarily on other matters, such as the fact that he had not first resigned his position as Chief Justice. See JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 127 (1970); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM 394-95 (1993); HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 68-70; Letter from Jay to Mrs. Jay
(May 12, 1794) (editor’s note), in 4 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 21 n.1.
185. But see Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 117 (arguing that “it is the advice of
the Senate as an organized body, not the advice of individual senators (over coffee and doughnuts at the White House, perhaps) which the Constitution calls for”).
186. Alexander Hamilton argued that, while principal security in the Treaty Clause consisted of the “JOINT AGENCY” of the President and Senate, the latter might punish a President
for misconduct in “deviati[ng] from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the
conduct of the negotiations committed to him;” he also held out the possibility of punishing “a
few leading individuals in the Senate.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 137, at 52-54 (Madison’s notes) (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (advocating for a strong executive to check the
legislature).
187. Jay spent over half of his appointed ambassadorships under explicit instructions to offer
navigation rights under the appropriate conditions. As a result, popular criticism was scarcely
limited to Jay. See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 255 (suggesting that southern delegates learned
both to be wary of executive discretion and to realize “the virtues of executive independence”);
WHITAKER, supra note 171, at 76-77 (describing Jay as “intimidated by the widespread denunciation of Congress’ decision, which, though taken in secret session, soon became public property”); Allen, supra note 170, at 463 (describing “the great public outcry . . . over Congress’s
August 29 reversal of Jay’s instructions,” as well as “[d]enunciations of Jay pour[ing] in from all
over the country”). A circular from Pennsylvanians to the people of Kentucky blamed Jay, but
the resulting Kentucky circular omitted mention of Jay and seemingly blamed Congress. See
THOMAS MARSHALL GREEN, THE SPANISH CONSPIRACY 109-10 (1891).
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than a solution.188 Improving legislative operations was complicated,189
and the advantages of the executive alternative must have been apparent.190 Discussion at the Constitutional Convention and afterward
wrestled with whether a two-thirds rule would protect minority state
interests as well as the Articles of Confederation had, but no one
seemed to believe that Senate control over the nation’s emissaries
191
had actually been increased by the Constitution. The result was put
most plainly by George Nicholas in the Virginia convention: it was
“Congress, under the existing system,” that had threatened invasion
of navigation rights;192 the representation of minority interests in the
Senate would be no less than in the previous Congress; and finally, in
the new system, at least the President would serve as a check.193
3. The New Constitution and the Horizontal Scope of the Treaty
Power. As Nicholas indicated, one advantage of involving the
President was to enhance the minority-state check in the Senate.
References to the President’s value as a check on the Senate abound

188. See JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS 111 (1998) (describing how the August
1787 Convention debates “brought a reaction against the Senate, which many framers saw increasingly as a replica of the Continental Congress (because of the equal vote and its election by
the state legislatures). This reaction worked to the advantage of the presidency.”); Rakove, supra note 129, at 274 (citing a supporter of the two-thirds requirement as “reply[ing] that the
Navigation of the Mississippi after what had already happened in Congress was not to be
risqued in the Hands of a meer [sic] Majority”).
189. No one was terribly sure which voting rules would be most effective; in the end, the
Convention defeated proposals that would have subjected a treaty to consent by two-thirds of
all the members of the Senate, apparently with the help of Virginia’s delegates. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 548-49 (Madison’s notes); see also Warren, supra note 170,
at 295 (“All these efforts were to make it as difficult as possible for any combination of Northern States to ratify a treaty which should bargain away the navigation of the Mississippi.”). As
previously noted, moreover, making peace treaties more difficult might deter Congress from
waging war on behalf of navigation interests. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at
548 (Madison’s notes) (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
190. See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 267 (explaining that divisive congressional debates
over the Newfoundland and Mississippi instructions allowed the Framers “readily [to] appreciate the diplomatic and political advantages of allowing the president a significant initiative in
the conduct of foreign relations”); see also Rakove, supra note 129, at 275 (articulating the lessons the Framers may have drawn concerning “the dangers of allowing foreign policy to be
made exclusively by a Senate that would bear an unfortunate resemblance to the existing Congress”).
191. At the Virginia ratifying convention, critics doubted the adequacy of both the new and
the old systems. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 1244 (statement of William
Grayson) (June 13, 1788); id. at 1246 (statement of Patrick Henry) (June 13, 1788).
192. Id. at 1249 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788).
193. See id. at 1249-52 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788).
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in the Convention records, period correspondence, pamphlets and
196
197
articles, and the ratification debates. The Virginia debates saw fit
to emphasize the President’s role in thwarting any attempt to give
away navigation rights.198 Involving the President, in other words,

194. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 540 (Madison’s notes) (citing
Rufus King as arguing in opposition to the two-thirds requirement, on the grounds “that as the
Executive was here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist in Congress
where The [sic] concurrence of 2/3 was required”); id. at 540-41 (stating that Gouverneur Morris
asserted the need for the President’s inclusion in peace treaties because of the President’s status
as “the general Guardian of the National interests”).
195. In one of his many important letters to George Nicholas, Madison explained that
the circumstance most material to be remarked in a comparative examination of the
two systems, is the security which the new one affords by making the concurrence of
the President necessary to the validity of Treaties. This is an advantage which may be
pronounced conclusive. At present the will of a single body can make a Treaty. If the
new Government be established no treaty can be made without the joint consent of
two distinct and independent wills. The president also being elected in a different
mode, and under a different influence from that of the Senate, will be the more apt
and the more free to have a will of his own.
Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note
171, at 44, 48.
196. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing “the additional security which would result from the co-operation of the executive” and the “the joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate”);
Letter from “Civis” [David Ramsay] to the Citizens of South Carolina (Feb. 4, 1788) (alteration
in original), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 147, 150
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (“Neither the senate
nor president can make treaties by their separate authority.—They both must concur.—This is
more in your favor than the footing on which you now stand.”). Even the Anti-Federalists, who
were wary (though not uniformly so) of a strong executive, considered the Senate’s role in
treaty-making to be an even worse aspect of the treaty power, as it “represented for many of
them all that was wrong with the Constitution.” HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 48 (1981); accord MAIN, supra note 169, at 138-39, 141.
197. See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 266-67; Rakove, supra note 129, at 246. The best exponent of this view in the ratification debates was James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who defended
the Senate against the charge that it would control treaty-making, observing that “[t]he Senate
can make no treaties; they can approve of none unless the President . . . lay it before them.” 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 480 (statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 4, 1787);
accord id. at 491 (statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 4, 1787) (“With regard to their power in
forming treaties, they can make none, they are only auxiliaries to the President.”); see also 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 161, at 119-20 (statement of William Davie) (July 28, 1788) (arguing that the treaty power is divided equally between the President and the Senate).
198. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1130 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 10, 1788) (“The consent of the President is a very great security.”); 10 id. at 1241
(statement of Madison) (June 13, 1788) (“[T]he President[] must concur in every treaty which
can be made.”); id. at 1251 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788) (refuting Patrick
Henry’s argument that “the concurrence of the President to the formation of treaties will be no
security”). But see id. at 1246 (statement of Patrick Henry) (June 13, 1788) (“[T]he President as
distinguished from the Senate, is nothing. They will combine and be as one.”).
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199

made it harder to produce unwise treaties.
Inviting the President also improved the American prospects for
success in any bargaining that was undertaken. As John Jay ably explained in The Federalist No. 64, the President enjoyed clear advantages in negotiation—principally greater “secrecy” and “dispatch”
than even the Senate could manage—that would “tend to facilitate
200
the attainment of the objects of the negotiation.” Hamilton argued,
as well, that increasing the President’s power would increase his
credibility and standing in foreign negotiations, which would in turn
inure to the nation’s advantage.201
The Senate, it must be stressed, was thought to have advantages
of its own—such as in defining, or at least in helping to define, the
“objects of the negotiation.”202 But emphasizing those virtues was per199. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 456-58 (1988) (explaining the role of independent chief negotiators
in exercising veto power over international agreements).
200. As Jay elaborated:
Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most
dispatch are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the
negotiation. For these the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any
circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any
time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations
for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and
dispatch on the other.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphases added); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (insisting that “decision, secrecy, and dispatch” are compatible with the President as an individual
negotiator, but that they are incompatible with “a body so variable and so numerous” as the
House or the Senate); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 161, at 119-20 (William Davie) (arguing
that negotiations between nations require the “secrecy, design, and despatch” characteristic of
the executive). Jay is sometimes misunderstood to have trivialized these advantages by suggesting that they were “not otherwise important in a national view,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at
393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), but his suggestion that they were important in
achieving the ends of negotiation seems critical. See id.
201. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 620-23 (interpreting Jay’s The Federalist No.
64); Rakove, supra note 129, at 253-54 (same). In general, the Senate was regarded as a more
appropriate body for the exercise of those components of the treaty power resembling legislative activities. Responding to the objection that the Treaty Clause improperly intermixed powers, Hamilton argued that the power to make treaties was neither strictly legislative nor executive in nature and that the Constitution properly employed both the Senate and the President:
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations point out the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the
vast importance of the trust and the operation of treaties as laws plead strongly for
the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of
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fectly consistent with an understanding that involving the President
was a significant innovation in the process of advice and consent.
Whether advice should be sought was plainly left to the President’s
203
judgment, and because the Senate would not always be available for
204
consultation, the President would almost invariably take the initiative in defining certain objects of negotiation. Finally, the fact that the
President would take the lead in designating diplomatic agents was
scarcely overlooked.205
It is critical to recognize, moreover, that the overall diminution in
legislative authority was not so significant as to warrant concern or
occasion objection. The Mississippi experience had demonstrated
that, whatever the procedure for instruction, the Senate’s control over
treaty approval could ultimately check any diplomatic excesses. What
is more, any potential decrease in congressional control over negotiation—its power of “advice”—was offset by its increased autonomy
with respect to treaty ratification—its power of “consent.” As the debate over Jay’s instructions indicated, Congress might have felt obligated to ratify treaties negotiated in accordance with legislative in206
structions, but it scarcely felt the same about treaties negotiated
making them.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 663-65 (interpreting Hamilton’s The Federalist
No. 75); Rakove, supra note 129, at 254 (noting that “the most striking feature of Hamilton’s
essay is that he seems almost to strain to justify any presidential involvement”). As Bestor assumes, and Rakove explicitly concludes, the views Hamilton expressed as Publius during the
process of ratification are more significant than the views he expresses in the Pacificus-Helvidius
debates with Madison in 1793. See infra text accompanying note 220.
203. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[A]lthough the President must, in forming [treaties], act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may
suggest.”).
204. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 562 (statement of James Wilson)
(Dec. 11, 1787) (asking whether, given the duration and distance involved in bilateral negotiations, Congress would necessarily be in session during an entire negotiation); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 519 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the
President’s assumption of executive functions meant Congress would no longer incur the expense of sitting year-round and that “[e]ven the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject
to their final concurrence”).
205. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 538-40 (Madison’s notes). This afforded
greater Senate control than Hamilton’s earlier proposal, under which the President would have
the sole power to appoint “the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War, and
Foreign Affairs,” with the Senate involved in the appointment of “all other officers,” specifically
including “Ambassadors to foreign Nations.” 1 id. at 292.
206. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (1904)
(“Congress, in which were combined the negotiating and ratifying functions, recognized an obli-
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207

contrary to diplomatic instructions. Early in his first term, President
Washington asserted to the Senate that U.S. practice now distinguished between negotiation and signature, on the one hand, and ratification, on the other, and he indicated that only the latter would be
208
binding. President Washington’s argument—which went unquesgation to ratify what it had authorized.”). Indeed, the commission of American envoys frequently included solemn promises to foreign sovereigns that Congress would abide by the envoy’s signature. For example, Jay was commissioned to negotiate with Spain as
our minister plenipotentiary, [with] full power, general and special, to act in that
quality, to confer, agree and conclude . . . a treaty of commerce; and whatever shall be
so agreed and concluded for us and in our name, to sign, and thereupon make a treaty
of commerce; and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the same, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if
we were personally present and acted therein; hereby promising, in good faith, that
we will accept, ratify, fulfil and execute whatever shall be agreed, concluded and
signed by our said minister plenipotentiary; and that we will never act, nor suffer
any person to act, contrary to the same, in whole or in part.
15 JCC, supra note 144, at 1117 (Sept. 28, 1779); accord 29 JCC, supra note 144, at 561-562 (July
20, 1785) (commissioning Jay to negotiate with Spain). The American practice does not appear
to have been unique. See id. at 562-64 (reprinting, in translation, the commission of Don Diego
de Gardoqui of Spain).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77. Pinckney’s proposition was not in fact well
settled at that time, see 5 MOORE, supra note 124, § 743 (collecting authorities), nor was it necessarily well understood in the states, see 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 123637 (statement of William Grayson) (purporting to recall the “dilemma of either violating the
Constitution by a compliance [by permitting seven states to prevail], or involving us in war by a
non-compliance”). It also did not necessarily imply the same liberty where the party instructing
the negotiator was simply different than the party responsible for ratification. The Convention
touched on this in debating whether the House should have a hand in approving treaties; at least
two delegates considered awkward the prospect of having ministers instructed by a different
body than would be responsible for ratification, but they did not appear to have contemplated
that it would change the legal status of American negotiations. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 138, at 392 (Madison’s notes) (Nathaniel Gorham); id. at 393 (Madison’s notes)
(William S. Johnson); id. at 395 (James McHenry’s notes ) (Nathaniel Gorham).
The Senate later queried Jay as to whether they were bound, “either by former agreed
stipulations, or negotiations entered into by our Minister at the Court of Versailles, to ratify”
the Consular Convention with France, which had been negotiated under the Continental Congress. 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 7 (July 22, 1789) (1828) [hereinafter SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL]. Jay replied,
in essence, that although it was a bad treaty, it conformed with the scheme Congress had proposed and had conveyed through Jefferson to France with a promise to ratify any conforming
convention—a promise reiterated in Jefferson’s commission—and that approval was therefore
indispensable. See 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 425-26 (July 27, 1787) (Jefferson’s commission); 1
SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra, at 7-8 (July 27, 1789) (reprinting Jay’s letter of July 25,
1789). See generally HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 6-9 (concluding that both Jay and the Senate
felt compelled to approve the treaty as it was negotiated).
208. Washington’s letter, which was focused on developing a common understanding of the
procedure to be followed in Indian treaties, advised:
It is said to be the general understanding and practice of nations, as a check on the
mistakes and indiscretions of ministers or commissioners, not to consider any treaty
negotiated and signed by such officers as final and conclusive until ratified by the sovereign or government from whom they derive their powers. This practice has been
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tioned by the Senate—was more prescient than accurate as a reading
209
of international law, but it was unimpeachable in its understanding
of the structural change in the treaty power. Under the Constitution,
the U.S. position during negotiation and ratification might differ for
perfectly legitimate reasons: if the Senate instructed and dictated the
course of negotiations, the President might decline to ratify; if the
President were in charge of negotiations, on the other hand, the Senate might signal disagreement when it came time for consent.
The new treaty power, in consequence, liberated the Senate’s
power of consent by permitting it to judge the merits of completed
210
treaties with a relatively fresh eye. Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution thus could unselfconsciously emphasize the Senate’s treaty
power without diminishing the new authority conferred on the President. Even in the event that the Senate failed to participate in directing negotiations—whether due to constraints on its authority, a desire
not to intervene, or presidential circumvention—its consent power
would suffice to derail unwanted presidential initiatives. The premise,
adopted by the United States respecting their treaties with European nations, and I
am inclined to think it would be advisable to observe it in the conduct of our treaties
with the Indians; . . . being formed on our part by the agency of subordinate officers,
it seems to be both prudent and reasonable that their acts should not be binding on
the nation until approved and ratified by the Government. It strikes me that this point
should be well considered and settled, so that our national proceedings in this respect
may become uniform and be directed by fixed and stable principles.
Letter from Washington to the Senate, reprinted in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
406, 406-07 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) [hereinafter WASHINGTON WRITINGS]. The Senate
did not directly address the merits of the practices described by Washington, but it did follow his
recommendations. See CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 26-28;
HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 11-16.
209. See, e.g., HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 153-56 (describing a diplomatic contretemps with
Great Britain over the U.S. obligation to ratify an entire treaty). But Washington’s view became
increasingly prevalent over the course of the nineteenth century. See Michael J. Glennon, The
Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 275-76 n.115 (1983) (citing J. MERVYN
JONES, RATIFICATION AND FULL POWERS 12, 74-78 (1949)). Compare Porto Rico—License to
Construct Wharf, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 551, 558 (Oct. 17, 1901) (noting President Monroe’s position, but explaining that “[n]ow, the general maxim that public conventions do not become
obligatory until ratified is firmly established,” at least in view of the clear division of the U.S.
treaty-making power), with Bruce Stein, Note, The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the
Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 456 (1982) (“According to international law, the ‘monarch
cannot, in honor, refuse to ratify a Convention made by a minister with full powers, unless it can
be proved that the minister had remarkably and openly deviated from his instructions.’” (quoting W. STULL HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 26 (1964))).
210. Cf. HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 32 (reprinting a resolution pledging ratification that
was “of a type adopted several times by the Senate during the early administrations” and observing that “[l]ater Senates did not bind themselves thus in advance, and would have deemed
such a promise incompatible with their right to withhold their assent from any provision of a
treaty submitted to them”).
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then, that presidential authority was inconsistent with claims of Senate authority—or at least should have provoked a greater hue and
211
cry—is fundamentally misguided.
Early practice was highly consistent with this depiction.212 President Washington, entrusted by Congress with a new diplomatic rela213
tions apparatus, seems to have conscientiously explored means of
214
securing Senate advice, yet he clearly considered himself free to
211. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 402-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the executive in the
formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices . . . .”); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 563 (statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 11, 1787) (“Neither the President nor
the Senate solely can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other and are so balanced, as
to produce security to the people.”); 10 id. at 1391-92 (statement of Francis Corbin):
[The treaty power] is . . . given to the President and the Senate (who represent the
States in their individual capacities) conjointly.—In this it differs from every Government we know.—It steers with admirable dexterity between the two extremes—
neither leaving it to the Executive, as in most other Governments, nor to the
Legislative, which would too much retard such negotiations.
212. Practices in the Washington administration may illuminate both because of their
proximity to 1787 and because of the attention paid by the institutions involved toward the delicate, precedent-setting nature of their relations. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 232 (1989). This is
not to say, however, that the mere existence of a practice determines its constitutionality. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) (“That an unconstitutional action has been
taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.”).
The further one proceeds, however, the more substantial the objections become to employing
post-ratification history. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 108, at 174 & n.171.
213. The creation of the new government’s Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789 made
clear, for example, that the President was to direct the department’s secretary in his duties,
which were to be “agreeable to the Constitution” and related to matters such as diplomatic instructions and negotiations with foreign governments. An act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1 Stat. 28 (1789). Representative Sedgewick, addressing the issue of the President’s removal power, reasoned that “[i]f . . . the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the mere instrument of the President, one would suppose, on the
principle of expediency, this officer should be dependent upon him.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 522
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789). More generally, this department was among the few not defined in
terms of carrying out congressional mandates, thus permitting the President to “determine what
should be done, as well as how it should be done.” THACH, supra note 138, at 160. See generally
HUNT, supra note 146, at 54-78 (describing the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs).
214. Much has been made of Washington’s personal appearance before the Senate in 1789
in connection with the Treaty with the Creek Indians, when his failure to obtain instantaneous
advice and consent on his proposed instructions led him to forswear any further appearance—
and marked the last occasion that any President personally sought out the Senate’s counsel. See,
e.g., CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 24-26; id. at 24 (concluding
that the episode demonstrates a mutual understanding that the Senate’s advice and consent includes “discussion in advance of the course of action to be pursued”); HAYDEN, supra note 135,
at 20-27 (recounting Washington’s unsuccessful visit to the Senate). But as Currie recognizes,
Washington also sought counsel where it was anything but obligatory, such as in his attempt in
1790 to solicit advice from the Supreme Court. See CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS,
supra note 135, at 25 n.136. In the case of treaties, Washington had just beforehand indicated
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215

proceed without the Senate’s permission. The Senate, in keeping
with its new constitutional role, felt equally at liberty to withhold consent from any resulting treaty, but it did so on substantive grounds,
216
not based on the President’s failure to seek advice beforehand. Notably, the Senate acquiesced in President Washington’s decision to
217
take over instructing Jay in his negotiations with the British, and
when the sensitive negotiations with Spain were resumed, the Senate
was provided with only partial instructions on navigation rights,218
uncertainty as to the nature of his constitutional obligation. See Sentiments Expressed to the
Senate Committee on the Mode of Communication Between the President and the Senate on
Treaties and Nominations (Aug. 8, 1789), in 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 373,
373-74; Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee at a Second Conference on the Mode of
Communication Between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations (Aug. 10,
1789), in 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 377, 378-79. The Senate’s response to
both sets of suggestions was wholly concerned with matters of form. See 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE
JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 19 (Aug. 21, 1789); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 184,
at 56 (noting the Senate’s apparent acquiescence in Washington’s treaty with the Southern Indians). At the same time, as Washington had already had cause to guess, the Senate was treating
Indian treaties differently, and might thus have regarded his initial consultation with them as
constituting the entirety of their advice and consent on the matter. See, e.g., Letter from Washington to the Senate (Sept. 17, 1789), in 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 406-08;
1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 27-28 (Sept. 18, 1789); id. at 28 (Sept. 22,
1789); see also CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 26-28 (describing
the evolution of treaty-making practices with respect to Indian tribes); HAYDEN, supra note
135, at 11-16 (same). It is difficult to conclude that President Washington’s thinking about the
Treaty Clause, or that of the Senate, was fixed in any meaningful sense at the time he appeared
before the Senate, as his subsequent change of practice would seem to confirm.
215. On one occasion, the cabinet advised him that consulting the Senate would only tip off
the British. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 37-39; ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 96 (1976). On other occasions, Washington negotiated and concluded Indian treaties without consulting the Senate and without any
apparent exigent circumstances. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 34-37 (discussing a proposed
treaty with the Wabash and Illinois Indians).
216. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 37 (“In no case did the [Senate] take exception to being . . . ignored [by the President before and during his negotiations] . . . .”).
217. See id. at 71; Instructions to Jay as Envoy Extraordinary (May 6, 1794), in 4 JAY
PAPERS, supra note 171, at 10, 10-21 (transmitting Jay’s instructions from the executive branch
via Secretary of State Edmund Randolph). The Senate did, however, provide informal counsel.
See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 72-73 (“[T]he Senatorial group still exercised a powerful if not
a predominant influence” in instructing Jay before he left for England, although their input was
passed on through “informal conferences.”).
218. After the Senate confirmed the appointment of commissioners, see 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 99 (Jan. 24, 1792), Spain expressed the desire to negotiate over commercial matters not described in the President’s nomination message. Washington
returned to the Senate with proposed instructions on those matters, see id. at 106 (Mar. 7, 1792),
which the Senate approved, see id. at 115 (Mar. 16, 1792). But the instructions sent to the commissioners on the original topics for negotiation—including the infamous question of navigation
rights to the Mississippi—were never provided to the Senate. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at
56; see also Report on Negotiations with Spain (Mar. 18, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
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with the apparent result that Senate ratification was promised only on
219
the matters more specifically detailed. It is surely possible to lean
too heavily on some early assertions of presidential authority—such
as Hamilton’s defense of the neutrality proclamation of 1793220 or
John Marshall’s defense of President Adams’ conduct in the Jonathan
221
Robbins incident. But both controversies and more workaday pracJEFFERSON 296, 296 (Charles T. Cullen et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS]
(stating that the enclosed instructions from Secretary of State Jefferson to President Washington would be provided to the commissioners appointed to negotiate with Spain, but not stating
that they would be provided to the Senate). See generally HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 54-57
(describing the appointment of the commissioners and the Senate’s role in this treaty-making
endeavor). It should be emphasized, however, that the President had pledged to instruct the
commissioners as to “the foundation of our rights to navigate the Mississippi, and to hold our
southern boundary at the 31st degree of latitude, and that each of these [was] to be a sine qua
non” of the treaty. 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 107 (Mar. 7, 1792).
219. The President’s nomination of the commissioners described the topics for a treaty only
in general terms, but pointedly “sav[ed] to the President and Senate their respective rights as to
the ratification of the same.” Id. at 96 (Jan. 11, 1792). The Senate confirmation repeated the
proviso. See id. at 99 (Jan. 24, 1792). The Senate’s subsequent promise to advise and consent to a
conforming treaty followed Washington’s specific request for advice and consent, albeit with
several additions to the treaty proposed by a Senate Committee. See id. at 106-09 (Mar. 7, 1792)
(documenting Washington’s request and the committee’s recommended additions); id. at 115
(Mar. 16, 1792) (documenting the Senate’s two-thirds acceptance of Washington’s March 7 proposal with the incorporated additions proposed by the committee).
220. In any event, the exchange between Hamilton and Madison regarding President
Washington’s proclamation reveals little about either writer’s view concerning the Senate’s advice function. See, e.g., Powell, The Founders, supra note 128, at 1476 n.13 (“[I]t is unclear what
weight to give [the exchange] as expressions of the authors’ constitutional views.”).
221. Pursuant to a provision of the Jay Treaty, President Adams directed the delivery to the
British Consul of Jonathan Robbins (a/k/a Thomas Nash), who had been accused of murder
during a mutiny aboard a British frigate. Defending President Adams’s decision in Congress,
then-Representative John Marshall declared:
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations. . . .
....
The Executive is not only the Constitutional department, but seems to be the
proper department to which the power in question [that is, the interpretation and
execution of treaty obligations] may most wisely and most safely be confided.
The department, which is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation, with the negotiation of all its treaties, with the power of demanding a reciprocal
performance of the article, which is accountable to the nation for the violation of its
engagements with foreign nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation, seems the proper department to be entrusted with the execution of a national
contract like that under consideration.
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800). Justice Sutherland emphasized some of the broader aspects of Marshall’s rhetoric. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) (“The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation . . . . He alone negotiates.”); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942)
(“Power to [settle the claims of U.S. nationals] certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.’”
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tices shared the premise that the President could at least assume diplomatic authority in the absence of Senate instruction or congressional constraint, and the Treaty Clause was viewed as an important
222
source of this authority.
Early practices also began to disclose the negative, or dormant,
dimension of the treaty power—that is, the notion that the assignment
of treaty functions to the Senate and President entailed the prohibition of practices interfering with these functions. For example, the
House’s attempt to obtain documents relating to the negotiation of
the Jay Treaty was resisted on the ground that releasing the documents would interfere with the President’s exercise of authority under
the Treaty Clause. As President Washington explained, such disclosures would be “extremely impolitic,” potentially endangering future
223
negotiations or causing other harms. But he also clearly claimed
that these policy ends were protected by the Constitution, and spoke
in almost legalistic terms of avoiding a precedent for future encroachments.224
(quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320)). Yet, others have interpreted it more
narrowly—either as consistent with the President’s essentially subordinate responsibilities for
communicating with foreign governments and executing treaties, or even as bespeaking the
President’s subordination to Congress. See GLENNON, supra note 46, at 8 (“[T]he truth is that it
probably never occurred to John Marshall . . . that the President, acting within the Constitution . . . could disregard this congressional restriction.”); Louis Fisher, Evolution of Presidential
and Congressional Powers in Foreign Affairs, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT 20 (Louis W. Koenig et al. eds., 1985); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical
Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998);
see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 351-52 & n.466 (1990) (citing, but disagreeing with, authorities).
222. Marshall, for example, clearly considered that the President’s authority in any particular situation would be augmented in the event of Senate inaction. Thus, he conceded that “Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole
execution of the contract [i.e., treaty]; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive
department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.” 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614
(1800). As Professor Powell observed,
[t]he most likely interpretation . . . . is that [Marshall’s] general assumptions about the
constitutional distribution of authority over foreign affairs were similar to those of
Jefferson in 1790, Washington’s cabinet in the various events of 1793-94, and many
speakers during the 1796 House debates . . . : Whatever authority Congress or the
Senate may have to limit or control presidential discretion, the President ordinarily
has responsibility for the direction of United States foreign policy and the initiation of
diplomatic efforts. As in the 1793 discussions, furthermore, Marshall drew connections between the President’s authority over foreign affairs and his power to direct
“the force of the nation.”
Powell, The Founders, supra note 128, at 1527-28; see also id. at 1532 (drawing the conclusion
that “one interpretive option in Founding-era constitutionalism was to read the Constitution to
accord the President independent authority in the area of foreign affairs”).
223. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
224. See id. at 760-61; see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington
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Whatever the incident’s significance for the relative authority of
the Senate and President, it clearly demonstrated President Washing225
ton’s conviction, with the eventual acquiescence of the House, that
other institutions had no right to intrude on the executive’s negotiating authority. The class of prohibited encroachments was not limited
to rival attempts to enter into binding foreign commitments. Even the
President had no such power under the Treaty Clause. His agreement
with a foreign power, while not to be casually discarded,226 did not
bind the nation until the Senate had consented and the treaty was
ratified.227 The Treaty Clause did, however, ordinarily contemplate
(Mar. 7, 1796), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 159, at 68 (“A discretion in the Executive
Department how far and where to comply in such cases is essential to the due conduct of foreign
negotiations . . . .”).
225. Representative William Smith opined:
The Constitution had assigned to the Executive the business of negotiation with foreign Powers; this House can claim no right by the Constitution to interfere in such
negotiations; every movement of the kind must be considered as an attempt to usurp
powers not delegated, and will be resisted by the Executive; for a concession would
be a surrender of the powers specially delegated to him, and a violation of his trust.
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (1796); see also id. at 745 (noting, in favoring disclosure, that “the
power claimed by the House was not that of negotiating and proposing Treaties; it was not an
active and operative power of making and repealing Treaties; . . . it was only a negative, a restraining power on those subjects over which Congress had the right to legislate”) (Rep. Albert
Gallatin). But cf. HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 51-52 (describing how Washington consciously
kept the House and Senate equally informed during his three-year negotiation of the Treaty
with Algiers of 1795, in accord with Jefferson’s views about proper conduct with treaties requiring substantial legislation); id. at 60-61 (discussing measures by Washington to brief both
houses during early negotiations with Great Britain preceding Jay’s appointment).
226. Thus, Jefferson felt confident in claiming that the President was “the only channel of
communication between this country and foreign nations[;] it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever he
communicates as such, they have a right and are bound to consider as the expression of the nation . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1903)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS].
227. If the President possessed genuinely unilateral authority, it arose from an extra-textual
source independent of the Treaty Clause. For a thorough discussion of the original understanding of the President’s ability to enter into executive agreements, see Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 108, passim. The line between the President’s authority under the Treaty
Clause and his ability to forge sole executive agreements is far from clear, but it would appear
that as the latter power grew more certain, the emphasis on making the President choose between the procedures increased. Compare Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 75 (1884) (permitting the President, while a treaty was pending before the Senate, to act in accord with the
agreement “until the diplomatic negotiations between the two governments on the subject are
finally concluded”), with SEC v. International Swiss Invs. Corp., 895 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1990) (concluding that the Inter-American Convention “has no force until ratified by a twothirds vote of the Senate,” at least as against conflicting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
given stated presidential intention to treat the Convention as requiring ratification rather than
as an executive agreement).
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that the President would be entitled to engage in preparatory acts
without interference. An 1816 report by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which advised against a proposed resolution recommending that the President pursue a treaty with Great Britain on specific terms, asserted that the President’s constitutional responsibility
as the U.S. representative to foreign nations meant that he “must
necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of
success,” and that any interference necessarily diminished that re228
sponsibility.
Whether or not the Committee’s minimalist view of the Senate’s
229
role was constitutionally inevitable —and certainly both the Senate
230
and Congress as a whole have deviated on occasion —its assumption
that there was presidential authority not to enter into foreign engagements was uncontroversial. Even those with reservations about
the federal treaty authority at least endorsed the constitutional
authority of the President to derail unwise international commitments.231 Indeed, the treaty power unavoidably invests the President
with a variety of means to terminate the national intercourse with a
foreign power, even without relying on the more extreme option of

228.

See Foreign Relations Comm. Report of Feb. 15, 1816, in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS
UNITED STATES SENATE 1789-1901, S. DOC. NO. 56231, at 24 (1901).
229. Justice Sutherland took the report’s language at face value. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (adopting a lengthy quote from the report’s
discussion of the President’s role as a representative in international relations). Others, however, dispute its relevance. Michael Glennon, for example, construes the Committee’s report as
referring to “the President’s sole power to communicate, not the power to do its job or that of
the Senate or Congress,” GLENNON, supra note 46, at 24, when in fact the Committee was
plainly addressing the broader question of whether it should employ advice to direct foreign
relations. Raoul Berger simply gives the report the back of his hand, citing contrary views expressed in an earlier report and a subsequent speech by Rufus King, notwithstanding the fact
that the 1816 report demurred to a resolution introduced by King. See Berger, supra note 46, at
30-31. For thorough discussions of the report and its implications, see HAYDEN, supra note 135,
at 199-208; Powell, The Founders, supra note 128, at 1528-33.
230. See, e.g., CRS, supra note 109, at 72-75 (describing nonbinding resolutions and binding
legislation authorizing, calling for, or suggesting presidential negotiation on various topics).
231. See infra text accompanying note 269 (noting concerns that treaties not be too easily
made). An exception may be President Jefferson’s comment that the American “system” on
treaties “was to have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided,” in preference for more
informal relations. Letter from Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (July 18, 1804), in 11 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 226, at 38, 38-39. It is not clear whether Jefferson was speaking of a constraint imposed by the Constitution, or a more ephemeral party preference, but his comments
do not indicate any indulgence for commitments entered into without federal control.
OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
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232

derecognition. And there appears to be no precedent for the notion
that the Senate or Congress could compel the President to enter into
233
negotiations against his will. That challenge, instead, has come from
below.
B. The Treaty Power’s Relation to State Authority
Much discussion of the relationship between federal treatymaking authority and state power concerns the limits, if any, on the
potential field for federal treaties.234 Even broader reflections on the
relationship between foreign affairs and federalism are inclined toward this focus on the end-game of treaty-making, as with assertions
that the federal interest in diplomacy is protected by the exclusive
235
power to enter into binding treaties. But such accounts neglect the
degree to which both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were concerned with establishing a federal monopoly over the
process of bargaining with foreign powers, not just its results. State
defiance of this monopoly was endemic at the beginning, and was
recognized as a threat to the successful negotiation—as well as avoidance—of preemptive federal treaties. Low-level defiance has persisted ever since, but has only recently come to be viewed by some as
legitimate, largely because the standard view (or, as Jack Goldsmith
puts it, “popular lore”236) of state diplomacy as frustrating common
ends has been lost.237
232. The President has a variety of powers in this area:
It is on [the President’s] initiative and responsibility that the treaty–making process is
undertaken; he determines what provisions the United States wishes to have embodied in the treaty; he decides whether reservations or amendments that the Senate attaches to a draft treaty are acceptable to him and should be submitted to the other
parties to the treaty; and, even if the Senate by two-thirds vote approves a treaty that
he has negotiated, he may, influenced by change of heart or of political conditions,
decide not to ratify it and at the last minute file it in his wastebasket.
HOLLIS W. BARBER, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1953). The President may
also determine whether to recognize a foreign government as the subject for negotiations, but
that authority has not always been respected. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 43-45.
233. Indeed, there is precedent to the contrary. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (“Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade
it.”); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to enforce,
on constitutional grounds, a statutory requirement that the Secretary of State initiate certain
negotiations with foreign countries to achieve protection for sea turtles).
234. For an excellent elaboration and critique of the “nationalist view” of the treaty-making
power, which rejects any such limitations, see Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29.
235. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1643-50, 1707.
236. Id. at 1644.
237. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1311 (1999) [hereinafter Flaherty, Are We to Be a
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1. Text and Structure. Focusing on the Missouri v. Holland238
problem, Martin Flaherty recently opined that the constitutional
clauses granting the federal government “treaty-making and corollary
powers . . . are, on their face, as broad or broader as any other such
provisions in the document,”239 and that “[c]onversely, when the text
does refer to states in this area, it proclaims the exclusivity of federal
power in no uncertain terms.”240
Can it be that it was all so simple then? The “Power . . . to make
Treaties” is certainly vested in the President, by and with the advice
241
and consent of the Senate; treaties made “under the authority of the
United States” are surely part of the supreme law of the land;242 and
states are expressly prohibited from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”243 But states may enter into an “Agreement
or Compact” with a foreign power, if so permitted by Congress,244 and
it may be impossible for us to recapture any clear distinction between
such agreements and the prohibited treaties, alliances, and confederations.245 The puzzling result, it has been suggested, is that there is no
distinction between the preparatory steps that a state may take toward compacts and the federal government’s exclusive exercise of
treaty-making—each is free, in other words, to negotiate toward its
own legitimate ends.246
The Convention and ratification debates offer little insight,
probably because the Constitution’s prohibition on state treatymaking was thought to be derived directly from the Articles of Con247
federation—a point emphasized by Publius. To Madison, the only
Nation?] (urging recovery of “another reason for the Constitution that most of us learn in high
school—that the national government under the Articles of Confederation was hopelessly weak,
especially in national affairs”).
238. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
239. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, supra note 237, at 1305.
240. Id. at 1306.
241. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
242. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
243. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
244. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
245. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-63 & n.12
(1978) (“The records of the Constitutional Convention . . . are barren of any clue as to the precise contours of the agreements and compacts governed by the Compact Clause.”). For the sake
of convenience, I will refer to the class of “treaties, alliances, and confederations” as “treaties”
and the class of “agreements or compacts” as “compacts,” except where necessary to avoid confusion.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 333-58.
247. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (as-
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differences were that the Constitution was “disembarrassed . . . of an
exception under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by
248
regulations of the States,” and that the federal government was expressly given the power to appoint and receive not just ambassadors,
but also “other public Ministers and Consuls.”249 Such additions, in his
view, were consistent with the notion that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”250
To understand the Constitution, then, we must recover the
meaning of the Articles of Confederation. Article IX gave the United
States the “sole and exclusive right and power . . . of sending and reserting that the power to make treaties and the power to send and receive ambassadors “speak
their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation . . . .”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The prohibition
against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and
for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution.”); David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63, 80-81 (1965) (explaining that the Constitution expanded the prohibition
against state treaty-making by eliminating the possibility of congressional consent); Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1644 (“But the foreign relations provisions of Article I, Section
10 were borrowed directly from the Articles of Confederation.”). Joseph Story’s account is
worth quoting at length:
The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations, constituted a part of
the articles of confederation, and was from thence transferred in substance into the
constitution. The sound policy, nay, the necessity of it, for the preservation of any national government, is so obvious, as to strike the most careless mind. If every state
were at liberty to enter into any treaties, alliances, or confederacies, with any foreign
state, it would become utterly subversive of the power confided to the national government on the same subject. Engagements might be entered into by different states,
utterly hostile to the interests of neighbouring or distant states; and thus the internal
peace and harmony of the Union might be destroyed, or put in jeopardy. A foundation might thus be laid for preferences, and retaliatory systems, which would render
the power of taxation, and the regulation of commerce, by the national government,
utterly futile. Besides; the intimate dangers to the Union ought not to be overlooked,
by thus nourishing within its own bosom a perpetual source of foreign corrupt influence, which, in times of political excitement and war, might be wielded to the destruction of the independence of the country. This, indeed, was deemed, by the authors of
the Federalist, too clear to require any illustration. The corresponding clauses in the
confederation were still more strong, direct, and exact, in their language and import.
3 STORY, supra note 124, § 1349 (footnotes omitted).
248. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264-65 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Article IX barred commercial treaties that would restrain the states “from imposing such imposts
and duties on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever.” See ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IX. The “result [was] that . . . Congress could regulate trade by treaty, but
could provide no effective check upon conflicting state regulations—a deficiency which would
cause Congress, its committees, and later secretaries of foreign affairs considerable embarrassment.” MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 90; see also infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
249. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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ceiving ambassadors [and] entering into treaties and alliances.” Article VI provided in relevant part that “[n]o State without the consent
of [Congress] . . . shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy
from, or enter into any conferrence [sic], agreement, alliance, or
252
treaty with any King prince or state.” Congressional consent was
required, in other words, for any state desiring to exercise those rights
otherwise entrusted “solely” and “exclusively” to Congress.253 From
the presumptive prohibition—barring state activity unless permission
were obtained—one can infer that consent needed to be obtained be254
forehand. The same provision also required consent for the diplomatic missions that might be thought a prerequisite for reaching
agreement. There, even more clearly, consent meant consent ob251. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
252. Id. art. VI. I assume for purposes of this discussion that “any King prince or state” has
the same scope as the references to “foreign powers” in the Constitution. See infra note 499 and
accompanying text (discussing state relations with foreign corporations). But see Timothy C.
Blank, Significant Development: A Proposed Application of the Compact Clause, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 1067, 1076-78 (1986) (speculating that the Constitution, by referring to compacts with
“foreign powers,” expanded the reach of the prohibition on state foreign relations activities articulated in the Articles of Confederation). The Articles lacked any comparable provision for
congressional review of interstate compacts, such as those resolving boundary matters, but instead provided a special mechanism for dispute resolution. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
art. IX; Engdahl, supra note 247, at 81.
253. Though the text is unclear, it appears that the “consent” of Congress was required for
“any conferrence [sic], agreement, alliance, or treaty,” just as for the sending and receiving of an
“embassy.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI. Otherwise, states would seem to have
lacked any provision for making arrangements with foreign powers, and the new Constitution’s
terms would have created a new class of permissible state-based foreign relations—a result colliding both with the supposed lack of meaningful change and the direction of constitutional reform as understood by Madison and others. See Draft of ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV
(July 12, 1776), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 79 (“No Colony or Colonies,
without the Consent of the United States assembled, shall send any Embassy to or receive any
Embassy from, or enter into any Treaty, Convention or Conference with the King or Kingdom
of Great-Britain, or any foreign Prince or State . . . .”).
254. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1644 n.121 (assuming that “Article VI
of the Articles prohibited treaty-making by states without prior congressional consent” (emphasis added)); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (stating that “the states were required to seek the consent of
Congress before entering into” international agreements other than treaties). The July 12, 1776,
draft was much clearer, providing in Article V that “[n]o two or more colonies shall enter into
any Treaty, Confederation or Alliance whatever between them, without the previous and free
Consent and Allowance of the United States assembled, specifying accurately the Purposes for
which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.” Draft of ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV (July 12, 1776), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 79
(emphasis added). The substance of this provision was substantially preserved in the final Article VI, except that the “previous and free” qualifiers to “consent,” and the reference to the
“Allowance” of the United States, were eliminated. There is no surviving explanation of the
change.
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tained beforehand, given the then-traditional means of instructing
treaty negotiations. Consistent with this construction, Madison bemoaned the existence of interstate compacts made “without previous
application [to Congress] or subsequent apology” as an “encroach255
ment on the federal authority.”
Because the Constitution lacks the Articles’s express requirement of consent for state embassies, it is unclear whether consent was
supposed to be a prerequisite for negotiating or even for entering into
256
compacts. But the widespread assumption that the Constitution
continued the Articles’s bar on independent state diplomacy is more
257
than tenable. The formal assignment to the President of control
over diplomatic matters was intended to expand federal authority, not
contract it,258 and was perceived by Madison to be one of the many in255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 316 (Madison’s notes).
256. Like the Articles, the Constitution does not specify when “consent” is required for
agreements or compacts, prohibiting states only from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
257. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the
embassy prohibition as an example of how “even the Articles of Confederation” diminished
state independence and sovereignty); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575-76 (1840)
(“It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign
relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the several state authorities.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824)
(“By the confederation . . . [n]o state . . . could send or receive an embassy; nor make any treaty;
nor enter into any compact with another State, or with a foreign power; nor lay duties, interfering with treaties which had been entered into by Congress.”); infra text accompanying notes
339-58 (discussing Holmes); see also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1297-98 (1996) (“[F]ew would argue that states possess authority to send and receive ambassadors, even though the Constitution does not explicitly
deny this power to the states.”); Ramsey, supra note 29, at 393-94 (“[I]t seems unlikely that a
state, or even a convention of states, could send or receive ambassadors on behalf of the United
States.”).
Professor Goldsmith criticizes the assumption that “this quintessentially international activity should be anything other than an exclusive prerogative of the federal government.” Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1707 & nn.367-68. He notes that “it is far from inconceivable that states retain some authority to ‘send and receive ambassadors’”; to the extent that such
activity “impinges on traditional diplomatic prerogatives,” the combination of the “express prohibition against states entering into treaties or making compacts or waging war,” together with
the preemptive force of federal enactments, will sufficiently attenuate the possibility of state
interference. Id. at 1707. For the reasons noted above, though, it seems highly unlikely that the
Constitution would have so substantially improved on the authority of the states to conduct foreign affairs. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the adequacy of positive substitutes for the
dormant treaty theory).
258. The President was entrusted to “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, [to] appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls,” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” id. art. II, § 3. Although
Hamilton, as Publius, stressed the essentially formal nature of these powers, his remarks were
intended to minimize the significance of this expansion relative to the Senate, not relative to the
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stances in which the new Constitution tended to “obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power”
259
by the states at Congress’s expense. The other assumptions of the
Articles had not changed—under prevailing diplomatic practices,
consent would ordinarily precede negotiation (at least),260 and would
certainly be necessary to preempt state attempts to engage in the prohibited negotiation of treaties. Still, because the Constitution’s text is
unclear on this point, it is worth examining the problems to which the
Articles and the Constitution were responding.
2. Understanding at the Founding. The treaty powers assigned
to the federal government by the Constitution were designed to
address specific problems experienced under the Articles of
Confederation. The clearest problem was that states had failed to
abide by federally negotiated treaties.261 This sorely embarrassed the
Continental Congress262 and had material consequences: for example,
states. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[I]t was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner than that there should
be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign
minister . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 518 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“As ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed constitution can make no other difference than to render their characters . . . more respectable . . . .”). See generally HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37-39 (discussing the significance of the
President’s powers in a horizontal context).
259. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison cited, in particular, the ability to receive consuls from abroad, which had not been specifically provided under the Articles.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 206. This line of argument may seem inconsistent with the preceding interpretation of the Treaty Clause, in which the Senate’s power of “advice and consent” was construed to permit Senate intervention after presidential negotiation—
even notwithstanding the additional prerogative of “advice,” which may be thought to
emphasize the temporal priority of legislative counsel. As indicated in the text, the varying
interpretations of the Compact and Treaty Clauses are best explained by the different problems
confronting the Framers, which would have led them to be more concerned about state
freelancing and less confident concerning alternative means of controlling it. As a purely textual
matter, though, there is a patent difference between the Treaty Clause’s grant of authority to
the President, subject to advice and consent, and the Constitution’s prohibition of state
authority subject to a permissive exception, particularly when the absolute bar on state treatymaking is considered.
261. Treaties were not clearly designated as the supreme law of the land; even had they
been, as Frederick Marks has emphasized, “[t]here was no federal judiciary to decide cases in
dispute between federal and state governments, and no coercive force to back up such a judiciary had it existed.” MARKS, supra note 144, at 3.
262. See DANIEL GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW
OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 75 (1985) (“For men like Hamilton the inability of
Congress to fulfill its treaty obligations was embarrassing and troubling . . . .”); see also
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 316 (Madison’s notes):
The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which
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state failures to heed provisions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris were
exploited by the British as a basis for their own failure to withdraw
263
militarily. The Supremacy Clause, together with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, was intended to allow the federal government to
ensure U.S. compliance with its international obligations.264 These
treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be
the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among
the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that
no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole.
263. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 5-11. British negotiators were fully aware that Congress
generally lacked authority to enforce obligations against states. See MORRIS, FORGING, supra
note 144, at 364 n.5 (observing that Americans made clear to the British that “Congress lacked
the power to enforce treaty obligations”); MORRIS, PEACEMAKERS, supra note 183, at 379-80
(describing the aggressive negotiation by the British of the Treaty of Paris and noting the states’
failure to abide by the treaty’s provisions for restitution for state seizure of British property); see
also PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776-1814, at 121 (1993) (contrasting the British refusal
to negotiate trade concessions for America with a liberal British treaty with France and concluding that this difference resulted from America’s inability to enforce its treaties). It is clear
now that the British reluctance to vacate their forts was foreordained. See, e.g., BEMIS, supra
note 168, at 70-72 (discussing the relationship between Great Britain’s refusal to abandon its
posts and the states’ refusal to abide by the Treaty of Paris); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note
184, at 126 (stating that that the inability of Congress to enforce its treaties was a “settled excuse” for British resistance to the withdrawal of troops demanded by the Treaty of Paris, and
the resistance was actually prompted by British concern over its control of the fur trade and
over the military security of Canada); MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 201-03.
At the time, though, Jay reacted to the British allegations of treaty infringements by
drafting a strong analysis of the incompetence of states to make, interpret, or breach any compacts whatsoever, which Congress then adopted. See Letter from President of Congress to the
State Governors (Apr. 13, 1787), in 3 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 472, 473 (“Treaties
must be implicitly received and observed by every member of the Nation; for as State Legislatures are not competent to the making of such Compacts or Treaties, so neither are they competent
in that capacity, authoritatively to decide on, or ascertain the construction and Sense of them.”
(emphasis added)); see also MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 202 (describing Jay’s letter
and the resulting congressional resolution as the foundation for the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause).
264. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 14-15; Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, supra note 237,
at 1312-15; see also, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 164, 316 (Madison’s notes);
James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 539, 548. As Hamilton observed:
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the
peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the
passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that
the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their
safety, on so precarious a foundation?
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
As is made clear elsewhere in this discussion, Article VI supremacy does not by itself obviate the need to accord preemptive force to the federal treaty power; among other things, satis-
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same experiences also suggested that America needed a means of
265
forcing other nations to comply with their obligations. The power
under the Constitution to regulate domestic and foreign commerce
was thought to be essential in forcing other nations to cease
discriminatory conduct against U.S. commerce266 and in protecting
factory treaties could not easily be attained were the states entitled to negotiate on their own
behalf, or on behalf of the United States. Professor Ramsey’s recent suggestion, in considering
Representative Lee Hamilton’s concerns about the Massachusetts Burma law, that “a treaty
relating to sanctions would be drafted to remove state as well as federal sanctions and would
preempt state law under Article VI,” see Ramsey, supra note 29, at 382 n.148 (emphasis added),
is correct only to the extent that a treaty could be so drafted. But Representative Hamilton may
have had in mind the federal anti-apartheid sanctions, which preempted state sanctions neither
when passed nor when repealed, or trade accords that have gone to great length to exempt state
laws from challenge. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102,
108 Stat. 4809, 4815-19 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)) (barring anyone other than the
United States, including private parties, from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction based
on its consistency with the statute, as well as providing a process by which the United States is to
consult with the states and provide notice to Congress before taking legal action against a state
or local government for noncompliance with the statute); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1087 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5001), repealed by
South African Democratic Transition Support, Pub. L. No. 103-149, §§ 4(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)(1),
(c)(2), 107 Stat. 1504 (1993) (urging states, local governments, and private entities to repeal restrictions on economic interactions with South Africa). Whether or not this poses a substantial
additional hurdle to the exercise of national power, it plainly shows that Article VI does not invariably obviate the need for other forms of federal preemption.
Nor, conversely, can it fairly be said that the dormant treaty power would render “the
treaty provisions of Article VI largely superfluous.” Ramsey, supra note 29, at 406. Not only is
Article VI necessary in order to maintain the significance of Senate consent and presidential
ratification, cf. id. at 406 n.232 (conceding that “Article VI still might serve to make treaties superior to federal law”), but it is required to permit treaties to preempt state and local laws that
do not interfere with the dormant treaty power, yet are of national concern, see infra text accompanying notes 484, 527.
265. See, e.g., James Wilson’s Opening Address to Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov.
24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 791, 800 (citing the “lamentable history” of America’s inability to retard imports (or at least gain revenue through tariffs),
its inability to export, and its inability to “perform treaties on our own part, or to compel a performance on the part of the contracting nation”).
266. See Marks, supra note 165, at 308 (claiming that “commercial problems caused by inability to retaliate effectively against foreign trade restrictions tended, more than anything else,
to unite the new nation” and pointing out that “by 1786 it was evident to all but a few that the
states acting individually would never achieve the uniformity necessary to retaliate against external constraints or to vest Congress with requisite power. This despite the fact that nearly all
states agreed on the need to do so.”); see also ALBERT ANTHONY GIESECKE, AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789, ch. 6 (1910) (describing the prevalence and failings
of state-level trade legislation); MARKS, supra note 144, at 69-70, 80-83 (discussing disappointing
attempts by individual states to mount retaliatory policies); VERNON G. SETSER, THE
COMMERCIAL RECIPROCITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1829, at 63-65 (1937) (concluding that the lack of uniformity permitted individual states to profit from restrictions adopted
by neighboring states, allowed Great Britain to invoke restrictions on trade to only those vessels
carrying goods from that state, and gave rise to embarrassing conflicts); Letter from John Ad-
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other vital interests.
The Framers were not content, however, merely to achieve universal compliance with existing treaties as an end in itself; to the contrary, enforcement was also seen as a means of enhancing the federal
268
government’s power to create treaties. Although some were concerned that treaties not be too easily made,269 there was also an overams to John Jay (June 26, 1785), in 2 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 672-73 (emphasizing the need for uniform measures); Letter from Adams to Jay (July 19, 1785), in 2 EMERGING
NATION, supra note 179, at 699 (same). A congressional committee reported in 1784 that
unless the United States can act as a nation and be regarded as such by foreign powers, and unless Congress for this purpose shall be vested with powers competent to
the protection of Commerce they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade
and without such reciprocity our foreign commerce must decline and eventually be
annihilated.
26 JCC, supra note 144, at 318-19 (Apr. 30, 1784); see also Letter from Adams to Jay (May 8,
1785), in 2 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 620, 623 (urging that “it behoves [sic] the
United States then to knit themselves together . . . form their foreign Commerce into a System,
and encourage their own Navigation and Seamen, and to these Ends their carrying Trade” and
expressing the fear that “[w]e shall never be able to do this, unless Congress are vested with full
Power, under the Limitations prescribed of 15 Years and the Concurrence of Nine States, of
forming Treaties of Commerce with foreign Powers”). Jay was so convinced that he advocated
delaying the conclusion of treaties where possible, and advocated limiting the duration of those
treaties that were too far along, because the advent of a centralized government would so improve the U.S. negotiating posture. See MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 207-08. This argument was naturally invoked in attempts to gain support for the new Constitution. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 85-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The American
estimation of foreign perceptions seems to have been accurate. See MARKS, supra note 144, at
83 (quoting a British magazine that dubbed the American states as the “thirteen Dis-United
States”); MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 194 (citing the British assurance that this dissention would prevent Americans from taking measures against Great Britain); ONUF & ONUF,
supra note 264, at 120 (citing the British perception of this disharmony and sentiments that the
Americans did not merit serious attention).
267. Jay, perhaps having the Mississippi mess in mind, was particularly attentive to this potential. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 47-48 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (assuring
that “[i]n the formation of treaties, [one government] will regard the interest of the whole, and
the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole” and declaring that one
government “can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular
part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies
can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system”).
268. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall, elaborating the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine in Brown v. Maryland, recounted that
[t]he oppressed and degraded state of commerce, previous to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign nations, with a single
view to their own interests; and our disunited efforts to counteract their restrictions
were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the
power of making treaties; but the inability of the federal government to enforce them
had become so apparent as to render that power in a great degree useless.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827); see also Spiro, Foreign Relations,
supra note 29, at 1230.
269. Such comments are occasionally invoked as a guide for interpreting the intended scope
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whelming consensus on the need to maximize U.S. leverage through
270
unified, centralized treaty negotiations. This was understood to require not only greater substantive federal authority, but also the
means to prudently exercise it. The goal of becoming “one nation” for
foreign affairs,271 rather than a “thirteen-headed sovereign,”272 was to
be promoted internally by replacing state-centered decisionmaking
with the representation of state interests in the Senate.273 Externally,
the new Constitution would dispel any foreign uncertainty about
274
where legislative competence lay.
of the treaty power. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 1, at 442 n.2 (quoting Convention participants
in support of a limited reading); Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 410-11 (same).
But they were made for a variety of other purposes. Gouverneur Morris made the point in advocating an amendment that would have permitted treaties to be binding only where ratified by
law—but he failed to persuade others at the Convention, and he seemed in any event to be
mainly concerned about treaties of alliance. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 39293 (Madison’s notes). Madison, too, remarked that “it had been too easy in the present Congress to make Treaties,” id. at 548—perhaps an allusion to the Mississippi—but spoke for his
own proposal to make treaties of peace easier, see id. at 540. Finally, James Wilson projected
that there would be few treaties, but he was concerned chiefly with minimizing the case against
the Senate by stressing how infrequently it would meet, and secondarily with the difficulties
posed by European alliances. See James Wilson, Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787),
in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 831, 851.
270. See CRANDALL, supra note 206, at 50; LANG, supra note 262, at 80-81 (discussing this
need as highlighted by the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation); Marks, supra note 165,
at 308 (noting that “by 1786 it was evident to all but a few that the States acting individually”
would never be able to maximize American bargaining power). See generally BEMIS, supra note
168, ch. 5 (describing dissatisfaction with negotiations during the Jeffersonian period and the
War of 1812); MARKS, supra note 144, ch. 2 (describing the rise of nationalist sentiment regarding commercial authority); id. at 146-51 (describing a Convention debate on this topic).
271. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(declaring that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in 10
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 218, at 603 (instructing that national government should “make
us one nation as to foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in Domestic ones”).
272. Paul, supra note 221, at 730.
273. Thus, under the Constitution, it was no longer necessary to prevail upon at least nine
states in order to secure congressional approval for a treaty or to pursue certain commercial
matters through the wholly independent agencies of the 13 states. See MORRIS, FORGING, supra
note 144, at 91 (detailing problems of “indifference and irresponsibility” that plagued the delegates to the Continental Congress); Paul, supra note 221, at 730-31 (detailing the weaknesses of
the Union and their effects on America’s place in the world). The fact that the Senate was expected to defend state interests has been emphasized in the recent literature. See Bradley, The
Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 412; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1645. However,
the difference between the federal expression of state interests and independent state action has
perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated—nor has the intended function of the President in
checking state preferences. See supra text accompanying notes 193-99.
274. For representative expressions of uncertainty, see Letter from W.S. Smith to John Jay
(Apr. 1, 1787), in 5 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 183, at 45960 (“‘[W]ith respect to the American Governments, . . . we do not know whether they are under
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An indispensable assumption of this new scheme was that the
Constitution would strengthen the principle of federal exclusivity that
the Articles of Confederation had already attempted to instill. The
risk that states would reciprocate the occasional interest of foreign
nations in establishing formal diplomatic relations was not considered
great—on that score, an occasional admonition from the national
275
government was generally thought sufficient. There remained the
risk, however, that individual states would sap the national government’s negotiating authority through less direct means. In addition to
276
their authority over foreign commerce, states engaged foreign gov277
ernments on matters as prosaic as loans and as fundamental as po278
litical independence. As Madison put it, shortly before the Constituone head, directed by many, or whether they have any head at all.’” (quoting Lord Grenville));
id. at 460; Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (Apr. 21, 1788), in 3
EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 761, 762 (expressing uncertainty about Congress’s competency).
275. Foreign interest in conducting 13-part relations seems to have been easily rebuffed. In
1781, John Adams resisted a proposal for separate negotiations between Great Britain and each
of the 13 states. As he reported to the French, such an approach would breach the Articles of
Confederation, and it would be a “public disrespect and contempt offered to the constitution of
the nation” for any foreign power to so circumvent the Congress. Letter from John Adams to
Vergennes (July 21, 1781), in 4 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note
183, at 595. According to Adams, “[t]here is no method . . . to convey anything to the people of
America but through the Congress of the United States, nor any way of negociating [sic] with
them but by means of that body.” Id. at 596; see also MARKS, supra note 144, at 123 (discussing
the demand by Great Britain “for thirteen ambassadors from the United States”); MORRIS,
FORGING, supra note 144, at 66-67; Letter from Jay to Adams (Aug. 3, 1785), in 2 EMERGING
NATION, supra note 179, at 720 (“There is no Reason to suspect that the different States even
wish to send Ministers to foreign Powers in any other Way than the one directed by the Confederation.”); Letter from Adams to Jay (May 8, 1785), in 2 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at
621 (noting settled authority under the Articles and viewing the contrary view of British officials
as attributable either to misunderstanding or a desire for delay). For one account of an inadvertent breach by a Swedish consul, and a swift reaction by Jay, see Gary D. Olson, The Soderstrom
Incident: A Reflection upon Federal-State Relations Under the Articles of Confederation, 55 N.Y.
HIST. SOC’Y Q. 109 (1971).
Rufus King’s assessment at the Convention was not inaccurate:
The states were not “sovereigns” in the sense contended for by some. They did not
possess the peculiar features of sovereignty. They could not make war, nor peace, nor
alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they
could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could
not hear any propositions from such Sovereign.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 323 (Madison’s notes).
276. See supra note 266.
277. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 4.
278. Vermonters, for example, who had intrigued with the British throughout the Revolutionary War in order to gain independence from New York and New Hampshire, were bought
off only by false promises of statehood near the close of the war, and they continued to deal directly with Great Britain through the 1780s. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 137, at 86-87 (conclud-
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tional Convention, “[e]xamples of [encroachments by the states on
the federal authority] are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen
in almost every case where any favorite object of a State shall present
279
a temptation.”
These activities imperiled the national interest in a number of regards. State trading policies, even if unilateral, risked impairing common negotiating efforts. Seemingly benign decisions, like the efforts
by some states to resume trade with Great Britain upon the cessation
of hostilities, had been “disastrous” for ongoing efforts by U.S. negotiators to achieve commercial concessions as part of the general
280
peace. Conversely, separate attempts at retaliation came to be regarded not only as ineffectual, but also as posing the risk of diplomatic contretemps and counterattack against the entire nation.281
ing that this and similar controversies helped weaken the Articles of Confederation). Jay was
also suspicious of ties between Vermont and Canada, and he suspected that Shay’s Rebellion of
1786 had been assisted by the British in Canada. See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 34.
279. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDERS: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 83, 83
(Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
280. MARKS, supra note 144, at 151; see also LANG, supra note 262, at 76 (discussing Sheffield’s view that individual American states would compete for British trade, making the treaty
unnecessary); Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes (Apr. 15, 1783), in 2
EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 89, 89-90 (forecasting, and criticizing, the premature
rush of different states for British trade); RAKOVE, supra note 146, at 346 (pointing out that
“some delegates already believed that the country had to be protected from its own lust for
British goods”).
Other state attempts to grant concessions to particular nations with generosity backfired
because of treaty rights already fashioned for others. See 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 676, 678-83
(Oct. 13, 1787) (adopting resolutions apologizing to the Netherlands for Virginia measures that
favored import of French brandies and reprinting the views of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs);
see also id. at 522-26 (reprinting a committee report concerning those Virginia measures); infra
text accompanying notes 297-300. Jefferson had anticipated this problem. See Answers to
Démeunier’s First Queries (Jan. 24, 1786), in 10 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 218, at 11, 1516.
281. Hamilton remarked that “[s]everal States have endeavored by separate prohibitions,
restrictions, and exclusions to influence the conduct of [Great Britain] in this particular,” and he
warned that “the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing
and dissimilar views in the States, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will
continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He also
noted the prospect of embarrassment: “The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of
umbrage and complaint to others . . . .” Id. at 144. Hamilton warned that “it is to be feared that
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.” Id. at 144-45; see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (proposing
that “the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will un-
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Most generally, the Framers saw the coordinated conduct of foreign
policy as indispensable for rescuing America’s diplomatic dignity and
domestic unity. Separate state conduct threatened to perpetuate the
low esteem in which U.S. ministers, and the nation as a whole, were
282
held abroad, with material effect on the prospects for securing
commercial advantage.283 Foreign intrigue with states and private citizens was also widely regarded as a serious threat to the union.284
doubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.”); Madison, supra
note 279, at 84 (noting that “those disputes with other nations, which being among the greatest
of public calamities, it ought to be least in the power of any part of the community to bring on
the whole”); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(criticizing the Articles of Confederation for “leav[ing] it in the power of any indiscreet member
to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that under the Constitution, letters of marque
required licenses from the federal government even following declaration of war, an amendment “fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers;
and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to
be responsible”).
282. See Marks, supra note 165, at 313-19 (attributing low esteem and low national pride to
independent state conduct of foreign relations). With a divided sovereignty, America had a hard
time persuading foreign governments to conduct the most basic diplomatic relations. At the
time of the Convention, Great Britain had still not sent an ambassador to America, but the
United States felt that until the new Constitution was adopted it lacked the wherewithal to reciprocate the slight. See 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 520-21 (Sept. 24, 1787) (report of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs) (cautioning that returning the slight “would eventually produce more
inconveniences than advantages”); Letter from Adams to Jay (Feb. 14, 1788), in 3 EMERGING
NATION, supra note 179, at 723 (complaining of being treated with “dry Decency and cold Civility abroad”).
283. Hamilton and Jay, as Publius, hammered these points home. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
4, at 49 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that foreign nations would respect a
united America, but “[i]f, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government . . . or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies . . . what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes!”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 53 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning of the same); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (claiming that
“[t]he imbecility of our government even forbids [foreign powers] to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 149
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cautioning that “[a] nation, with which we
might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, even though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves”). Onuf and Onuf relate that “Revolutionary diplomats sought, but failed, to
negotiate treaties that would secure national independence, foster trade and promote a more
lawful world,” and that “Britain refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with the erstwhile
colonists that would reopen lucrative West Indian markets.” ONUF & ONUF, supra note 264, at
95. They also add that “Spain’s refusal to acknowledge American rights to the free use of the
Mississippi precipitated sectional divisions that threatened the union.” Id. Finally,
“[c]onstitutional reformers recognized that advantageous treaties, particularly with Britain and
Spain, were the sine qua non of union. They also knew that the creation of a strong union was an
essential precondition for success in negotiating such treaties.” Id.
284. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 100-01(detailing the fear of subversive activity).

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

1206

09/21/00 12:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

This spectrum of concerns was again well illustrated in the matter
of the negotiations over the Mississippi. Notwithstanding concerns
285
about the direction of negotiations, southerners were by no means
sure that they desired the treaty-making power of Congress to be impaired. Under the status quo, the northern states, with their lesser attachment to western emigration and greater emphasis on foreign
commercial opportunity, would use the issue to divide the nation in
two.286 Accordingly, many insisted that the only way to ensure access
to the Mississippi was through a treaty negotiated by a unified federal
power. Responding in the Virginia convention to Patrick Henry’s
warning that the new government would give away American rights,
Madison declared:
No treaty has been formed, and I will undertake to say, that none
will be formed under the old system, which will secure to us the actual enjoyment of the navigation of the Mississippi. Our weakness
precludes us from it. We are entitled to it. But it is not under an inefficient Government that we shall be able to avail ourselves fully of
that right.—I most conscientiously believe, that it will be far better
secured under the new Government, than the old, as we will be
287
more able to enforce our right.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 168-93; see also Letter from Madison to James
Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 153-54 (expressing such
concerns and a fear that the entire project might be frustrated).
286. See HENDERSON, supra note 179, at 394-95 (detailing thoughts of disunion); Drew R.
McCoy, James Madison and Visions of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A Regional Perspective, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 226, 243 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (noting Monroe’s
conviction that the eastern states would convince the middle states to join them in forming a
permanent “northern bloc”).
287. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1225 (statement of Madison) (June 12,
1788). As Madison put it in private correspondence, “[w]hat ought to be desired therefore by
the Western people is not so much that no treaty should be made, as that some treaty should be
made which will procure them an immediate and peaceable use of the river.” Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 49; accord
10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1242 (statement of Madison) (June 13, 1788);
Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (Apr. 8, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 169, at 707; Letter from Madison to John Brown (Apr. 9, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 169, at 711-12; Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 97; see also 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169,
at 1117 (statement of Marshall) (demanding “[h]ow shall we attain [the Mississippi]? By retaining that weak Government which has hitherto kept it from us?”); An Address from an American (Tenche Coxe) to the Members of the Virginia Convention (May 21, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 832, 835-36:
[S]uch is the effect of our distracted politics, and of the feebleness of our general government, that foreign powers openly declare their unwillingness to treat with us, while
our affairs remain on the present footing . . . . [Yet, as with Great Britain and France,]
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Madison’s emphasis on the “inefficiency” and “weakness” of the
existing government is vague, as is the means by which the new gov288
ernment would resolve these matters, but Madison and his contemporaries clearly viewed unity, and the appearance of authority, as instrumental to successful negotiations with the Spanish. All this was
plainly threatened by the attempts of westerners and foreign powers
to circumvent the national monopoly on negotiations. Beginning in
the mid-1780s, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia separatists alternately threatened, and conspired with, the Spanish in attempts to obtain commercial privileges and access to the Mississippi.289 Others

[t]he Court of Spain too, however they might be influenced by a firm and respectable
union, will never listen to our demands for the navigation of the Mississippi, while we
remain in our present unconnected situation. We are no object even of respect to them
much less of apprehension; and should the present constitution be rejected, they will
laugh at all future attempts to continue or invigorate the union. Our Minister at that
Court expects to effect no arrangements there, without an efficient government being
first adopted here.
Accord Resolution of the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 324, 324 (citing as the one specific advantage of Constitution its improvement on “the weakness of Congress” to negotiate
with Spain and Britain so as to obtain the advantages of the Mississippi trade to obtain compliance with foreign treaty obligations to surrender defensive outposts). But see 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1211 (statement of Patrick Henry) (June 12, 1788)
(warning that “[t]he navigation of the Mississippi, which is of so much importance to the happiness of the people of this country, may be lost by the operation of [the Constitution]”).
288. It would have been hard to state with confidence that sectionalism in Congress would
cease, or that Spain would soon rethink its decision to close the Mississippi. The reopening of
the Mississippi in 1788, and Spain’s eventual capitulation in Pinckney’s Treaty of 1795, in fact
owed more to Spain’s difficulties in Europe and to westward emigration than to any constitutional evolution in the United States. See Allen, supra note 170, at 466-67 (concluding that
“European diplomacy ultimately combined with American expansion and Spanish setbacks in
the old Southwest to bring about a victory for the United States in the Mississippi affair”).
289. For accounts of these fascinating and complicated episodes, see SAMUEL FLAGG
BEMIS, PINCKNEY’S TREATY: AMERICA’S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE’S DISTRESS, 1783-1800
chs. 6-7 (reprint 1965) (1960) (focusing on the Spanish conspiracy with Kentucky and Tennessee); HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 37 (focusing on the dealings of Tennesseans and Kentuckians); WHITAKER, supra note 171 (same); Allen, supra note 170, at 466 (detailing Spain’s
plan to gain the loyalties of western Americans); see also GREEN, supra note 187 (focusing on
Kentucky); The Spanish Conspiracy in Tennessee, 3 TENN. HIST. MAG. 229 (1917) (focusing on
Tennessee). Reginald Horsman described the significance of these experiences:
The problem of conducting an effective foreign policy was only one ingredient in a
complex of motives that eventually led to a new constitution, but it was an important
one. It was not simply that many were disappointed with the inability of Congress to
shape effective commercial agreements with Great Britain, Spain, or other powers, or
that there was an obvious inability to defend American interests against either the Indian tribes or foreign powers in the Mississippi Valley, it was now strongly felt that
the situation on the borders of the United States threatened the very security and
survival of the republic.
HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 37.
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290

sought French intervention with Spain, and even the British tried
291
their hand at influence. Such efforts were frequently at odds with
one another and complicated bilateral negotiations: Spain was entreated by some, for example, not to capitulate on Mississippi navigation, so as better to foment western revolt.292 These intrigues could
substantially be resolved by entering into a satisfactory treaty, but it
was also abundantly clear that stamping out such divisive attempts at
foreign relations was a precondition for any optimal treaty.293 It is
striking that, in the midst of partisan debate over federal prerogatives,
there was little or no argument that subnational entreaties were permissible or appropriate under the Articles of Confederation.
Ostensibly unilateral acts were viewed in exactly the same light.
In 1787, for example, Virginia had to officially disavow the reprisals
by its sometime-agent General George Rogers Clark against the
property of Spanish subjects, in retaliation for Spanish policy on the
294
Mississippi. Secretary Jay and Congress registered their disapproval
even more strongly,295 even complaining that Virginia’s communication of its disavowal to Spain had violated the federal government’s
296
monopoly on communicating with foreign governments. Virginia’s
290. See HENDERSON, supra note 179, at 397-98 (describing contacts with Otto, a French
charge d’affaires).
291. See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 33-34 (noting British attempts to recruit American
citizens); see also Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 320 (stating that “[i]t is hinted to me that British partisans are already feeling the
pulse of some of the West settlements”).
292. See THOMAS PERKINS ABERNATHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 330 (1937) (detailing one such entreaty, from General James Wilkinson, a Kentucky merchant).
293. Under Madison’s guidance, for example, Virginia censured lawless action against the
Spanish and Indians in the Kentucky district, but paired that resolution with one urging that the
westerners be given prompt satisfaction through the negotiation of a treaty with Spain guaranteeing navigation rights. See Resolutions on Western Law Enforcement and Mississippi Navigation (editorial note), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 124. One of the most active conspirators, James Wilkinson, seems to have believed that the new Constitution would spell the
end of his intrigues. See ABERNATHY, supra note 292, at 330, 347.
294. See GREEN, supra note 187, at 78-80; WHITAKER, supra note 171, at 81, 97.
295. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 189-99 (Apr. 13, 1787) (reflecting Jay’s recommendations that Congress formally declare its “displeasure” with the “offenders” and immediately
punish them); id. at 231 (Apr. 24, 1787) (calling on the Secretary of War to intervene). Not incidentally, on the same day Congress received Jay’s report, it ordered issuance of the strong reminder, also drafted by Jay, of the states’ comprehensive lack of authority either to make or
construe treaties. See supra note 263.
296. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 189-99 (Apr. 13, 1787) (reprinting Jay’s report of Apr.
12, 1787). Among the Virginia delegates reprimanded by Jay was Madison, who had, after
communicating the Virginia governor’s declaration, participated in what he described as a “free
conversation” on the subject of the western temper and the Mississippi. See GREEN, supra note
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preferential treatment of French brandies also provoked controversy
after the Dutch protested that their most-favored-nation status under
297
the bilateral treaty had been violated. A congressional committee
reviewing the protest, unsure of whether Virginia’s favors were gratuitous or compensatory, took the view that any quid pro quo would
violate the constitutional norm “that no State, or part of the nation,
shall have any part in making a treaty . . . between the nation and a
foreign power, but by its delegates in the national Council.”298 Secretary of State Jay’s report, which Congress later followed, considered
the Virginia policy gratuitous, but cautioned as to the disruptive effect
of unilateral state trade policies. Citing Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation, Jay noted that “[t]his Article appears to have been
calculated to preserve uniformity, not only in our political, but also in
our commercial Systems. If no Individual State can contract with a
foreign power, it follows that the States individually can grant no
privileges otherwise than gratuitously.”299 Put simply, even implicit exchanges with foreign powers ran afoul of the federal monopoly on
300
treaty negotiations.
187, at 79-80 n.*; see also id. at 81 n.* (noting that Madison urged prosecution of Clark under
state law).
In another episode involving the Mississippi, the Georgia state assembly created a district
called Bourbon County in territory claimed not only by Georgia, but by Spain and the United
States as well. Four justices of the peace from Georgia were instructed to negotiate with Spain,
but one exceeded his authority, threatened Spain, and was expelled by the Spanish governor.
After receiving Spanish protests, Congress condemned the activities and apologized to Spain.
See ABERNATHY, supra note 292, at 312-13, 323; WHITAKER, supra note 171, at 55-58; Letter
from Madison to Monroe (June 21, 1785) (editorial note), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note
171, at 308 n.2. Madison, seeking further information, professed to “willingly suppose that no
State could be guilty either of so flagrant an outrage on the fœderal [sic] Constitution, or of so
imprudent a mode of pursuing their claims against a foreign Nation.” Letter from Madison to
Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 306-07.
297. See, e.g., SETSER, supra note 266, at 64.
298. Accordingly, it drafted a resolution providing that “no individual state can constitutionally, without the Consent of the [Congress], make any compensation for privileges or exemptions granted in trade Navigation or Commerce by any foreign power to the United States
or any of them.” 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 526 (Sept. 24, 1787). Moreover, any simple grant of
privileges or exemptions would have to be extended to any nation given most favored nation
status under U.S. treaties. See id.
299. Id. at 682-83 (Oct. 13, 1787).
300. Professor Ramsey’s recently published work cites a number of state enactments discriminating against foreign nations, some seeking a quid pro quo of some kind. Addressing the
thesis that the Constitution barred all state activities impacting foreign affairs, he observes that
“the framers plainly knew of the states’ propensity to legislate with foreign policy objectives,”
but took no obvious action to enshrine any new principle of exclusivity. Ramsey, supra note 29,
at 390 n.181 (citing Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Virginia laws); see also GIESECKE, supra
note 266, ch. 6 (describing the ubiquity of state-level trade legislation discriminating against for-
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Madison understood this point completely,301 and there was no
consideration of weakening this norm under the proposed Constitution. If anything, the experience of the Framers pointed to the importance of insisting on the federal prerogative. By extending the federal
treaty monopoly to commercial matters previously reserved to the
302
states, the Constitution eliminated any pretext state and local
authorities may have had for engaging in bargaining with Spain and
the other relevant foreign powers.
At the same time, the Constitution expanded the range of impediments the states could pose to the actual execution of federal
authority. The Framers’ argument was not merely that the federal
government needed sufficient authority to adopt binding law; instead,
they also perceived that achieving results under that authority required unified expression.

eign nations and other states under the Articles of Confederation); SETSER, supra note 266, at
62-63 (same).
During the relevant period, the national government lacked the ability to effectuate
treaty relations on such trade matters, though they gained this ability under the new Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 250. As Professor Ramsey recognizes, “many of these
particular laws would have been precluded by the specific provisions of the Constitution.” Ramsey, supra note 29, at 390 n.181. Though I have not examined the history of each state enactment
in detail, they were generally ineffective and counterproductive, and were considered one of the
strongest reasons to expand the scope of the federal treaty power and, more generally, to unify
negotiations with foreign nations. See supra text accompanying notes 265-74; see also Virginia
General Assembly, House of Delegates, Broadside of Nov. 14, 1785 (Early American reprints,
No. 19352) (urging Virginia delegates to the Continental Congress to regulate trade and import
tariffs, given that the United States “require[s] uniformity in their commercial regulations, . . .
for obtaining in the ports of foreign nations a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed [in U.S. ports], for preventing animosities, . . . among the several States . . . and for deriving from commerce such aids to the public revenue as it ought to contribute”); ROBERT L.
BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1790, at 152, 172, 181
(Octagon Books 1971) (1942) (describing the state interest in investing the national government
with authority over trade and revisions to the general tariff act of 1784-85, including the failure
of discriminatory tariffs due to the diversion of trade to neighboring states).
301. Madison was keenly aware of the French brandies controversy, carefully setting out the
dispute as to the issues of treaty construction and noting Jay’s conclusion that, in Madison’s
terms, “the states have no right to form tacit compacts with foreign nations.” Letter from Madison
to Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 320-21; see also Letter
from Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 18, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at
271, 272-73 (describing the controversy); Letter from Virginia Delegates to Randolph (Mar. 25,
1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 333 (same). There is cause to think that the
issue of state encroachment was a foremost concern for Madison as he prepared for the Convention. See Letter from Virginia Delegates to Randolph (Mar. 25, 1787) (editorial note), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 333-34 n.2.
302. See supra notes 248, 265-66 (describing the dissatisfaction with Article IX of the Articles of Confederation).
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3. The New Constitution and the Vertical Scope of the Treaty
Power. The new Constitution scarcely did away with the problems
303
federalism posed for foreign relations. Some of the more egregious
early episodes, like the occasional refusal by states and localities to
comply with ratified treaties and foreign affairs statutes,304 are better
understood as intransigence than as illustrating a constitutional
understanding. But states also enacted a number of measures that
caused acute diplomatic complications—laws discriminating against
aliens305 or foreign corporations,306 as well as general provisions, like
the Negro Seamen laws, that adversely affected both U.S. and foreign
303. Indeed, various Mississippi intrigues continued to fester. See generally ARTHUR
PRESTON WHITAKER, THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION: 1795-1803, at 189-217 (1934) (discussing
various foreign relations issues that persisted after ratification). President Washington and his
Secretaries of State, for example, doggedly sought Kentucky’s assistance in quashing French-led
threats against the Spanish territory, laying particular stress on the delicacy of ongoing negotiations. See A Message from the President of the United States to Congress, Transmitting Certain
Documents Relative to Hostile Threats Against the Territories of Spain, in the Neighbourhood
of the United States (May 20, 1794), (Doc. No. 271), in 22 NATIONAL STATE PAPERS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1789-1817 (pt. II) 255, 256, 257, 262, 265-66 (Eileen Daney Carzo ed., 1985). In
Washington’s farewell address on September 17, 1796, he stressed the need for the American
west to depend upon
the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as
one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage,
whether derived from its own separate strength or from an apostate and unnatural
connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.
WHITAKER, supra, at 120.
304. See Palumbo, supra note 4, at 37-48 (discussing American defiance of the 1807 Embargo Act); Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at 164 (discussing defiance, by the governor of
South Carolina, of President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 and the violation by
New England towns of the 1807 Embargo Act).
305. For discussion of the prolonged controversy surrounding discrimination by the western
states against the Japanese, see PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1913, at 625-53 (1920) (collecting diplomatic correspondence relating to the
dispute); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655 (citing Theodore Roosevelt’s concern
on this issue); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29, at 140-41 (intimating that similar antialien statutes in effect at that time were less likely to have engendered diplomatic complications); Palumbo, supra note 4, at 168-88. Compare, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 65356, 662 n.17 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting foreign and, derivatively, federal protests
concerning land laws), with Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding a Cincinnati ordinance prohibiting aliens from obtaining licenses to run pool and billiard rooms based
on the Equal Protection Clause and an 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain).
306. The highest-profile cases involved the retaliation against German companies for Prussia’s treatment of American insurance companies. See S. DOC. NO. 54-140 (1897) (collecting
diplomatic correspondence relating to the dispute); PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1899, at 284 (1901) [hereinafter PAPERS] (collecting further diplomatic correspondence, including the ultimate readmission of American companies to
Prussia and Prussian companies to New York); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at
1656-57 (same); Palumbo, supra note 4, at 48-50 (discussing the 1896 conflict between Prussia
and New York). The British complained about similar legislation, in that case enacted without
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307

citizens.
These conflicts may cast light on the contemporary understanding of the federal monopoly. With the exception of Chy Lung v.
308
Freeman, there was relatively little suggestion that the overseas repercussions of state activities like these would, by themselves, violate
the Constitution. As Professor Goldsmith insists, this casts doubt on
any strong claim that a full-blown, judicially enforced dormant foreign relations doctrine preceded Zschernig.309 At the very least, cases
any apparent retaliatory animus. See PAPERS, supra, at 345-48 (collecting correspondence).
307. For general historical accounts of this legislation, see Philip M. Hamer, British Consuls
and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860, 1 J. S. HIST. 138 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, British Consuls]; Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848, 1
J. S. HIST. 3 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, Great Britain]. For legally oriented commentary, see
CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 125-29; CARL B. SWISHER, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 378-81 (1974) (detailing cases challenging the Negro Seamen Acts);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655 n.163 (same); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost
Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1873-78 (1993)
(discussing the constitutional debate surrounding these acts as well as the subsequent legislation
of immigration law).
308. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). In Chy Lung, the Court found unconstitutional a California law
permitting a state commissioner to demand indemnification bonds for certain vaguely described
classes of passengers disembarking at California ports. See id. at 276. Justice Miller, in an opinion for a unanimous Court, speculated that were California to apply the law to British passengers, Great Britain would retaliate against the nation as a whole. See id. at 279. As he emphasized, since the Constitution “has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign
nations . . . and has taken the whole subject of these relations [as reserved for the federal government],” the Framers could not be held to have “done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the
power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to
just recriminations that it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which
it is held responsible.” Id. at 279-80.
309. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625-30 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968), as one of the first cases to establish a dormant foreign relations doctrine). Although Professor Spiro properly cautions that we should not expect nineteenth-century case law
to neatly express a federal exclusivity principle, and notes that certain episodes “demonstrate
a . . . constitutional understanding that the states were severely constrained in their foreign relations activities,” see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1230, I am less confident that
such an understanding was “prevalent,” id., or that it amounts to anything so broad as Zschernig. Construing cases like Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), and Chy Lung as
suggesting that a well-formed dormant foreign relations doctrine existed in the nineteenth century requires disregarding other cases, like Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901), and downplaying the most notable episodes of that era, like the Negro Seamen Acts and alien discrimination episodes, in which state actions having significant foreign relations effects were tolerated.
But see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1228-41 (arguing that the dormant foreign
relations doctrine has “firm roots” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
At the same time, I do not share Professor Goldsmith’s confidence that the notion of
dormant foreign relations preemption debuted in the 1960s and therefore was absent from the
debate over the alien discrimination acts. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655
(observing that “no one suggested that [the anti-alien acts] should be preempted under a dor-
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like Chy Lung should be seen in light of others, like Blythe v.
310
Hinkley, in which the Court gave the proverbial back of its hand to
a particularly attenuated claim that states could not touch matters
open for international adjustment. The Court elsewhere indicated
that state authority touching on foreign affairs grounds would only be
restricted upon final treaty ratification.311
mant foreign relations theory”). For example, in a 1914 note intended for the State Department,
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that California lacked the authority over international affairs necessary to enact its so-called Alien Land Law restricting the ownership of
land by foreign citizens. See Letter from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador (June 9, 1914), reprinted in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1914, at 426 (1922) [hereinafter 1914 FOREIGN RELATIONS PAPERS].
And in a later court case, the California Supreme Court found no conflict between a provision
of California’s Alien Land Act and a 1911 treaty between the United States and Japan, but after
invalidating the law as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the court opined that the underlying objective of discouraging immigration was “international in character, and [was] a matter
to properly to be disposed of by the federal government.” In re Tetsubumi Yano’s Estate, 206 P.
995, 1001 (Cal. 1922). Finally, some of Elihu Root’s observations at the 1907 meeting of the
American Society for International Law hint at a dormant federal relations power. See Elihu
Root, The Real Questions Under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 273, 283 (1907) (emphasis added):
Since the rights, privileges, and immunities . . . to be accorded to foreigners in our
country and to our citizens in foreign countries are a proper subject of treaty provision and within the limits of the treaty-making power, and since such rights, privileges, and immunities may be given by treaty in contravention of the laws of any state,
it follows of necessity that the treaty-making power alone has authority to determine
what those rights, privileges, and immunities shall be.
310. 180 U.S. 333 (1901). In Blythe, the Court considered “extraordinary” the claim that “in
the absence of any treaty whatever upon the subject, the State had no right to pass a law in regard to the inheritance of property within its borders by an alien.” Id. at 340. Blythe was later
cited in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), in support of the proposition that a dormant preemption claim concerning a state reciprocal inheritance law was “equally farfetched.” Id. at 517.
Blythe is also cited by Professor Goldsmith as grounds for doubting the tenure of any such doctrine. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1653 n.157. There is, however, a critical
difference between Blythe and cases like Clark. In Blythe, the complainant argued that California had overstepped its authority by permitting “any person, whether citizen or alien,” to inherit
property, thereby permitting the defendant, a British subject, to take property otherwise available to the complainant. See Blythe, 180 U.S. at 336-37 n.1 (quoting statutes referred to in the
original complaint, including Cal. Civ. Code § 671); id. at 340-41. The claim that California had
intruded on matters of foreign relations by failing to discriminate against an alien does indeed
seem “extraordinary.” Id. at 340. Such a statute functions very differently, in any event, from
those having the effect of bargaining with foreign powers in a fashion reserved to the federal
government. The California Supreme Court, in consequence, construed Blythe to be making the
unusual claim that
the very silence of our treaties with Great Britain upon the question is the equivalent
of an express denial to its subjects of the right to inherit within our republic, and that
therefore a conflict arises and [the California law] becomes void as an illegal attempt
to encroach upon the treaty making power of the general government.
Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 P. 431, 436 (Cal. 1900), aff’d, 180 U.S. 333 (1901).
311. See, e.g., People of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366, 371 (1858)
(concluding that a New York state law prohibiting trespass upon Indian reservations was valid
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There was greater consensus, however, on Chy Lung’s major
premise that state bargaining with foreign powers—if not all state activities having foreign effect—would unconstitutionally violate the
312
dormant treaty power. Few episodes provided a good opportunity
to test that doctrine, or to explore the parameters of the state conduct
so precluded. Where there were strong claims of conflict between a
state law and a federal statute treaty, or the Equal Protection Clause,
dormant federal authority objections may have seemed beside the
313
point. Moreover, federal authority over the recurring subjects of
unless it conflicted with the express terms of a federal treaty). Another early case, People v.
Gerke, 5 Cal. 381 (1855), held that a federal treaty could supersede state law on the inheritance
of property, but also suggested that states retained some power with respect to foreign affairs
issues. See id. at 385. While Gerke’s dicta indicated that “mutual concession . . . can only be effected” by the federal government, not by unilateral state acts, and thus seems to support a federal monopoly, the California Supreme Court clearly contemplated that state policies like those
in question would continue in force until preempted by federal treaty. Id. Among commentators, it is perhaps particularly notable that Professor Corwin’s brief for national power routinely
expresses the rule in this fashion, albeit without expressly addressing the issue of the dormant
treaty power. See CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 21-165 (discussing the relationship between the national treaty power and state police powers).
312. See Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280 (asserting that the Constitution “has forbidden the States
to hold negotiations with any foreign nations . . . and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself”). An 1897 memorandum from Senator Hale encapsulated an altogether
plausible view of the distinction:
[A] State of the Union, although having admittedly no power whatever in foreign relations, may take action uncontrollable by the Federal Government, and which, if not
properly a casus belli, might nevertheless as a practical matter afford to some foreign
nation the excuse of a declaration of war. We may instance the action which might
have been taken by the State of Wyoming in relation to the Chinese massacres, or by
the State of Louisiana in relation to the Italian lynchings, or by the State of New York
in its recent controversy with German insurance companies with relation to the
treatment of its own insurance companies by Germany.
S. DOC. NO. 54-56, at 5 (1897); see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 265 & n.8 (1922) (citing the Hale memorandum, and adding that “[t]he
intention of the Constitution is undoubtedly to render the states incompetent to make political
decisions which affect foreign nations in more than the most remote degree, yet state laws have
occasionally given rise to international controversy”).
313. For example, Justice Johnson’s opinion on the South Carolina Negro Seamen Act cited
several other grounds for considering it illegal. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495
(C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366) (Johnson, J., riding circuit) (holding that a South Carolina law
violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the 1815 commercial treaty with Great
Britain, but that it lacked jurisdiction to order redress). Attorney General William Wirt agreed
with Justice Johnson on the merits, see 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 659, 661 (1824) (opining that South
Carolina’s Negro Seamen Act was unconstitutional), but a successor, John Berrien, came to the
opposite conclusion, see 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 426, 442 (1831). Berrien’s successor, Roger B. Taney,
wrote an unpublished opinion claiming that the federal government lacked the power to deprive
slave-holding states of their authority over blacks within their jurisdiction. See SWISHER, supra
note 307, at 380 & nn.8-9 (citing and discussing Attorney General Taney’s opinion). A majority
of the House Committee on Commerce issued a report that sided with Justice Johnson and argued that the South Carolina act and others like it encroached on Congress’s foreign Commerce
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controversy—slavery,

315

insurance,

1215

and the right of aliens to real

Clause powers, but the House as a whole took no action. See generally H. R. REP. NO. 27-80, at
1-7 (1843) (arguing that the South Carolina act violated the dormant Commerce Clause); see
also Hamer, Great Britain, supra note 307, at 22 (noting that the House voted to take no action
on the Commerce Committee’s report). The U.S. Attorney in Charleston subsequently volunteered his conclusion that the South Carolina law violated the treaty, see CHARLESTON
COURIER, Dec. 15, 1851, at 1; see also Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 157 & n.65, but
the British ultimately decided not to court further controversy, see id. at 157-59 (noting that by
1852 the British had adopted a more conciliatory approach to relations with South Carolina).
Case law addressing alien land laws also illustrate a limited conception of the dormant
treaty power, focusing instead on Equal Protection Clause issues and potential conflicts with
already-existing treaties. See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (upholding against
equal protection and express treaty-based challenges a provision of the same law preventing
aliens ineligible for citizenship from purchasing shares in corporations dealing in agricultural
land); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 326 (1923) (upholding against similar challenges a provision of the same law prohibiting sharecropping contracts with Japanese aliens); Porterfield v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding against similar challenges a provision of California’s
Alien Land Law prohibiting the leasing of agricultural land to Japanese aliens); see also Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 224 (1923) (upholding against similar challenges a provision of a
Washington state statute preventing Japanese aliens from acquiring leases for agricultural land).
But see Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (striking down a Seattle pawnbroking license ordinance as applied to lawfully admitted Japanese aliens as conflicting with a federal
treaty and noting that while the treaty-making power “does not extend ‘so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids,’ it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and other nations” (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890))). For further discussion, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1653-54 nn.157 & 159 (discussing
the relationship between anti-alien state laws and the Equal Protection Clause and dormant
treaty power); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29, at 141 (arguing that in deciding Chy
Lung on equal protection grounds, the Court missed “a classic opportunity to deploy the foreign
relations rationale for constraining state activity”).
314. At the time of the Negro Seamen Act controversies, the federal government was powerless to enforce far less ambiguous dictates against South Carolina, and the federal government’s power was to wane further as South Carolina and other states sought to secede. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 138, 148-49 (noting the federal government’s lack of
effective action against the Negro Seamen Acts and also noting the House of Representative’s
refusal to act on the Commerce Committee’s report on the illegality of the Acts); Hamer, Great
Britain, supra note 307, at 28 (noting that the federal government was unable to take effective
action to block the Negro Seamen Acts); see also supra note 313 (describing Attorney General
Taney’s opinion that the federal government lacked the power to block the Negro Seamen
Acts). An 1831 opinion by Attorney General Berrien also illustrates the widespread perception
that the federal government had limited power to temper the slave-holding states. See 2 Op.
Att’y Gen. 426, 426-27 (1831). Berrien’s opinion reconciled the South Carolina Negro Seamen
Act with the 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain principally on the ground that Congress
was “under a constitutional obligation to respect” state exercises of police powers like quarantine laws “in the formation of treaties, and in the enactment of laws,” and that treaties should be
interpreted in light of those principles. Id.; see also id. at 432 (noting that treaty privileges were
conferred “subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries”).
315. Insurance policies were not then considered articles of commerce, and so they were for
the most part beyond the scope of national regulation. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168, 183 (1868) (holding that insurance policies “are not articles of commerce in any proper
meaning of the word”); see also Philip L. Merkel, Going National: The Life Insurance Industry’s
Campaign for Federal Regulation After the Civil War, 65 BUS. HIST. REV. 528, 528 (1991) (not-
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property —was also truncated at the relevant times. By the late nineteenth century, Supreme Court case law more consistently indicated
that the treaty power might support federal regulation where purely
317
domestic authority would otherwise be lacking, but lingering doubts
318
likely clouded the perceived scope of any dormant treaty power. Fiing that in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, insurance was regulated almost entirely by state
law); Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance
Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 664 (1993) (discussing the historical limitations on the federal
government’s ability to regulate insurance).
316. Here it is enough to say that the scope of federal authority was open to controversy. See
Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 419-20 (distinguishing various Supreme Court
treatments of treaties according aliens equal property rights); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra
note 29, at 142 nn.85-86 (speculating that judicial tolerance of alien land laws may have been
predicated upon the traditional view that such matters were “largely within the state’s exclusive
regulatory preserve”); see also Raymond Leslie Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese
Question, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 38-39 n.53 (1923) (concluding that the federal government could
use its treaty power to assure the property rights of aliens); Thomas Reed Powell, Alien Land
Cases in the United States Supreme Court, 12 CAL. L. REV. 259, 267-68 (1924) (presuming that
the federal government had plenary authority to override the California land law); Root, supra
note 309, at 279 (noting that “certain implied limitations arise[] from the nature of our government and from other provisions,” but opining that “those implied limitations do not in the
slightest degree touch the making of treaty provisions relating to the treatment of aliens within
our territory”).
Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of the federal government’s perceived ability to
modify alien’s property ownership rights through treaty is contained in the correspondence of
Secretary Bayard, who opined:
Were the question whether a treaty provision which gives to aliens rights to real estate in the States to come up now for the first time, grave doubts might be entertained
as to how far such a treaty would be constitutional. A treaty is, it is true, the supreme
law of the land, but it is nevertheless only a law imposed by the Federal government,
and subject to all the limitations of other laws imposed by the same authority. While
internationally binding the United States to the other contracting powers, it may be
municipally inoperative because it deals with matters in the States as to which the
Federal government has no power to deal. That a treaty, however, can give to aliens
such rights, has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court . . . and consequently,
however much hesitation there might be as to advising a new treaty containing such
provisions, it is not open to this Department to deny that the treaties now in existence
giving rights of this class to aliens may in their municipal relations be regarded as operative in the States.
Letter from Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Miller (June 15, 1886), in 5 MOORE, supra
note 124, at 178-79. Bayard’s ambivalence was symptomatic of the uncertainties surrounding the
exercise of state police powers with respect to aliens. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 307, at 1893
(concluding that the “mysterious line between the exercise of the police power and the regulation of commerce left indeterminate room for state control of immigration” and that this indeterminacy was not entirely resolved by the introduction of foreign affairs concerns in Chy Lung,
92 U.S. 259 (1876), and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
317. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890) (noting the broad scope of the treatymaking power and citing cases to that effect); see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (“The
treaty-making power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation
with foreign governments.”).
318. See, e.g., Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267 (noting that “[i]t would not be contended that [the
treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
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nally, any judicially enforced doctrine was surely less appealing in
light of the political branches’ apparent conviction that the treaty
power should not (or could not, for political reasons) be used to in319
vade areas in which the states traditionally reigned sovereign.
Nevertheless, both critics and defenders of the national government’s prerogatives converged on one critical proposition: if the national government lacked the authority to forge international agreements, then such authority existed nowhere, as states were powerless
to conduct international relations on behalf either of themselves or
320
the United States. This did not limit state activities to those with
character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the
latter, without its consent”). Numerous commentators have discussed the scope of the dormant
treaty power. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 117 (102 (Andrew McLaughlin ed., 3d ed. 1898)
(claiming that “[t]he Constitution imposes no restriction upon [the treaty power], but it is subject to the implied restriction that nothing can be done under it which changes the constitution
of the country, or robs a department of the government or any of the States of its constitutional
authority”); CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 42-165 (discussing assertions in
the case law and commentary that state sovereignty places limitations on the treaty power);
PUTNEY, supra note 124, at 158-59 (arguing that the treaty power is limited by the reserved
powers of the states); HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 284-341 (1915) (discussing the
limits that the state police power places on the federal treaty power); WRIGHT, supra note 312,
at 73-74 (same); Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 409-22 (discussing the subjectmatter and states’ rights limitations on the treaty power during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); William Draper Lewis, Treaty Powers: Protection of Treaty Rights by the Federal Government, 34 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 313 (1909) (noting some uncertainties in the scope of the dormant treaty power); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the TreatyMaking Power of the President and Senate of the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 559 (1909)
(discussing whether the states’ reserved rights place a limit on the federal treaty power); White,
supra note 254, at 9-10, 21-26 (describing the limitations of the unenumerated federal foreign
relations powers when they conflict with reserved state authority).
319. This is illustrated by Secretary of State Hay’s response to promptings for a bilateral
treaty to preempt state laws discriminating against British fire insurance companies, in which he
recounted that
[T]he negotiation of such a treaty would probably be futile . . . [owing to] the indisposition of the people of the United States to suffer encroachment upon the ordinary
and constitutional exercise of the legislative functions of the respective States by the
making of treaties which are passed on by only one branch of the Federal Congress
but which have the force of supreme law.
Letter from John Hay, Secretary of State, to Reginald Tower (July 19, 1899), in 1914 FOREIGN
RELATIONS PAPERS, supra note 309, at 347-48; see also Letter from John Hay, Secretary of
State, to Reginald Tower (Apr. 27, 1899), in 1914 FOREIGN RELATIONS PAPERS, supra note
309, at 346 (concluding that “[l]egislation such as that enacted by the State of Iowa is beyond the
control of the executive branch of the General Government, and even did this legislation contravene any existing treaty . . . the remedy would lie in an appeal to the courts of law”); cf. Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 F. 711 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1899) (dismissing a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge by British fire insurance companies to a discriminatory Iowa state law).
320. The argument was precisely stated by the Attorney General’s opinion on the droit
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purely internal effects, but it did mean that the solution to matters of
international controversy could lie only with the central government.
In sum, states might legislate or opine on innumerable subjectmatters to the extent otherwise permissible under federal law, but
could not, in so doing, abridge the federal government’s monopoly on
treating with foreign powers.
Episodes like the Negro Seamen Act controversies usefully illusd’aubaine, the antiquated principle that some states had invoked to prevent aliens from inheriting real property:
[I]n the matter of foreign negotiation, the States have conferred the whole of their
power, in other words, all the treaty-powers of sovereignty, on the United States.
Thus . . . if the power of negotiation be not in the United States, then it exists nowhere, and one great field of international relation, of negotiation, and of ordinary
public and private interest, is closed up, as well against the United States as each and
every one of the States.
8 Op. Att’y Gen. 411, 415 (1857); see also 1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES § 22, at 39 (1902) (arguing that the resting of treaty-making
power in the national government “absolutely prohibit[s]” a state from “performing any functions of sovereignty beyond its own boundaries, except through the medium of the Central
Government”); ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 141, at 138 (1908) (describing the federal government as “the only government recognized by the Constitution as possessing a national character” and thus possessing “all
the powers that relate to intercourse with other nations”); FRANKLIN PIERCE, FEDERAL
USURPATION 254 (1908) (arguing that while expansive federal power is undesirable, it is clear
that within subject-matter limitations “the whole of the treaty-making power was conferred
upon our national government”); 3 STORY, supra note 124, § 1349 (describing the breadth of the
prohibition on state treaty-making); 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 822 (1899):
The treaty-making power between the United States and foreign nations was given, as
we have seen, to the President and Senate as representing all. The relations of each
State, therefore, to foreign powers was fully met by this power to make treaties between the United States and foreign countries. To make peace and avert conflict, it
was the wise policy of the Constitution to give the exclusive treaty-making power to
the President and Senate as representing all the United States, and to exclude any one
State from entering into any such international obligation.
See also infra note 331 (citing Supreme Court case law); cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 60 (1825) (contending, with respect to
argument that legislation was necessary to effectuate treaty obligations, that “[h]aving felt the
necessity of the treaty making power, and fixed in the department in which it shall be rested, the
people of course excluded from all interference with it, those parts of the government which are
not described as partaking of it”).
Perhaps the most striking endorsement of treaty power exclusivity came in John C. Calhoun’s comments before the House of Representatives:
The enumeration of legislative powers in the Constitution has relation, then, not to
the treaty-making power, but to the powers of the states. In our relation to the rest of
the world the case is reversed. Here the states disappear. Divided within, we present,
without, an exterior of undivided sovereignty. . . . Whatever, then, concerns our foreign
relations, whatever requires the consent of another nation, belongs to the treaty
power—can only be regulated by it; and it is competent to regulate all such subjects,
provided—and here are its true limits—such regulations are not inconsistent with the
Constitution.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 161, at 464 (emphasis added).
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trated the distinction between permissible state effects and impermis321
sible state bargaining. As it did later in the alien land controversies,322 the federal government effectively conceded that, however
much it might disagree with South Carolina’s law, the mere fact of international controversy did not oust state jurisdiction.323 South Carolina’s authority actually to negotiate with a foreign power, however,
was another matter. The Secretary of State reacted vigorously upon
learning that South Carolina had begun negotiating with Great Britain, and there was virtually no attempt to defend the state’s actions
against the criticism that it was usurping a federal function.324
321. The Prussian matter is arguably an exception, given that the retaliatory regulation contemplated (and, in some cases, adopted) by the states concerned seems to be the kind of indirect
negotiation with foreign powers that should ordinarily be deemed unconstitutional. See supra
text accompanying note 306. At the same time, the states generally relied on the State Department to communicate their threats to the government of Germany, and it apparently agreed
with their position, even while cautioning against the disruptive effects of the tactic. See Letter
from Mr. Uhl to Mr. Runyon (June 4, 1895), in S. DOC. NO. 54-140, at 3-4; see also Letter from
Governor Morton to Mr. Olney (Dec. 3, 1895), in S. DOC. NO. 54-140, at 21 (observing that “the
people of no state have diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Prussia save as they are represented by the General Government”).
322. The federal government jawboned California into temporarily suspending enforcement
of its anti-alien policies due to foreign policy considerations, but the President appeared to share
California’s premise that the laws, however unwise, were within the state’s constitutional
authority. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting
the temporary success of presidential, gubernatorial, and corporate intervention in convincing
California to limit enforcement of its alien land law); id. at 662 n.17 (attributing California’s
nonenforcement of its alien land law to a desire to remain consistent with federal policy).
323. See supra text accompanying note 307; see also supra note 313 and accompanying text;
cf. H. R. REP. NO. 27-80, at 3 (1843) (noting that the application of the Negro Seamen Acts to
foreign vessels had been suspended).
324. South Carolina and Great Britain took great pains to conceal their interactions, and
when correspondence between the South Carolina governor and the British consul was leaked
to the press, there was considerable protest. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 15356 (discussing the controversy). After the British ambassador was called in by Secretary of State
Daniel Webster, he issued a face-saving notice declaring that the British consul should have
been clearer that he was “merely attempting, as a local agent, to procure a remedy for a grievance inflicted by a local law” (a misleading description, it must be said, of the consul’s activities).
Letter from Ambassador Bulwar to Daniel Webster, Secretary of State (Jan. 31, 1851), quoted
in Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 153. Even conservative southern newspapers were
given pause—a Richmond paper objected that South Carolina had “no political existence whatever in the eyes of foreign nations,” and a Savannah paper warned that, were states to confer
with foreign governments, “[t]he Federal Government . . . becomes a nullity, and the Confederacy resolves itself into thirty-one separate and distinct sovereignties, each possessing the right to
treat with other Powers, form alliances, and declare war.” Id. at 151 (internal citations omitted);
cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1235-36 & n.63 (noting the controversy as evidence
of foreign effects, but concluding that the “[t]he context . . . presented the rare case in which the
domestic consequences of suppressing state action outweighed any diplomatic complications
prompted by its persistence”). This was not effective, however, in suppressing British-state negotiations. See Palumbo, supra note 4, at 205-10 (describing negotiations about the Negro Sea-
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Congressional legislation also suggested something in the nature
325
of a federal monopoly on diplomacy. The Logan Act of 1799, for
example, broadly criminalized conduct by unauthorized U.S. citizens
(including, on the Act’s face, state officials) designed to influence foreign governments or officials relative to disputes or controversies with
the United States, or to defeat its measures.326 Though very rarely invoked, the Act was predicated on the notion that the federal government, in particular the President, should not be disturbed in the exclusive exercise of foreign relations327—and, as one proponent put it,
men Acts between British representatives and the government of South Carolina).
325. Act of Jan. 30, 1799, ch. I, 1 Stat. 613 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994)).
326. The Act takes its name from Dr. George Logan, a well-known Pennsylvania state legislator who undertook a negotiating mission to France. Logan’s mission caused something of an
uproar and incited Federalist supporters of the Act, who were openly skeptical that his mission
to France was independent. See CRS, supra note 109, at 70-71 (discussing the background of the
Logan Act); Kevin M. Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional
Analysis, 36 EMORY L.J. 285, 292-303 (1987) (same). In light of their suspicions, it is hardly surprising that congressional debate flagged the issue of criminal liability for public officials. See 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 2504 (1798) (transcribing the statement of Rep. Harper that notes Logan’s
membership in the Pennsylvania state legislature); id. at 2618 (noting the statement by Rep.
Harper that assumes that the Act would encompass purposeful, but not inadvertent or incidental, conduct by a member of Congress); see also Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1708
(assuming that the Logan Act applies to public officials); Brad Roth, The First Amendment in
Foreign Affairs Realm: “Domesticating” the Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 TEMPLE POL.
& CIV. RTS. Q. 255, 265 (1993) (same); Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty Revisited: The “Grey Areas” and “Yellow Zones” of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization: Choosing Among
Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion to Escape an Era of Misguided “New Federalism”, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 45 & n.46 (1998) (same); Kearney, supra, at 287-306 (same). There
have since been occasional threats of prosecution against both Members of Congress, see CRS,
supra note 109, at 71-72 (noting that “[q]uestions concerns the Logan Act” have been raised in
relation to the activities of several members of Congress); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 681-82 (1992) (noting that while the
Logan Act is only rarely applied, it has sometimes been applied to members of Congress), and
state officials, see, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 25, 481 (1989) (statement of Rep. Bentley) (“Many
Governors are acting as their own State Departments completely disregarding the constitutional
prohibition against anyone save the Executive having treaty-making powers. There is also the
old Logan Act dating from the period of the War of 1812 which forbids citizens other than those
charged with those specific constitutional powers to treat with foreign governments.”); Steve
Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
459, 515 (1994) (noting threats by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture against the Texas Agriculture Commission for its offer of negotiating assistance and cooperation with European Commission officials).
327. There was bipartisan endorsement of the notion that the authority for all governmental
diplomacy rested exclusively with the President and his authorized agents. See 8 ANNALS OF
CONG. 2586 (1798) (statement of Rep. Pinckney); id. at 2494, 2607 (statement of Rep. Griswold); id. at 2521 (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 2588 (statement of Rep. Bayard); id. at 2594
(statement of Rep. Pinckney); id. at 2617 (statement of Rep. Harrison). Albert Gallatin, the
bill’s most vigorous opponent, submitted that if the bill were intended to criminalize interference with the President’s constitutional authority, it did not go far enough, since it addressed
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on the view that if state governments were constitutionally excluded
328
from such activities, so too should private citizens. Such views are
surely probative of constitutional meaning, at least to the same extent
as Congress’s occasional tolerance of state-created contretemps.329
In short, the persistence of state activities with foreign effect may
cast doubt on suggestions that the federal government alone could be
“known” to foreign nations in some factual or consequential sense.
Yet there was surprisingly little dissent—in an era where the bounds
of federal authority were hotly contested—to the proposition that the
330
states must remain “unknown” as states to foreign nations. Well
prior to Zschernig, case after case observed that the federal government enjoyed a monopoly on the conduct of foreign relations, and
that the states possessed no such power;331 power was not used in the
only matters of “controversy or dispute.” Id. at 2498. Gallatin also argued that it was ridiculous
to believe that an individual, acting on his own authority, could usurp the President’s unquestioned monopoly on official authority. See id. at 2637-38. Not everyone agreed with Gallatin. See
id. at 2531-32 (statement of Rep. Harper) (emphasizing a broad understanding of negotiation
and suggesting that even private acts less than negotiation could interfere with foreign relations
as conceived by the executive).
328. See id. at 2496 (statement of Rep. Rutledge).
329. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655 (noting that prior to the Supreme
Court decisions in the 1960s that clarified the federal government’s exclusive foreign relations
power, “states often acted in ways not prohibited by a federal enactment that either looked like
the exercise of foreign relations power or that stirred foreign relations controversy”); Spiro,
Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1229 n.25 (“It is now generally accepted that institutions
other than the courts contribute to constitutional lawmaking.”).
330. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228-29 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring):
The States are unknown to foreign nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation
to each other and the general government. Whatever regulations foreign commerce
should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general government would be
held responsible for them; and all other regulations, but those which Congress had
imposed, would be regarded by foreign nations as trespasses and violations of national faith and comity.
331. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947) (“[P]eace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation, rather than an individual state . . . .”);
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (describing the “forbidden domain of negotiating with a
foreign country”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external affairs
is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941):
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the fortyeight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. . . . [T]he interest of the cities, counties and states, no
less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that
federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.
Accord id. at 68 (noting that international relations are “the one aspect of our government that
from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[I]n respect of our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State . . . does not exist.”); Board of
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all-embracing modern sense of being able to affect others, but instead meant legal power or the authority to engage other nations in
their sovereign capacities. The only such authority was conferred by
the Treaty Clause on the national government and denied just as emphatically to the states.
There was just one weak spot—what about the express license
for states to enter into foreign compacts and, it would seem to follow,
333
to negotiate toward that end? If anything, early case law accentuated this problem by reading the class of “agreement[s] or compact[s]” quite broadly, creating pressure to diminish the burden of requiring congressional consent.334 Thus, it was held that the form and
timing of consent for interstate compacts were almost entirely up to
Congress,335 and that no consent was necessary for compacts not inTrustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (“In international relations and
with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The United States . . . are vested by the Constitution with the entire
control of international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain
that control and to make it effective.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)
(“For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing
our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (noting that the federal government “has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and
for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government” and that “[i]f it be
otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations”); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875) (noting that regulation “must
of necessity be national in its character” when it affects “a subject which concerns our international relations”); The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 555 (1871) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The United States . . . is the only government in this country that has the character of
nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace,
and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all which are forbidden to the state governments.”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840) (“All the powers which relate
to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general government.”); id. at 575-76 (“It was one
of the main objects of the constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one
people, and one nation . . . .”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821) (“[T]he
government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in [war, making
peace, and ‘all commercial regulations,’ id. at 413] is the government of the Union.”).
332. See, e.g., Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFFS., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 50 (describing the decline of nation-state autonomy and the increasing power of nonstate actors); see
also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at
183 (describing the disaggregation of power).
333. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . .
enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power.”).
334. See, e.g., Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571 (suggesting that “compact” and “agreement”
have broad meanings that are independent of each other and of the term “treaty”). The best
description of this dynamic is Engdahl, supra note 247, at 64-67 (discussing the scope of the
terms “compact,” “agreement,” and “treaty”).
335. See Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) (upholding a compact between
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creasing the relative political power of the states. Modern commentary often assumes that foreign compacts are to be treated likewise, so
that the states might negotiate and reach agreement with foreign
powers before seeking consent, and perhaps even conclude some
binding agreements without ever submitting them for federal ap337
proval. If so, the resulting loophole seems to doom any argument
Tennessee and Virginia that was consented to by Congress after the states reached agreement);
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-87 (1823) (upholding a compact between Kentucky
and Virginia that Congress only consented to after the fact, and then only indirectly, in the
course of recognizing Kentucky as a state); accord Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co., 4 G. & J. 1, 1-3 (Md. 1832) (discussing a compact between Virginia and
Maryland, regarding the establishment of railroad companies, that became effective after Congress consented). Also noteworthy is the Court’s pronouncement in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503 (1893), that “[t]he Constitution does not state when the consent of Congress shall be
given, whether it shall precede or may follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express
or may be implied.” Id. at 521. For a helpful digest of early compacts and their history, including
many instances in which congressional approval followed agreement between the states, see
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 735-48 (1925), which contains a list of various compacts between states dating from 1789 to 1925. As Frankfurter and Landis also indicate, the practice of
seeking congressional approval for state compacts has its roots in colonial practice, where
agreements between colonies typically required the approval of the Crown. See id. at 692-93.
336. See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 218-19 (1803) (assuming the validity
of a boundary agreement between Virginia and Tennessee that largely codified the states’ preexisting rights); Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (stating in dicta that the Compact Clause applies to
agreements “directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States”). The dictum from Virginia has been adopted by modern courts as an accurate
statement of the law. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (citing the
above language from Virginia as part of the “test” for whether an agreement between states requires the consent of Congress and applying such a test to uphold a settlement agreement interpreting the language of an already-binding 1740 decree); see also, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985) (following
the approach of the New Hampshire and Virginia cases); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440
(1981) (same); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978)
(same). But see Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724-25 (1838) (assuming
that the prohibition on “any treaty, alliance, or confederation,” and the requirement of consent
for “any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power,” made consent a
requirement for all interstate boundary disputes).
337. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 302f (“By analogy with inter-State compacts, a State compact with a foreign power requires Congressional consent only if the compact
tends ‘to . . . increase . . . political power in the States which may encroach upon or interfere
with the just supremacy of the United States.’” (quoting Virginia, 148 U.S. at 503); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 155 (“Since the same language applies to foreign compacts, one might extend and
adapt the Court’s distinction [in Virginia v. Tennessee] to such agreements as well.”); id. at 156
n.†:
[S]ince the states may make foreign agreements with the consent of Congress (and
some even without such consent . . . ), they must have the right to negotiate with foreign governments or with their subsidiary units to achieve such agreements. It has not
been suggested that states must obtain Congressional consent to begin negotiations.
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that might be mustered for a dormant treaty power and leave the case
law profoundly conflicted well before the late-twentieth-century explosion in state conducted foreign relations.
But just as the Court has for some time distinguished between
338
foreign and interstate commerce, its case law has differentiated foreign compacts—precisely because of the exclusive federal treaty
power. Holmes v. Jennison,339 decided in 1840, concerned the governor of Vermont’s attempt to extradite an alien prisoner to Canada in
the absence of an extradition treaty with Great Britain. An evenly divided Court dismissed the appeal, but Chief Justice Taney, writing
what was nearly a plurality opinion,340 would have held that VerAccord Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and Between States and a
Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 233 (1953) (assuming that interstate compacts should be
subject to the same congressional consent requirements and exemptions that govern compacts
between states and foreign nations); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 44 (same); Note, The Power of
States to Make Compacts, 31 YALE L.J. 635 (1922) (same). But see Engdahl, supra note 247, at
88 (“Arrangements with foreign powers must satisfy other constitutional requirements than
those imposed by the compact clause.”); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 45 (arguing that the fact
that states can and do negotiate with foreign governments on some topics does not imply that “a
state could begin negotiating with a foreign government on any topic” (emphasis added)).
338. See supra text accompanying note 66; see also The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 373
(1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing between interstate commerce power—“intended
to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse as between the States”—and the foreign commerce power, which “clothed Congress with that power over international commerce,
pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with foreign nations, and subject . . . to no implied or reserved power in the State”); Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482
(1888):
It may be argued [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation by
Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which concern the exterior relations of the United States with other nations and governments
are general in their nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative
authority of the nation.
But see The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847) (“The power to regulate commerce
among the several States is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as
the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it.”).
339. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 538 (1840).
340. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion was joined by three other Justices, with the remaining
four Justices writing separately. Justice Catron clearly leaned against any finding of a compact,
absent proof of a demand by Canada for Holmes—evidence that existed at the time, but was not
reflected in the Supreme Court record. See id. at 594-98 (Catron, J., dissenting); Ex parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 632-33 (1840) (quoting a letter from the government of Vermont that suggests that Canada requested Holmes’s extradition); id. at 641 (noting that Justice Catron based
his opinion on the lack of evidence that Canada had demanded Holmes’s extradition and that
therefore “[h]ad the return been as it now is [i.e. had Canada demanded Holmes’s extradition],
it is to be inferred, from his [Catron’s] opinion that he would have concurred with the other justices”). But having decided “that it is better for the country [that] this question should for the
present remain open,” he voted to dismiss, taking care to note that he was not in any respect
bound in his future deliberations. Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 597. Justice Thompson’s opinion

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

2000]

09/21/00 12:58 PM

NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM

1225

mont’s conduct amounted to an implicit agreement with Great Britain—through the latter’s anticipated acceptance of the extradited
prisoner—that was unlawful in the absence of congressional consent.
Understood solely as a Compact Clause case, Holmes courts
paradox. Chief Justice Taney’s expansive view of compacts seems
341
strained —at least in part because it expanded the range of agree342
ments to which Congress may consent. There was also no hint that
Vermont’s conduct produced undesirable foreign effects, presumably
because Canada favored extradition. Instead, Holmes is best understood as addressing state activities germane to either foreign compacts
or treaties—the process of obtaining pacts rather than their eventual
rested primarily on the supposed inability of the Court to enforce its judgment. See id. at 585
(Thompson, J., dissenting). Justice Baldwin essentially ignored the compact question in favor of
the view that, absent a treaty, states retained police powers over the presence of “fugitives,
vagabonds, criminals, or convicts” that could not even be invaded by congressional statute, and
he suggested too that Chief Justice Taney’s result would be politically infeasible for the Court to
enforce. Id. at 614, 618-19 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
341. Compare Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 569, 572-74 (describing the breadth of the consent requirement), with id. at 579, 80 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (disputing the view of the Vermont-Canada arrangement as a “compact”), and id. at 588 (Barbour, J., dissenting) (same), and
id. at 595-96, 598 (Catron, J., dissenting) (same).
342. Chief Justice Taney understandably balked at viewing the informal arrangement at issue as a treaty, id. at 571, but his opinion may be read to suggest that Congress could consent to
less formal arrangements even on traditionally national issues like extradition. Though attempts
to distinguish the various subjects-matter appropriate to treaties and compacts were at odds,
none appear to contemplate that extradition would be an appropriate topic for compact. See St.
George Tucker, Editor’s Appendix to 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 310 (St.
George Tucker ed., 1803) (describing treaties as “relat[ing] ordinarily to subjects of great national magnitude and importance” and “often perpetual, or made for a considerable period of
time,” while compacts “concern[] transitory or local affairs, or such as cannot possibly affect any
other interest but that of the parties”); 3 STORY, supra note 124, §§ 1395-97 (distinguishing
“treaties of a political character,” “treaties of confederation,” and “treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or general commercial privileges,” from
compacts concerning “mere private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary; interests in land, situate in the territory of each other; and other internal regulations for the mutual
comfort, and convenience of States bordering on each other”); Engdahl, supra note 246, at 75-81
(suggesting that the Framers followed Vattel in distinguishing between compacts that were
“dispositive” in nature—e.g., boundary settlements and cessions—and all other, nondispositive
arrangements that were treaties strictly proscribed to the states); see also Abraham C. Weinfeld,
What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U.
CHI. L. REV. 453, 464 (1936) (concluding that compacts “included (1) settlements of boundary
lines with attending cession or exchanges of strips of land, (2) regulation of matters connected
with boundaries as for instance regulation of jurisdiction of offenses committed on boundary
waters, of fisheries or of navigation”). Today, the Court does not deny that some such distinction was intended, only that it has been lost. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-64 (1978) (recounting the interpretations of the words “treaty,”
“compact,” and “agreement” by the Framers and the Court, and concluding that the distinct
meanings were lost by 1833 when perceived by Justice Story).
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classification. As Taney explained, the treatment of every form of
pact in Article I signaled that
the framers of the Constitution . . . . anxiously desired to cut off all
connection or communication between a state and a foreign power:
and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to
the word “agreement” its most extended signification; and so apply
it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the par344
ties.

There was no allegation of congressional consent, and so Taney
was not called upon to discuss issues of timing or procedure. But his
description of compacts and agreements as prohibited—and of the
Framers’ intention that “there would be no occasion for negotiation
or intercourse between the state authorities and a foreign government”—left no doubt but that consent would be required for all compacts or agreements, and that it could tenably be granted only before
intercourse with a foreign government.345
The constitutional bases for Taney’s understanding were the federal treaty power and the subordinate power to send and receive am346
bassadors. For Justice Barbour, any such federal authority rested in
the hands of the political branches: where no agreement or compact,
narrowly defined, had been entered into, and no federal treaty nor
legislative authorities had actually been exercised, the states were free
347
to act. To Chief Justice Taney, in contrast, state diplomacy con343. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1230-32 (considering Chief Justice Taney’s opinion as “expound[ing] a dormant theory of federal power over foreign relations”).
344. Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572.
345. Id. at 573-74. Justice Catron, who would have concurred had the record reflected evidence of a demand by Canada for Holmes, see id. at 595-96 (Catron, J., dissenting), was apparently of a like mind.
346. As the opinion put it,
[e]very part of [the Constitution] shows that our whole foreign intercourse was intended to be committed to the hands of the general government: and nothing shows it
more strongly than the treaty-making power, and the power of appointing and receiving ambassadors; both of which are immediately connected with the question before us, and undoubtedly belong exclusively to the federal government. It was one of
the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign
governments, and the several state authorities. The power now claimed for the states,
is utterly incompatible with this evident intention; and would expose us to one of
those dangers, against which the framers of the Constitution have so anxiously endeavoured to guard.
Id. at 575-76.
347. See id. at 588-94 (Barbour, J., dissenting) (quoting Chief Justice Taney to show that the
actions of Vermont’s governor did not infringe on the treaty-making power because “‘[i]t is not
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flicted with federal authority that was “dormant” in the modern
348
sense. The federal government’s power to appoint and receive ambassadors, he argued, entailed not just the authority to change officials but also the authority (vested, in the ordinary case, in the President) to abstain from political communication with foreign nations.349
Therefore, because the treaty-making power contemplated the power
to conduct and refrain from all manner of foreign engagements, any
state exercise of foreign relations would plainly invade that power.350
Chief Justice Taney’s Holmes opinion, not Justice Barbour’s, was

the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of the
same power by the states’” (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196
(1819))); see also id. at 598 (Catron, J., dissenting) (“There being no agreement in the case; certainly none of the exclusive powers secured to the general government . . . were violated.”). But
see id. at 576-77 (arguing emphatically that the treaty-making power could not be dormant and
that it is vested wholly with the federal government, even though the Constitution expresses no
explicit prohibition on the states).
348. To Taney himself, however, “dormant” literally meant open to use by the states. See id.
at 576 (“From its nature, [the treaty-making power] can never be dormant in the hands of the
general government.”).
349. Chief Justice Taney argued:
[I]f the general government deemed it to be the true policy of the country to have no
communication or connection with foreign nations, by ambassadors, other public
ministers, or consuls; and refused, on that account, to appoint any; could it be said
that this power was dormant in the hands of the government, and that the states
might exercise it? Or if the general government deemed it advisable to have no such
communications with some particular foreign nation, could any state regard it as an
unexercised power, and therefore undertake to exercise it? We can readily imagine
that there may be reasons of policy, looking to the whole Union, that might induce
the government to decline an interchange of ambassadors with certain foreign countries. It is not material to the question in hand, whether that policy be right or wrong.
But assuming such a case to exist, can any state regard it as an unexecuted portion of
the power granted to the federal government; and, by appointing an ambassador or
consul, counteract its designs, and thwart its policy? There can be but one answer, we
think, given to this question.
Id. at 577. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Chief Justice emphasized the role of the President in
exercising this power. See id. at 570 (describing aspects of the President’s treaty-making power,
such as acting upon the Senate’s authorization to make treaties, and nominate and receive ambassadors, public ministers, and foreign officials).
350. Chief Justice Taney reasoned:
The argument which supposes this power may be dormant in the hands of the federal
government, is founded, we think, in a mistake as to its true nature and character. It is
not the mere power to deliver up fugitives from other nations upon demand; but the
right to determine whether they ought or ought not to be delivered, and to make that
decision, whatever it may be, effectual. It is the power to determine whether it is the
interest of the United States to enter into treaties with foreign nations generally, or
with any particular foreign nations, for the mutual delivery of offenders fleeing from
punishment from either country; or whether it is the interest and true policy of the
United States, to abstain altogether from such engagements, and to refuse, in all
cases, to surrender them.
Id. at 576.
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351

regarded as authoritative, perhaps in part because Taney’s general
prejudice against theories of dormant national power made his depar352
ture in Holmes seem truly obligatory. Taney’s specific suggestion
351. The Chief Justice’s opinion was certainly seen at the time to have carried the day. The
Vermont Supreme Court subsequently ordered Holmes’s release, based on the combination of
Taney’s opinion for four Justices along with evidence that would have satisfied Justice Catron as
to a compact’s existence. See Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 635-37, 640-42 (1840) (holding that
the governor of Vermont does not have the power to surrender a suspect wanted by a foreign
country); see also Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 595-96 (Catron, J., dissenting) (finding nothing in
the record to support a prior agreement between the governor of Vermont and Great Britain
that would have been a violation of the Constitution); id. at 598 (reporter’s note) (clarifying that
even though no judgment was given, the Court found no power by which the state could deliver
the prisoner). Later cases have treated Chief Justice Taney’s opinion as authoritative. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 413-14 (1886) (citing Taney’s opinion in Holmes with
approval); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 124 F.2d 800, 808 (3d
Cir. 1941) (citing Taney’s opinion to illustrate the broad meaning of the terms “treaty,” “agreement,” and “compact”); In re Manuel P., 215 Cal. App. 3d 48, 67-69 (Ct. App. 1989) (incorporating Taney’s distinction between exercising the state’s police power and assisting a foreign
country in punishing those who have violated the foreign laws into recognizing California’s right
to remove a Mexican national); People v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321, 325 (1872) (“This subject [a compact between a state and foreign country] was so fully and elaborately considered by the Supreme Court . . . in [Holmes v. Jennison] that an extended discussion here is unnecessary, if not
inappropriate.”); 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661, 661 (1841) (“I think, from the whole argument of the
bench in the case of [Holmes,] . . . we may consider it as law.”); see also COOLEY, supra note
318, at 102 (“An attempt by a State to deliver a fugitive from justice to a foreign sovereignty, in
response to a demand therefor, would be an attempt to perfect and perform an agreement, and
is therefore unauthorized.” (citing Holmes)); NATHANIEL C. TOWLE, A HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160 (1871) (citing Taney’s opinion
for the proposition that the Constitution “intended to cut off all negotiation and intercourse between the State authorities and foreign nations”); 1 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 846 (1910) (citing Taney’s Holmes opinion in support of his assertion that the Framers “anxiously desired to cut off
all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power”).
Where Holmes has been noted but disregarded, it has either been because of the mistaken view that it was effectively overruled by Virginia v. Tennessee, see, e.g., Fraser v. Fraser,
415 A.2d 1304, 1305 (R.I. 1980) (finding that the Court had changed from the literal approach
used in Holmes to a “functional view” of the Compact Clause), or because Holmes dealt with
the traditionally national area of extradition, see, e.g., McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540,
544 (N.D. 1917) (distinguishing the right of extradition as a “national and governmental power”
from an agreement regarding the construction of a drainage system between a state and a foreign country where the drain was in the United States and the outlet in Canada). These attempts
to lump foreign compacts with domestic compacts, and at the same time isolate Holmes to a particular class of international problem, are transparently at cross-purposes. As explained below,
Virginia v. Tennessee is consistent with the Holmes plurality, and the Supreme Court has subsequently cited Chief Justice Taney’s opinion with approval. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 183 (1992) (citing, and distinguishing, the plurality opinion as inapplicable to the collaboration of states in seeking federal legislation); id. at 198 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding an informal “agreement” to an interstate compact, for estoppel purposes, under the test articulated by the Holmes plurality).
352. See CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 104, at 247-49
(praising Chief Justice Taney’s “well-crafted opinion” and noting a “striking[]” contrast be-
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that the states are not free to negotiate foreign agreements without
prior consent has survived considerable evolution in the Court’s
353
Compact Clause doctrine. To be sure, it has not always been ad354
hered to in practice. But it is hard to attribute much significance to
tween the Chief Justice’s position concerning the competence of states to regulate commerce
and the authority to enforce Article IV’s Fugitive Slave Clause); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1821-1855, at 338, 340 (1922) (describing Chief
Justice Taney’s opinion as “superbly able” and adding that “[t]he most striking feature . . . of
Taney’s notable opinion was the fact that it sustained the supremacy of the Federal Government, with a breadth and completeness which had been excelled by no one of Marshall’s opinions”); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE 55-56 (1937) (observing that Chief Justice Taney “never voted to invalidate a state
statute because it offended the protection of the ‘dormant’ commerce clause”). But see, e.g., The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 465-66 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting limitations to the treaty power); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579-83 (1847) (denying
that the Commerce Clause abridges state power to regulate commerce within the state absent
conflicting federal legislation, or that state authority is limited to matters of “police powers”). In
Holmes itself, Chief Justice Taney observed that “[t]he state does not co-operate with a foreign
government nor hold any intercourse with it, when she is merely executing her police regulations.” Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 569.
353. In Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), the Court departed from any broad construction of Holmes in dicta, suggesting that consent was required only for compacts affecting
“the political power or influence” of particular states or “encroach[ing] . . . upon the full and
free exercise of Federal authority,” and further indicating that consent could in any event be
more appropriately provided in some cases after an agreement was reached. Id. at 520, 521.
As to consent, Virginia v. Tennessee did not cite Holmes, but is entirely consistent with
Chief Justice Taney’s view that foreign compacts invariably fall among those encroaching on
federal authority and requiring consent. See, e.g., Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Construction & Marine Equip. Co., 928 F. Supp. 1388, 1401-02 (D.N.J. 1996) (applying both Virginia
v. Tennessee and the Holmes plurality opinion in holding that the state Waterfront Commission
Act requires consent because “[w]aterfront governance is closely related to interstate and foreign commerce, and unquestionably impinges on the supremacy of the federal government”); cf.
27 Op. Att’y Gen. 327, 332 (1909) (“The State of Minnesota can not enter into a compact or
agreement with Great Britain or the Canadian government whereby the dam can be constructed
without the consent of Congress.”). As to the timing of consent, the Court remarked that “the
consent will usually precede the compact or agreement, as where it is to lay a duty of tonnage, to
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or to engage in war.” Virginia, 148 U.S. at 521.
354. A few foreign compacts have been entered into without prior consent. Congress has
consented to perhaps six or seven compacts ultimately entailing participation by Canada or its
provinces. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS 1783-1977 (A
REVISED COMPILATION) 3, 5, 6, 8 (1977) (listing compacts and referring to the Champlain Basin Compact, which contained a provision for Canadian participation); HENKIN, supra note 1, at
153 (giving examples of congressional authorization of compacts between foreign nations and
states); see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 335, at 743 (considering a flood-control compact possibly permitting cooperation with Canada). In three compacts, Canadian participation
(or at least the opportunity for Canadian participation) followed congressional consent. See
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 5, 6, 8 (listing compacts); FREDERICK L.
ZIMMERMAN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 98-99
(1976) (noting the Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, consented to by
Congress in 1949 with a provision authorizing joinder by Canadian provinces, later to attract
Quebec and New Brunswick); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 335, at 743 (noting that the
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compacts where Congress was informed tardily or not at all, and the
executive agencies have reliably resisted those foreign compacts of
355
which they were made aware.
Flood Control Commission initially included only states, but that a North Dakota resolution
moved to include Canada).
In other cases, compacts may never have received consent. See, e.g., Union Branch R.R.
Co. v. East Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 333 (1853) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state authorization for a railroad bridge); McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544 (N.D.
1917) (upholding the constitutionality of an agreement between North Dakota counties and a
Canadian municipality for the construction of a transborder drain entered into with prior or
subsequent congressional consent). See generally 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 464, at 24-25 (1943) (providing examples of interstate compacts and
state-foreign agreements, while warning that agreements tending to increase state political
power or infringing on the treaty power are either not allowed or require consent); Raymond
Spencer Rodgers, The Capacity of States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements:
The Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1021, 1024-28 (1967) (describing recent developments in the roles of both states and the federal government in the “international sphere,” including references to several agreements between states and Canada,
throughout which the Department of State has made an effort to stay involved); Schaefer, supra
note 326, at 45 (examining the boundaries of state authority in foreign relations and noting that
states have entered into negotiations with Canadian provinces without congressional approval).
355. The Department of State has, when asked, rejected proposed compacts out of hand or
insisted on congressional consent. See 5 HACKWORTH, supra note 354, § 464, at 24-25 (citing
1924 advice given by the State Department that it was unaware of the “conclusion of any treaty
or agreement between a State of the United States and a foreign government”; its reply to a
1937 proposal to promote trade between Florida and Cuba that it “did not contemplate the conclusion of special agreements or pacts between separate states and foreign governments even if
the consent of Congress to such special agreements could be obtained”; and its view that congressional consent would be required for a California proposal of reciprocity arrangements with
Mexico relating to motor vehicle registration); Rodgers, supra note 354, at 1022-23 (describing
the traditional view of the State Department’s denying the power of the states to enter into foreign compacts without congressional consent—even in the case of reciprocal exemption of motor vehicle registration and fees).
Similarly, the Department of Justice has advised that states must, at a minimum, obtain
the permission of Congress before entering into any foreign compacts. See 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661,
662 (1841) (“[I]t is necessary to refer the whole matter to Congress, and submit to its wisdom
the propriety of passing an act to authorize such of the states as may choose to make arrangements with the government of . . . any . . . foreign state . . . .”). In a later opinion, Attorney General Wickersham emphasized that congressional permission was not only required, but could
properly be obtained only in view of the contemplated agreement. While this might be read to
authorize prior negotiations, the point instead seems to have been that a very general authorization would not by itself suffice. See 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 327, 332 (1909):
[W]hen such consent is given, Congress shall have in mind the particular matter consented to; and certainly Congress did not intend by the general act in question to give
its consent for a State to enter into an agreement with a foreign power by which such
power might occupy the soil within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The State and Justice Departments were among the many federal agencies urging Congress to
reject the proposed inclusion of Canadian provinces in the Great Lakes Commission, in part on
the ground that it would interfere with the treaty power. See WELDON V. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 119 & n.65 (1967); Michael J. Donahue,
Strengthening the Binational Great Lakes Management Effort: The Great Lakes Commission’s
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Critically, moreover, Holmes captured the norm against state
bargaining as a rule that courts should enforce, one that was not just
dependent on state self-policing or intervention by the federal politi356
cal branches. Such authority was defensible because it was rooted in
specific textual authority granted to the President and Senate and the
357
specific preclusion of state authority. Consequently, Holmes suggested a narrower, more rigorous dormant preemption doctrine, one
premised not on avoiding foreign effects but instead on prohibiting
acts too closely resembling exclusive federal functions.358
As previously stressed, that doctrine was highly dependent upon
359
contemporary notions of the treaty power’s limits, even in areas like
360
immigration and foreign commerce. Nonetheless, to the extent that
Provincial Membership Initiative, 1998 TOLEDO J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 27, 32-33.
Their efforts resulted in language specifically withholding congressional consent to Canadian
membership, declaring that consent would not interfere with the work of federal agencies or the
federal treaty-making power and reserving to Congress the right to “alter, amend or appeal” its
consent. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, art. 9, 82 Stat. 414, 418-19 (1968). It
appears that the Great Lakes Commission is undeterred. See Donahue, supra, at 32-35 (describing the Commission’s interest in Canadian relations).
356. In my view, accordingly, Professor Goldsmith is mistaken in stressing that Chief Justice
Taney “always tie[d] the exclusivity point to a federal policy, inferred from the absence of federal extradition treaties, to prohibit all extraditions to foreign countries.” Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 1, at 1650 n.147. While the Chief Justice cited what he “believed” to be federal policy, the point seems to have been to illustrate that the federal government’s power to
control extradition by treaty was “as fully exercised by the decision not to surrender, as it could
be by a decision the other way”; in either case, “[t]he question to be decided is a question of foreign policy; committed, unquestionably, to the general government.” Holmes v. Jennison, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 538, 577 (1840). Goldsmith similarly suggests that Chief Justice Taney’s argument
regarding the exclusive federal power to appoint ambassadors supposes that the power is exercised. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1650 n.147. But Chief Justice Taney’s
point again is that the power invariably conflicts with state diplomacy. See Holmes, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) at 577. Some federal policy is presupposed, but only in the sense of a decision to act or not
to act.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 344-45. Attempts, then, to determine whether
Holmes and its progeny rest on either a Compact Clause basis or a dormant preemption doctrine, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1651-52 & n.150, not only overlook the
treaty power, but imply that dormant preemption doctrine cannot have any textual basis—
which, if true, would for many answer the question of the doctrine’s validity before it was asked.
358. This seems consistent with the reading of Holmes in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), in which the Court rejected a facial challenge to the
Multistate Tax Commission on the ground that conducting audits of foreign taxpayers would
interfere with the federal foreign relations power. See id. at 476-77. After noting that prior consent had always been required for matters involving foreign powers, see id. at 460 n.10, the
Court explained how Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Holmes could be reconciled with dicta in
Virginia v. Tennessee if his focus on matters with the “exclusive foreign relations power” of the
federal government were properly understood. See id. at 465 n.15.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
360. In The License Cases, for example, Justice Daniel opined that
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positive political authority was permitted, dormant treaty power pre361
emption followed. The obvious puzzle of why courts and scholars
[e]very power delegated to the Federal Government must be expounded in coincidence with a perfect right in the States to all that they have not delegated . . . . A
treaty, no more than an ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away any one right of a
State or of any citizen of a State.
The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 613 (1847) (Daniels, J., concurring). Foreign commerce was not regarded distinctly. See id. at 578 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). This line of thinking
was eventually overcome, but it took some time. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-10, 11518 (1890) (dismissing the idea that a state may act when Congress does not exercise its power).
In the interim, even those cases recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause acknowledged exceptions for the exercise of state police powers. Thus, in The Passenger Cases, the first to find a
Commerce Clause violation in the absence of a federal statute, both sides of a divided Court—
including Chief Justice Taney—recognized limits to federal authority in a setting pertaining
both to foreign commerce and immigration. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 457
(1849) (opinion of Grier, J.) (distinguishing cases involving the “sacred law of self-defence,
which no power granted to Congress can restrain or annul”); id. at 466 (Taney, C.J., dissenting)
(“Any treaty or law of Congress invading [the right to expel dangerous or immoral persons] . . .
would be a usurpation of power which this Court could neither recognize nor enforce. I had
supposed this question not now open to dispute.”).
361. In Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court stated: “[W]hether or not registration of aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.” Id. at 73. Since Congress had acted in Hines, the Court did not have to decide whether
“the federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.” Id. at 62. Hines
legitimately calls into question whether there was a dormant immigration preemption doctrine
and arguably suggests that Zschernig was novel. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 434 n.57; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1653-54. But see Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29,
at 138-41 (defending the pedigree of dormant foreign relations preemption); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1227-41 (reviewing the historical foundations of federal exclusivity over
foreign relations). But Hines also endorses Chy Lung’s concerns about the ultimately federal
responsibility for state acts. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 63-64 & n.12. More important, it takes the
view that the Constitution “imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference,” see id. at 63, 62-68, and leaves undisturbed Chy Lung’s conclusion that states were neither free to negotiate with foreign powers nor
to engage in equivalent acts, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (indicating that
the Constitution “has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations . . . and
has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself,” including the power to pass laws
engendering diplomatic controversy). Judge Feld, writing in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas.
252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546), similarly noted, with respect to a San Francisco ordinance
requiring the apparently offensive treatment of Chinese prisoners, that
to [the national] government belong[s] exclusively the treaty-making power and the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well
as traffic, and, with the exceptions presently mentioned, the power to prescribe the
conditions of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these particulars,
and with those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can never be admitted.
Id. at 256.
In commercial matters, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), raised complex
questions of how to reconcile congressional authority over foreign commerce with Senate and
executive control over treaties respecting those matters, particularly if the treaty power might
regulate matters out of congressional reach. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 209-11, 486-87 n.131.
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might find dormant preemption appropriate for other aspects of the
362
burgeoning federal authority, but not for the treaty power, results
from underestimating the rocky beginnings of any exclusive federal
authority, and from ignoring the centrality of treaty-related bargaining to the raison d’être of the foreign relations monopoly.
This evolving constitutional understanding was set back, of
course, by the narrowing of the dormant treaty power in Clark v. Allen, and was hardly restored by the monopoly’s distension in Zschernig v. Miller. Clark presented the question of whether state reciprocal
inheritance legislation unconstitutionally interfered with the dormant
treaty power. The federal government argued not only that the California statute violated a treaty with Germany, but also that such laws
unconstitutionally attempted to negotiate with foreign states by inviting them to “trade inheritance rights abroad for inheritance rights
363
in these states.” Describing the state’s program in those terms, and
emphasizing the exclusivity of the federal government’s negotiating
power, was perfectly in keeping with dormant treaty power doctrine.
But the brief confused matters by also citing possible interference
with the federal treaty “program” and asserting that such laws could
only have adverse effects on foreign relations.364 The respondents acBut see 2 BUTLER, supra note 320, §§ 361, 378, 388, at 64-65, 84-86, 185-87 (stating that the last
in time of a conflicting treaty stipulation and act of Congress controls, thus implicitly assuming,
prior to Missouri v. Holland, that congressional and treaty authority were coextensive). But it
was plain, under those conditions, that enforcing a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause entailed
the judicial protection of the treaty power as well and that the former’s scope might be enhanced by invoking treaty considerations. The clearest illustration was in Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875), in which the Court adverted to international relations concerns
bearing on municipal regulation of maritime passengers before concluding that “if there be a
class of laws which may be valid when passed by the States until the same ground is occupied by
a treaty or an act of Congress, this statute is not of that class.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
362. Cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1648-49 & nn.139-40 (querying why
dormant preemption developed relative to, among other areas, the Commerce Clause, the
power to tax federal instrumentalities, and fugitive slave legislation, but not in relation to Congress’s bankruptcy power, its “define and punish” power, and its copyright and patent powers).
363. Brief for Petitioner at 69-70, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626) [hereinafter
Clark Petitioner’s Brief]; accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Markham v. Allen, cert.
granted sub nom. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) [hereinafter Clark Petition].
364. See Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 69-75; see also Clark Petition, supra note
363, at 8. Thus, the brief also suggested that the constitutionality of such an act depended on
whether the state “ha[d] the same objective as the existing reciprocal inheritance rights treaties
and must, therefore, be regarded as an indirect attempt to negotiate with foreign countries and
as an attempted duplication of the treaty-making program.” Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note
363, at 70. This would make any dormant treaty power doctrine depend on the actual content of
federal policy, just like a more typical “positive” preemption claim. Neither argument was
helped terribly by the citation of dicta in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), or People v.
Gerke, 5 Cal. 381 (1855). Compare Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 70-71 (citing
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cordingly disputed that state laws might be unconstitutional merely
because they had “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries”—an argument incorporated (and even quoted) by the Supreme
365
Court. While noting the argument that California’s initiative might
366
undercut national objectives and endorsing the view that “negotiating with a foreign country” was solely a task for the federal government, the Court concluded simply that the state had not actually
“entered th[at] forbidden domain.”367
The different result twenty years later in Zschernig could be
viewed as a return to first principles, insofar as the Court cited Ore368
gon’s usurpation of the federal negotiating function. In the main,
though, Zschernig continued Clark’s ill-advised focus on foreign effects. The government revived its position that the governing treaty
resolved the question—a position necessarily diminishing its interest
in vindicating dormant federal negotiating authority369—and minicases), with note 361 (discussing Hines), and note 311 (discussing Gerke). The brief also invoked
Curtiss-Wright’s tenuous argument concerning the absence of state authority, see Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 70-71, claimed sweepingly that “all efforts of a state to engage
in foreign relations” are unconstitutional, id. at 70, and suggested that the California statute was
unconstitutional because its object—protecting the inheritance rights of Americans abroad—
was solely one that could be pursued by the federal government, see id. at 72.
365. See Brief for Respondents at 59 n.19, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (arguing that a
state acting within its own jurisdiction, whose actions do not conflict or hinder federal authority,
should not be held invalid); see also Clark, 331 U.S. at 517 (reasoning that actions that have
some “incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries” may be prohibited).
366. As the Court characterized it, the claim was that “by this method California seeks to
promote the right of American citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal rights of
inheritance in California,” which was “said to be a matter for settlement by the Federal Government on a nation-wide basis.” Clark, 331 U.S. at 516-17.
367. Id. at 517; see also id. (“What California has done will have some incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would claim cross the
forbidden line.”). Although the Court cited a number of cases as counterpoints, its primary support was Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901). See Clark, 331 U.S. at 517; see also supra text
accompanying note 310 (discussing Blythe).
368. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 439 (1968) (explaining that the Oregon statute
“was to serve as ‘an inducement to foreign nations to so frame the inheritance laws of their respective countries in a manner which would insure to Oregonians the same opportunities to inherit and take personal property abroad that they enjoy in the state of Oregon’” (quoting Clostermann v. Schmidt, 332 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Or. 1958)).
369. In Clark, the Court had rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the treaty covered personal property located in the United States that was left by an American citizen to a
German national. See Clark, 331 U.S. at 516; see also Virginia V. Meekison, Treaty Provisions
for the Inheritance of Personal Property, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 passim (1950) (setting forth the
State Department’s position at length). In Zschernig, the Solicitor General opposed certiorari,
but indicated that the threshold question would be the issue of treaty interpretation decided in
Clark—indeed, after certiorari was granted, he argued that this aspect of the decision should be
overruled. See Memorandum for the United States at 5-8, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
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mized any potential conflict with what it cast as the “brooding omni370
presence” of federal authority over foreign relations. The Court, as
previously noted, disagreed, and distinguished Clark principally on
the ground that the potential for adverse foreign effects in Zschernig
was in fact demonstrable.371 The better distinction lay in the design of
the state statute at issue in Zschernig to effect change abroad—not
just its tendency to generate ill will. The state court had opined that
Oregon intended its statute as “an inducement to foreign nations to
so frame the[ir] inheritance laws . . . to insure to Oregonians the same
opportunities” as they enjoyed in Oregon.372 To the Supreme Court,
this bespoke a penchant for inquiring too closely into foreign concerns and intruding into “matters for the Federal Government, not
373
for local probate courts,” which it regarded as posing too high a risk
374
of adverse effect on foreign relations.
(1968) (No. 730) [hereinafter Zschernig Memorandum]; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 6, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 21) [hereinafter Zschernig Amicus
Brief]. The treaty issue may have been the more significant, given that similar or identical language was used in 10 other treaties then in force. See id. at 4-5 & nn.3-4 (listing the treaties containing identical and similar provisions).
370. Zschernig Memorandum, supra note 369, at 6. In its brief, the United States simply asserted that the Oregon statute did not unduly interfere with U.S. foreign relations, without even
framing the matter as a constitutional question. See Zschernig Amicus Brief, supra note 369, at 6
nn.5, 10 & 15.
371. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35 (noting that Oregon’s statute has “great potential for
disruption and embarrassment”); see also id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (dismissing the argument that state law does not conflict with the national interest today, while expressing a concern that it may in the future and that this constitutional issue is too important to risk a variance
of interpretation). But see supra text accompanying notes 92-93 (observing an absence of proof
concerning foreign effect). The same emphasis was suggested in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), in which the Court struck down Connecticut’s refusal to admit a Dutch lawyer to the state bar on grounds of citizenship. After outlining his disagreement
with the majority, the Chief Justice consoled that
the States may well move to adopt, by statute or rule of court, a reciprocal proviso,
familiar in other contexts; under such a reciprocal treatment of applicants a State
would admit to the practice of law the nationals of such other countries as admit
American citizens to practice. I find nothing in the core holding of Zschernig v.
Miller . . . to foreclose state adoption of such reciprocal provisions.
Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). The “core holding” distinguishing Zschernig from Clark and Griffiths was likely thought to be Zschernig’s emphasis on the foreign effects of judicial commentary, which one might fairly presume would be
less prominent in bar-related matters.
372. Closterman, 332 P.2d at 1041, quoted in Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 438-39.
373. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 438; see also id. at 433 n.5 (claiming that in Clark the statute’s
motive had not been litigated, permitting the conclusion that “just matching of laws” was requested and that representations by foreign officials as to their governments’ laws would suffice
to establish reciprocity); id. at 438-39 (citing Clostermann, 332 P.2d at 1042).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
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The real import, instead, had been sketched by the government
in Clark and by the private appellants in Zschernig. However much
distress the Oregon law might cause U.S. foreign relations, and however much Oregon might be legislating in an area susceptible to
resolution by treaty, the constitutional problem was that Oregon was
implicitly “negotiating” with foreign nations, and, in so doing, ex375
ceeding its authority under the Constitution.
III. RECONSIDERING THE DORMANT TREATY POWER
Even if constitutional text and structure, as elaborated through
the nineteenth century, suggests the basic contours of a dormant
treaty power, revisionist scholarship argues that global changes warrant revisiting the matter. The increasingly untenable distinction between matters of international and local concern, and the newly cosmopolitan nature of state and local governments, is thought to have
unsettled the Framers’ assumptions about the proper functions of
state government. Perhaps the states are so thoroughly invested in the
business of foreign nations that their excesses will be checked by selfinterest. If not, perhaps legitimate concerns about federal supremacy
can be adequately protected by the political branches, thereby
avoiding the obvious difficulties courts have had in evaluating the potential costs of state interference in foreign relations—and, perhaps,
their insensitivity to its benefits.
To the extent that such arguments suggest partial “translations”
376
of the Constitution, they face daunting difficulties: if political conditions have changed constitutional meaning, why have they not also
377
undermined any obligation to respect state sovereignty? But even if
375. The appellants’ argument was somewhat distinct from the one made here. Rather than
focusing on state encroachments on the negotiating function, the appellants suggested that Oregon’s proposal had violated an absolute prohibition on entering into a compact with a foreign
powers, asserting almost as an afterthought that negotiating toward that end was also barred.
See Brief of Appellants at 59-60, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 21). They also
failed to emphasize the location of federal authority in the Treaty Clause, instead relying on the
Foreign Commerce Clause. See id. at 60-61.
376. For a comprehensive account of this practice, see Larry Lessig, Fidelity and Translation,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 passim (1993) (arguing that originalism—that is, “fidelity to the text”—
can at times require changes in the interpretation of the Constitution). Of course, some degree
of translation is always necessary. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L.
REV. 659, 672 (1987) (“To converse with the founders, you need a translator.”).
377. Cf. Klarman, supra note 39, at 395-96 (considering analogous conundrums concerning
how to reconcile an original-intent interpretation of the Constitution with changing circumstances); supra text accompanying note 40 (noting the possible partial “translation” of the dormant treaty power).
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it is appropriate, under some circumstances, to adapt constitutional
readings in light of changed circumstances and experience, the claim
that the state activities touching on foreign relations may be blithely
entrusted to legislative supervision is unpersuasive. The better course,
instead, is to articulate a judicially manageable standard that respects
the balance struck by the Constitution. As I argue below, an actoriented prohibition on explicit or implicit state bargaining with foreign powers—tailored to exempt state conduct bearing little relationship to the original warrant for assigning the treaty power to the federal government—is vastly superior to conventional approaches
focusing on effects or purpose.
A. Is the Dormant Treaty Power Antiquated?
1. A New International Function for States? The exclusive
federal authority to control foreign relations was premised on several
simple propositions. First, multiple entreaties robbed the nation of
the uniformity, credibility, and critical bargaining mass necessary to
achieve advantageous treaties and stave off adverse actions. Second,
separate state action risked retaliation against the nation as a whole.
Finally, uniformity would enhance national pride and dignity, thus
indirectly assisting in foreign relations, and serve as a bulwark against
internal collapse due to conflicting interests. These propositions were
based on concrete experience under the Articles of Confederation,
and they were essentially uncontroversial.
Some conditions have changed dramatically—such as the need to
ensure the internal stability and external credibility of the infant
United States—without provoking widespread reconsideration of the
378
treaty power. Other changes seem overstated. The federal government has not really yielded its international role to the states.379 Failures to preempt state foreign relations activities might signal genuine
agreement with a state’s position, an inability to intervene due to political or administrative constraints, or simply opposition to preemp380
tion as a matter of principle. And even if concessions to states in re378. Cf. FRY, supra note 5, at 110-11 (contrasting the contemporary United States with
problems posed for Canada by Quebec separatism). But see id. at 1-3 (asserting political and
economic vulnerability of post–Cold War America).
379. But see Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 29, at 861-70
(citing examples of federal accommodation of state activities affecting international relations);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1674-78, 1683 (same).
380. See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1098-99 (positing different explanations for presidential

SWAINE TO PRINTER.DOC

1238

09/21/00 12:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

cent treaties and implementing legislation outweigh parallel incur381
sions into state sovereignty—a point open to dispute —they hardly
suggest that states are at liberty to determine their own constitutional
privileges.
To be sure, many traditionally local issues now implicate foreign
relations, domestic laws often have international repercussions, and
382
states and localities have higher international profiles. This muchballyhooed leap into globalization surely continues trends that began
much earlier this century,383 and raises issues not unknown even under
and congressional passivity). Professor Spiro suggests that the federal government is almost always begrudging of any state intervention. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1258 &
n.143 (disagreeing with Professor Bradley’s position that “state-level activity may now be unproblematic because in some cases Congress may ‘agree’ with it”).
381. For emphasis on the loss of local sovereignty, see, for example, A.J. Tangeman, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in a Global Economy: Will the
NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process Preserve State Sovereignty?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
243, 244-46 (1996); Joseph Wilson, Note, Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act:
‘Preserving’ State Sovereignty?, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 401, 402-03 (1997); William T.
Waren, Balancing Act: Free Trade and Federalism, STATE LEGISLATURES, May 1996, at 12 . For
emphasis instead on the loss of U.S. sovereignty, see William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The
Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 428 (1995). For
analyses suggesting that sovereignty concerns are misplaced, see John H. Jackson, The Great
1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 170-88 (1997); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 47 (1998).
382. See, e.g., BRIAN HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL
GOVERNMENTS AND MULTILAYERED DIPLOMACY 8-30 (1993); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1670-80; Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. &
POL’Y SYMP. 19, 31-32 (1997).
383. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162 (1914):
With the growth of international trade relations, immigration, and other forms of international intercourse, the conditions of life within particular nations become of ever
increasing concern to their neighbors, with the result that treaty-making among the
independent states of the world tends to extend to matters earlier deemed to lie quite
without its sphere.
Accord FISHER, supra note 46, at 59 & n.82 (“The framers made no such distinction and world
events since 1936 have increased the overlap between foreign and domestic affairs.”); Mark L.
Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1996) (describing pre–World War I writings of Norman Angell and the International Polity movement). In an article cited in Zschernig itself, Arthur Selwyn Miller predicted the “obsolescence of the nation-state as a form of social ordering,” contributing to his
conclusion that “[t]he social milieu in which the Constitution operates having changed so radically, the answers produced by the Founding Fathers must be re-examined.” Arthur S. Miller,
The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539, 157072 (1960), cited in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968). Just three years after Zschernig, Raymond Vernon declared that the concept of national sovereignty seemed “curiously
drained of meaning.” RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 3 (1971); see also Bayless Manning, The Congress, the Executive
and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 308-10 (1977) (describing the
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the Articles of Confederation: the controversy over navigation on the
Mississippi, for example, demonstrated how regional interests implicated foreign relations right in our own backyard, and states have
384
competed for overseas business since they were colonies. However
new and fundamental globalization may seem, we must also recall
how suffused with international concerns even “domestic” America
was at its beginning, and how critical a role that context played in the
385
founding.
Even if today’s globalization is revolutionary, it is hard to determine its constitutional import. The erosion of national boundaries
might as readily argue for expanding federal authority on the ground
that matters are increasingly of common interest—certainly the con386
ventional translation in our constitutional tradition. Globalization
interrelationship between issues on international and domestic agendas). The tendency to
greatly exaggerate the death of national sovereignty, and contemporary evidence indicating its
continuing significance, may be cause for skepticism. See PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME
THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE
POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE 1 (1996) (writing with a “mixture of scepticism [sic] about
global processes and optimism about the possibilities of control of the international economy”);
Movsesian, supra, at 1089 (arguing that “the decline of the nation state has been greatly exaggerated”).
384. Compare Blaine Liner, States and Localities in the Global Marketplace, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Spring 1990, at 11 (describing Virginia’s overseas effort in 1969 as a
“stroke of genius” and “an historic and very lonely act”), with Harry N. Scheiber, International
Economic Policies and the State Role in U.S. Federalism: A Process Revolution?, in STATES AND
PROVINCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY at 71 (Douglas M. Brown & Earl H. Fry eds.,
1993) (noting the parallel with eighteenth-century regulatory competition for European business). It remains the case, however, that domestic relations are generally more significant. See
Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1997,
at 21-22 (citing a study indicating that “trade between a Canadian province and a U.S. state
(that is, international trade) is on average 20 times smaller than between two Canadian provinces (that is, intranational trade)” ).
385. See generally Marks, supra note 165, passim (emphasizing the significance of foreign
relations issues at the Founding).
386. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 n.14 (1st Cir.)
(noting, in response to commentary criticizing Zschernig, that “in an increasingly interdependent and multilateral world, Zschernig’s affirmation of the foreign affairs power of the national
government may be all the more significant”), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999); CORWIN, supra note 383, at 171:
What with cable, steamship, wireless telegraphy, and inter-oceanic canals, the world
to-day is astonishingly small and the consequence is that the nations can no longer
live unto themselves in the way that was earlier possible. . . . The development of uniform national legislation of social character, in pursuance of international agreement,
is but another phase of the broader development of international solidarity.
Accord FRY, supra note 5, at 110 (noting that “the ability to act quickly and decisively in an increasingly complex and interdependent world might favor the maintenance—or even the
strengthening—of authority in the nation’s capital”); Comment, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE L.J. 445, 449 (1920) (describing the “drawing together” of
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might also counsel in favor of some intermediate approach, such as
improving the channels by which states can influence national pol387
icy. The constitutional significance of globalization ultimately depends to a great degree on one’s extrinsic commitment to the virtues
either of federal or state government.
One attempt to make sense of globalization emphasizes the diminishing prospect of state-induced externalities. Peter Spiro stresses
that the federal monopoly has “constitutional pedigree” and rests on
a wholly defensible thesis, the notion that externalities will prevent
states from shouldering, or even accurately predicting, the costs of
388
their foreign relations activities. According to Spiro, however, the
emerging prospect of “targeted retaliation”—the ability of foreign
powers to respond directly against the offending state, rather than
against the nation as a whole—might warrant reexamining of the traditional rule.389
His argument is somewhat tentative as to whether this evolution
390
has achieved constitutional significance, and appropriately so. Al391
though cases of targeted retaliation are not unknown, it is hard to
the world as the basis for increased international and, derivatively, federal regulation). Compare
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1672 (describing the new reach of public international law into “issues like environmental protection and family law that in prior times were exclusively governed by domestic law”), with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920)
(holding that the federal government’s authority to regulate migratory birds by treaty may be
broader than its statutory authority), and Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background
of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1126, 1128-30 (1999) (describing the degree to which
Missouri was anticipated). By analogy, much the same argument could have been made about
the impact of a burgeoning national market on constitutional notions of state authority, see
Larry Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and
the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 919-20 & n.88 (1996) (noting the original insignificance of interstate commerce), but the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not seem
to have been deterred—even without any of the traditional biases against states in foreign affairs.
387. For consideration, see KLINE, supra note 4, at 217-21.
388. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1246-47.
389. See id. at 1259-75.
390. See id. at 1261 (arguing that episodes of targeted retaliation “could mark the emergence
of a new doctrine of subnational responsibility, and the treatment of the states as demisovereigns under international law. . . . To the extent this development is perfected, the basis for
federal exclusivity over foreign relations slips away.”); see also id. (“[T]he case for shelving federal exclusivity hinges on the innovation of targeted retaliation.”). But see id. at 1226 (asserting
that “there is no justification for the courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face of contrary state-level preferences”).
391. See KLINE, supra note 4, at 179 (citing the Japanese retaliation against Texas-based
banks in response to a Texas prohibition on foreign-bank branches, as well as Swiss constraints
on Chicago-based banks in response to an Illinois law); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 51 n.67
(citing the example of U.S. retaliation against Ontario beer concerns). Professor Kline’s 1983
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392

find examples demonstrating its sufficiency. In fact, the controver393
sies surrounding state capital sentencing, the formative experience
with the California taxing method in Barclays,394 and the ongoing
Massachusetts Burma controversy395 illustrate perfectly how foreign
powers typically pursue both conventional diplomacy (including
threats of reprisals) with the federal government and diplomacy targeted at the responsible state. Retaliation, in other words, is not an
either/or proposition; consequently, even if a state cared for some
reason to minimize externalities and could predict which foreign
powers might take offense, it might be hard-pressed to know whether
they would forego national-level diplomacy.396 It remains at least as
study concluded that “there is not yet any firm evidence that foreign countries act so as to hold
individual states accountable for their restrictive policies (although states that are relatively free
from discriminatory regulations emphasize that fact in their promotional pitches abroad).”
KLINE, supra note 4, at 97.
392. Two of the three recent examples Spiro provides are speculative, and the states in question seem to have been utterly unaffected by any prospect of retaliation. As Spiro observes,
California’s Proposition 187, which withheld public benefits from undocumented aliens, was
immediately enjoined (for reasons unrelated to the foreign relations power) and was the subject
of relatively vague threats of reprisal by Mexico. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at
1262-64. A few death penalty cases have drawn clearer threats of investment or tourism boycotts, but they have been nonbinding and low-level, and they have had no discernible effect on
the states. See id.
393. In the controversy surrounding the proposed execution of a Canadian citizen, the Canadian foreign minister appealed directly to Secretary of State Albright, who sought to intercede with the Texas governor on grounds of national interest—claiming that if the United States
breached the Vienna Convention, “it could not expect foreign governments to honour their obligation to grant access to Americans facing imprisonment abroad.” David Usborne, Albright
Plea to Spare Killer, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 10, 1998, at 19. After Albright’s request
for a stay was refused, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization
of American States formally requested the State Department again to intervene. See Mike
Ward, Human Rights Group Joins Call to Spare Canadian Killer, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATESMAN, June 11, 1999, at B1.
The even more controversial execution by Virginia of a Paraguayan citizen also demonstrated how foreign governments and international institutions did not rely on state-level pressure, but instead pressured the United States, which again tried to intercede to protect what it
regarded as the national interest in ensuring the proper treatment of similarly situated Americans (not just Virginians) abroad. See Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora:
Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666 passim (1998).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74, 111-19. For an account describing the importance of foreign efforts at both the federal and state levels, as well as the differing emphases of
the Japanese and British, see HOCKING, supra note 382, at 130-51.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 15-23.
396. See Schaefer, supra note 326, at 51 & n.67 (noting that there is “no guarantee that [the
targeted retaliation] will occur”). The targeted-retaliation thesis overlooks, in any event, the
fundamental perversity of externalities. States should systematically prefer acts that do not risk
targeted retaliation, without regard for externalities. A foreign power, correspondingly, should
be most inclined toward targeted retaliation in those cases that do not implicate the national
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common for those powers electing between the options to impose national responsibility, which gives them the broadest range of possibili397
ties for recourse. Put simply, the pattern since 1787 has shown more
consistency than change and tends to vindicate the experience and
concerns of the Framers.398
At a minimum, though, the new incidence and diversity of state
initiatives suggest that we should avoid generalizing about the federal
interest (or the lack of state interest) in foreign relations. Sister-city
relationships and simple purchase agreements, for example, seem different from treaties of cession. As I have argued, case law and practice offer an appealing distinction between state laws having foreign
effects and state laws interfering with the exclusive federal control
over diplomacy, and modern foreign relations provide no basis for
unsettling that distinction. And even if the new international profile
of the states warrants reconsidering broad rules, á la Zschernig, that
broadly indict state activities having foreign effect, we should be cautious about discarding dormant federal preemption in its entirety
simply because one or more versions are ill suited to marginal cases.
2. A New Domestic Function for States? Revisionist accounts of
the changed world of international relations tend to ignore the
Framers’ argument that a federal monopoly is necessary in order to
maximize and apply American bargaining power—in modern terms,
their “collective action” argument. Here again, focusing on the new
function of states in international relations does not seem terribly
rewarding. Modern doubts about assuming a unitary state,399 and the
interest, and should tend to prefer national-level retaliation in those cases where more than the
interests of the state are at stake. (If many states impose economic sanctions, foreign opponents
would be unlikely to commence a whirlwind tour of state capitals, but instead would be encouraged to concentrate their energies on Foggy Bottom.) As a result, targeted retaliation is least
likely to deter, or resolve, those cases posing the greatest risk to the national interest.
397. Minds accustomed to international trade remedies, in which, for example, EC discrimination against bananas from U.S. growers is thought to be redressed by tariffs against Italian
cheese, should have no necessary attachment to redressing the original injustice allegedly suffered. While Spiro suggests that “the costs of disciplining the United States as a unit are often
greater than foreign actors are willing to bear,” Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 126768, the diversity of options would seem to preserve the possibility of appropriately modulated,
credible threats.
398. See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 4, at 16-19, 90-91, 98-99 (describing historical examples of
fallout from state and local legislation); id. at 96-97 (dismissing the significance of state-level
retaliation).
399. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?, 37 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 403, 403-04 (1993) (criticizing realists for “treat[ing] nation-states as unitary actors . . . .
[when, in] reality, foreign policy decisions are the result of political processes within nation-
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feasibility of maintaining “one voice” in foreign affairs, were equally
within the Framers’ contemplation—indeed, it was their decision to
deliberately fracture the congressional monopoly on treaty-making
and to vest part of that authority in the presidency, an institution less
401
responsive to state interests. The Framers seem to have supposed
that the possibility of achieving one (final) voice, along with the
theoretical appeal of the federal objective, was enough to warrant a
federal monopoly; and it is difficult to see how changed circumstances
have unsettled that judgment.
One might question, however, whether they were right in supposing that consolidating the treaty power in the federal government
402
conferred an advantage in international bargaining. Modern two403
level game analysis predicts that while domestic constraints may decrease the likelihood of a mutually satisfactory accord—by limiting
the range of outcomes to which both parties can agree404—they increase the likelihood that any agreement actually achieved will favor
405
the constrained side. It is often difficult for negotiators to demonstates”).
400. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 29, at 446; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at
1688.
401. See supra Part II.A.
402. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-6, at 230 (“[S]tate action, whether or not consistent with
current federal foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void . . . .”); supra text accompanying notes
270-74, 287; see also Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic
Theories of International Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 28 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY] (noting the “normal expectation that the statesman will preserve the maximum possible level of executive autonomy”).
403. For a concise exposition, see Putnam, supra note 199; for one of the rare applications in
the legal setting, and a useful literature review, see Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific
Salmon Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95 (1996).
404. This relies on the assumption that larger win-sets improve the prospect of reaching
agreement, see Putnam, supra note 199, at 437-38, rather than leading to squabbles over a larger
range of possible outcomes, see Frederick W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT’L ORG. 793, 797-98
(1992).
405. See Putnam, supra note 199, at 440 (quoting THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT 19-28 (1960)):
“The power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions
and meet demands . . . . When the United States Government negotiates with other
governments[,] . . . if the executive branch negotiates under legislative authority, with
its position constrained by law, . . . then the executive branch has a firm position that
is visible to its negotiating partners. . . . [Of course, strategies such as this] run the risk
of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to
concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown.”
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strate credibly that they are bound by domestic constraints, but
state laws might overcome this problem by directly communicating
domestic constraints to foreign powers. A country confronted by state
sanctions, for example, might be more easily convinced that U.S. negotiators must achieve certain objectives in bilateral negotiations in
order to secure domestic political support, and may offer concessions
in order to placate those interests and obtain a ratifiable agreement.407
On balance, though, two-level game theory does not unsettle the
Framers’ model, largely because the Treaty Clause they designed establishes just such a game. One of the Constitution’s important innovations, as we have seen, was precisely the creation of a credible constraint: assigning negotiation to a substantially independent President,
while simultaneously liberating the Senate’s advice-and-consent function, meant that the President could reasonably assert that agree408
ments under discussion would have to satisfy a third party. Adding
the states would upset the calculus. An additional constraint, in the
form of House approval, was specifically contemplated and rejected,
and there is abundant evidence that securing state approval was
deemed undesirable, largely because such consent posed too serious a
hurdle to agreement.409
We should also distinguish between the credible communication
of domestic preferences—which need not, of course, take legal
form—and activities that interfere with the conduct of diplomacy.
406. See James A. Caporaso, Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 563 passim. But see Howard P. Lehman & Jennifer L. McCoy,
The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations, 44
WORLD POL. 600, 640-42 (1992) (hypothesizing that Brazilian bargaining strength derived from
domestic opposition and weakness). Credibility problems are naturally greatest where the constraints have been artificially generated. See Robert Pahre, Endogenous Domestic Institutions in
Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
147, 147 (1997). See generally SCHELLING, supra note 405, at 19-28 (presenting “a tactical approach to the analysis of bargaining”); Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY,
supra note 402, at 397, 402-03 (discussing “tied hands” in negotiations).
407. Indeed, such a dynamic may be particularly useful in circumstances where international
bargains are distributive rather than creating joint gains, such as where human rights are at issue. See Mayer, supra note 404, at 797, 805, 816; id. at 798-805 (providing graphic illustrations
relating to two-party negotiations).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 206-11; see also Mayer, supra note 404, at 796
(“Having one’s hands tied can be quite useful in extracting concessions from an opponent in
negotiation. U.S. negotiators, for example, have long used the threat of congressional rejection
as a device for leveraging concessions at the bargaining table.”); Putnam, supra note 199, at 448
(considering the influence of the Senate on bargaining power of American negotiators and on
the prospects for agreement).
409. See supra text accompanying notes 162, 164-66.
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The Senate, for its part, was thought to lack diplomatic capacity and
could not influence negotiations save through negotiating instructions, indirectly enforced through its power of consent. In contrast,
state and local governments possess a fluidity, dispatch, and authority
410
that together poses a serious risk to executive diplomacy. In particular, state activities creating multiple negotiating channels, establishing or maintaining subjects for ongoing negotiation (and, potentially, agreement), or generating demands for preemption that
otherwise would not exist, can hardly be said to ease the task for
presidential negotiators.411
Finally, for domestic constraints to be useful, they must be rea412
sonably consistent with the federally defined interest. Plainly, state
policies that are antithetical to the federal objective—for example,
opposing normalized relations under any circumstances—will more
likely hinder than help. But even states desiring to support a federal
objective may find it difficult to conform to, or even to identify, that
objective.413 The less elaborate, two-level game embodied in the constitutional allocation of foreign relations power seems better suited to
the advantages of entrusting policy development to a negotiator with
at least qualified independence.414
410. It is no accident, perhaps, that strong governors—a phenomenon even less well anticipated by the Framers than a strong President—have taken the lead in establishing states in foreign affairs. For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see John Kincaid, The American Governors in International Affairs, PUBLIUS, Fall 1984, at 95.
411. If domestic constraints are too credible, moreover, such as to overwhelm the capacity
of the federal government to resolve them, any value is lost. At the extreme, for example, the
lack of a supremacy clause might seem an ideal demonstration of domestic constraints, but it
would also demonstrate that the negotiator could not promise to uphold any bargain struck. See
Putnam, supra note 199, at 438-39 (discussing involuntary defection); see also HELEN V.
MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 80-81 (1997) (noting that international agreements are in general
more difficult where domestic politics are involved).
412. See, e.g., MILNER, supra note 411, at 234.
413. For example, Massachusetts may have understandably considered its anti-Burma law to
be consistent with federal objectives, even when third-party relations were considered; the EU,
for example, had publicly supported international action against the Burmese regime. But federal Burma policy was intended to foster multilateral cooperation, and the Europeans viewed
the particular type of sanction selected by Massachusetts—secondary boycotts—as particularly
offensive. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46-47, 53-54, 76-77 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). Federal sanctions policy, writ large, appears to have
rationed such tools and resorted to them only in select cases, and federal European and east
Asian policies created multi-issue linkages that could scarcely have been anticipated. See id. at
47, 53-54.
414. Cf. Putnam, supra note 199, at 456-58 (relaxing the assumption of the chief negotiator
as a faithful agent for her constituents).
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B. Does Positive Political Authority Suffice?
Most of the post-Founding insights into the scope of the Treaty
Clause have been afforded by the political branches, and the instances
in which the judiciary has enforced, rather than merely declared, the
relevant norms are passing few. The rarity of judicial intervention
should not be surprising. The treaty power is expressly allocated to
the President and the Senate. Justice Stewart’s concurrence in
Zschernig noted that “the conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted
under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States”415—and, he might have added, neither was it entrusted to the Supreme Court. Dormant doctrines presuppose, of course, that the judiciary is not usurping federal
prerogatives, but is merely preserving them for exclusive exercise by
the political branches.416 Still, there is room for doubt as to whether
courts have the deft touch necessary to perform that function.417 If judicial intervention is to be redeemed, we need a clearer explanation
as to why the best judicial rule is simply not to interfere.
1. The General Argument Against Judicial Intervention. A
threshold issue then, and one posed repeatedly and skillfully by
Professor Goldsmith, is why the political branches should not be left
to protect their own prerogatives. Congress may pass preemptive
legislation, and the President has executive agreements and
regulations at his disposal. Given those instruments, and the obvious
superiority of the political branches in assessing foreign relations, why
empower the courts to intrude as well? To be sure, the political
branches can correct any decisions with which they may disagree,
thereby ameliorating the downside to judicial involvement.
Goldsmith argues, however, that the federal government is more
likely to step in where the courts underprotect federal interests—and
thus courts will tend, on balance, to generate uncorrected errors that
unnecessarily federalize state law and preempt genuinely tolerable

415. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
416. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1256 n.139 (distinguishing between intervention by federal courts against the federal political branches and protective intervention, as in
Zschernig).
417. If, as Justice Jackson asserted, courts lack the necessary information and capacity to
second-guess the political branches on questions that are “delicate, complex, and involv[ing]
large elements of prophecy,” perhaps even judicial intervention on behalf of the political
branches may do more harm than good. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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418

state activities.
This argument raises numerous questions worth pursuing, though
not easily resolved. The turn to self-enforcing constitutional law
seems to rest on a fundamental skepticism about the traditional function of federal courts—almost a political question doctrine favoring
419
the states. The premises of such a move, obviously, are debatable.
Even if one concedes that dormant foreign relations preemption is
constitutional common law, that does not mean that all such law is
presumptively illegitimate, nor that the foreign relations preemption
420
should be discarded first.
In any case, there is cause to be skeptical that Congress represents a sufficient alternative. Even if Congress is fully aware of state
encroachments, and concerned about them, it may find it difficult or
costly to intervene—particularly given its notorious weaknesses at
managing foreign policy.421 In the alien land law controversies, for ex418. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1692-95; Goldsmith, Formalism, supra
note 29, at 1420.
419. Cf. Louis Henkin, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23
(1976) (suggesting the existence of “constitutional provisions which can properly be interpreted
as wholly or in part ‘self-monitoring’ and not the subject of judicial review,” with the arguable
exception of the Guarantee Clause).
420. To the contrary, commentators with varying views on the legitimacy of federal common
law consider foreign relations to be the paradigmatic case for it. See Clark, supra note 257, at
1292-311 & 1298 n.252; Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1048 (1967); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36-39, 54-59 (1985) (describing the principle of preemptive lawmaking as a potential warrant for federal common law); id. at 56 n.238
(identifying the federal common law of international relations as a possible example of preemptive lawmaking).
421. Compare Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1683 (“Congress is more likely to
address state activity that harms the national foreign relations interest than it is to address other
harmful state acts.”), with ROBERT A. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1950) (generally describing congressional inadequacies), and BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS THE
EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS passim (1994)
(rebutting claims that Congress has reestablished control over foreign relations), and KOH, supra note 46, at 123-33 (describing congressional inadequacies, with particular reference to matters of national security), and STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN, A CULTURE OF DEFERENCE:
CONGRESS’S FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY 12-16 (1995) (describing congressional efforts at foreign policy as “reactive” and “well below even its general norm,” due largely
to the lack of constituent interest). Much of the criticism directed at Congress, to be sure, concerns its deference to the President, but many of the reasons for its inattention and paralysis
would also seem to impair its ability to react to state encroachment. What is more, Congress’s
attempts to maintain a modicum of influence on presidential policy have often found expression
through nonstatutory means, such as public relations, which may have less than the desired effect on state laws. See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign
and Domestic Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL
HILL 17 (Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993).
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ample, the federal government tolerated state activities with manifest
422
adverse effects on U.S. foreign relations. Although the federal government may since have grown more sure of its authority, it continues
to yield to state pressures.423 It is hard to determine in any given case,
of course, whether federal officials are genuinely disturbed by state
policies, and easy to speculate that Congress would intervene if it
424
really objected, as in the case of the Arab boycott. But the prevailing pattern—including the survival of state laws on the Eastern Bloc,
425
South Africa, Burma, and the taxation of multinationals —suggests
that Congress is solicitous of state interests even in cases where forI assume, with Professor Goldsmith, that any significant foreign relations controversy will
come to Congress’s attention, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1682, though I am
less sanguine that state activities discriminating against foreign nations are somehow more visible than analogous activities discriminating against interstate commerce. Even if there is a more
specialized legislative apparatus for foreign matters, the fact that potential complainants in cases
of interstate discrimination enjoy legislative representation may more than make up the difference. See infra text accompanying note 426. The increasingly blurry distinction between foreign
and domestic matters will further erode the ability of Congress’s specialized committees to
monitor foreign relations matters and quickly initiate change. Compare Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 1, at 1682-83 (emphasizing the function of legislative committees’ specializing
in foreign affairs), with WILLIAM I. BACCHUS, THE PRICE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNDING 38-40 (1997) (emphasizing the adverse effects of decentralizing reforms on committee authority and ease of legislating), and HINCKLEY, supra note 421, at 12-15 (same), and Manning, supra note 383, at 311 (citing overlapping committee jurisdictions on foreign policy issues as posing “deep-seated and
probably ineradicable” problems).
422. Indeed, this very fact is cited to show the supposed absence of dormant foreign relations law. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655.
423. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 676-78 (citing examples of federal accommodation of state activities affecting international relations); Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
supra note 1, at 1674-78, 1683 (same).
424. See supra text accompanying note 10. The Export Administration Act of 1979 may have
been successful in part because it was focused less on state-designed policies than on those reacting to “restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against
other countries.” 50 U.S.C. § 2407(c) (1994).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 11-13. As William Wong has explained, the persistence of Iron Curtain statutes, notwithstanding Zschernig, posed potential problems for nonresident Chinese aliens. See Wong, supra note 9, at 658-62; cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (advocating judicial nullification on grounds of desuetude). In the case of South Africa, moreover, Congress passed and then retracted sanctions
without preempting state measures, notwithstanding apparent disagreement with their continuation. See supra note 264. This result may have been anticipated in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986), where the Supreme Court of Illinois opined that
“[t]he ability of this country to choose between a range of policy options in developing its foreign policy in relation to the Republic of South Africa would be compromised by the existence
of State-sponsored sanctions which the Federal government could not remove or modify to fit
changing conditions.” Id. at 307. That description may make little formal sense, given the Supremacy Clause, but it captures the practical difficulty in orchestrating a measured and flexible
federal response.
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eign policy considerations, taken alone, might dictate a different approach.
The assertion that involving the judiciary tips the result toward
excess federalization is vulnerable for many of the same reasons. It
seems like guesswork to suppose that legislative intervention is more
likely to be inspired by foreign policy interests than by the desire to
vindicate state interests wounded by an adverse judgment, particu426
larly given the domestic orientation of representative politics. And
even if the risks of uncorrected error are asymmetric, the consequences of the two types of error may not be identical or equally intolerable. Judicial intervention may indeed protect federal prerogatives when Congress would deem it unnecessary, but the case for
specially heeding that risk is unconvincing.
Finally, even if the ability of the federal branches to defend their
own prerogatives were currently satisfactory, the notion that their
authority would be unaffected by the demise of the judiciary’s role
seems unrealistic. Were the Supreme Court to conclude, for example,
that the Constitution is insufficiently clear to bar automatically state
foreign relations activities, political branch defenses of the federal
monopoly—not infrequently couched as principled defenses of a constitutional assignment—would be deeply undermined, and states
might naturally assume that the range of permissible conduct had expanded.427 The dormant foreign relations doctrines and positive politi426. One would assume that foreign interests are relatively less influential in congressional
politics than are the states, though it is certainly difficult to measure in conventional terms. Foreign interests are handicapped by their lack of voting power and the foreclosure of most campaign contributions, see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1253 & n.133, but so are
states. Both foreign interests and states will find U.S. private surrogates for their interests, such
as (in the case of the foreign governments) the National Foreign Trade Council. But see KLINE,
supra note 4, at 223-26 (suggesting that Congress tends to be disproportionately responsive to
domestic interest groups on international issues); cf. FRY, supra note 5, at 109 (contrasting the
domestic orientation of Congress with the reorientation of states toward international interdependence).
The stronger point, it seems to me, is that by comparison to congressional delegations
from a state in controversy, opposition from other members will be relatively diffuse—as will
participation by the State Department, which has other programmatic interests that may make it
vulnerable to concerted pressure from Congress. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at
1253-54 (supposing that support of congressional delegation from an affected state will be relatively more intense).
427. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY passim (1960) (describing the “building” and “legitimating” work of judicial review). This is not the only possible reaction to judicial abdication, of course. One might also
suppose that “[l]egislators and other officials are likely to take the Constitution more seriously if
they cannot pass the buck to the courts[,] [f]or they are more likely to be blamed for unconstitutional actions if there is no mode of correction.” Richard A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, NEW
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cal authority are not, it seems clear, genuinely independent variables.
2. Positive Political Authority and the Dormant Treaty Power.
Even if judicial intervention in foreign relations is generally
deleterious, that does not necessarily impugn the dormant treaty
power. If other dormant doctrines are a yardstick, the case for reading
a dormant component into the Treaty Clause is relatively strong.
Even Justice Scalia, a dogged critic of the dormant Commerce Clause,
acknowledges that the treaty power’s structure—the assignment of
positive authority to the federal government, and the corresponding
denial of that authority to the states—makes it an appealing
428
candidate for a preemptive judicial rule. Professor Goldsmith,
however, offers a clever inversion of this argument. In his view, clear
grants of federal authority make it more likely that the political
branches will successfully ward off any state encroachment. At the
same time, the prohibition on certain state ends—here, barring states
from entering into treaties, and requiring congressional consent for
compacts—“attenuates the possibility that states will . . . interfere[]
with federal diplomatic prerogatives.”429
Whether the possibility of state interference has actually been attenuated depends on how broadly the federal prerogative is construed. Whether positive federal authority is a sufficient defense
against state conduct, moreover, depends on which branch’s power is
being defended. While Goldsmith assumes (with Barclays Bank) that

REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 37 (book review). But this supposes more obvious or wellunderstood norms than the dormant treaty power, which has not been wholly successful when
left to its own devices. See Kirgis, supra note 51, at 707-08 (noting, in light of lack of Supreme
Court guidance, that states have to “take responsibility for ensuring that they act within appropriate constitutional bounds when foreign relations are at hand” (citing authorities)); Shuman,
Local Foreign Policies, supra note 20, at 162 (“The relevant court pronouncements have been so
ambiguous and contradictory that few city attorneys have been convinced that their municipal
foreign policies were clearly illegal and not worth trying.”); id. at 167 (arguing that standards
announced by a lower court in the wake of Zschernig “are so vague and depend so heavily on
each case’s peculiar facts and circumstances that it is hardly surprising that few cities have been
deterred by the highly uncertain prospect of a Zschernig violation”).
428. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that “there is no correlative denial of power over commerce to the States
in Art. I, § 10, as there is, for example, with the power to coin money or make treaties”).
429. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1707. In the quoted passage, Goldsmith was
particularly addressing the need for a supplemental rule barring the states from sending or receiving ambassadors, but the example was meant to be illustrative. Were he to accept that prior
consent was necessary in order to enter into foreign compacts, see supra text accompanying
notes 252-60, congressional guardianship would presumably seem still more adequate.
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Congress’s power to regulate commerce is at stake, the treaty power
is at risk too—and that has meaningfully distinct implications.
To be sure, Congress possesses substantial authority to address
state interference with the treaty power. Though its own power to en431
croach on negotiations may be limited, it has the power to authorize—or refrain from authorizing—state negotiation with foreign powers toward compacts, and appears to be the sole judge of the
distinction between those pacts and treaties.432 Congress may also enact legislation expressly proscribing state diplomacy. It is difficult for
it to do so, however, in any fine-tuned or expedient way. Congress’s
ordinary frailties in managing foreign relations are multiplied when it
is asked to safeguard the integrity of international negotiations with
which it may be wholly unfamiliar, particularly where intervention
seems to sacrifice domestic interests for foreign ends or abstract principle.433 More programmatic intervention is also rare, and rarely effec430. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1698-1705.
431. For example, Congress may be barred from intruding in ongoing negotiations, or from
restricting the President’s ability to pursue negotiations on certain topics or with certain parties.
Cf. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 80 (“Limitations on Congressional power are implied in grants of
power to the President . . . .”); id. at 88 (“Even for champions of maximum Congressional
authority, . . . [there is] no doubt that [the President] alone, not Congress[,] can make treaties . . . . Congress has not seriously doubted that the President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments . . . .”). At the same time, though, it can enact legislation overriding any treaty. See id. at 209-14 (distinguishing between the legislative override of a treaty
and treaty termination). It may also interfere with the negotiating process in a number of ways
that would be constitutionally problematic were they pursued by individual states. Thus, the
House Committee on the Judiciary, in a report arguing for the now-discredited view that the
treaty-making power could not be used to invade congressional authority over matters such as
tariffs, conceded that while Congress “cannot reach out to negotiate with other nations” and
“cannot make compacts or agreements[,] [i]t may condition its own legislation on that of foreign
nations, and thus make overtures of international policy.” J.R. TUCKER, POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT TO NEGOTIATE TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, H. REP. NO. 2680, at 7
(1885).
432. See supra text accompanying note 335. It may not, however, authorize the states to negotiate toward treaties, however defined. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
657, 724-25 (1838) (“By the first clause of the tenth section of the first article of the constitution,
there was a positive prohibition against any state entering into ‘any treaty, alliance, or confederation:’ no power under the government could make such an act valid, or dispense with the
constitutional prohibition.”); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 37 (1823) (describing an
argument of counsel).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 421-25. Should Congress affirmatively disagree with
state policies, of course, legislating may be attractive. But where it desires simply to clear the
field for the exercise of the treaty power, intervention will still be perceived as a substantive disagreement with the extant state policies, with all the attendant political and legal problems that
might entail. Spear notes:
For the administration, though, suits against the states over constitutional matters are
a rather conspicuous way to handle this particular flap. At issue, after all, is the coun-
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434

tual. Goldsmith regards the Logan Act as dispelling “[a]ny remaining doubt about the adequacy of legal protection for federal inter435
ests,” but many would consider that statute’s virtual desuetude to
prove quite the opposite point.436
The courts, in consequence, are typically left to construe congressional silence, and the import of that silence is very different in the
treaty context. With the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, the alternative to congressional authority is state authority; silence passes
437
the baton, as it were. In matters subject to the treaty power, on the
other hand, the Senate is left free to instruct the President and to insist either on sacrificing state authority or preserving it. Barring Senate intervention, in turn, the President is considered to have unfettered authority to negotiate, or to refrain from negotiating. This raises
the question, then, whether the Senate and the President, and not just
the Congress, have genuinely effective means of protecting their
authority and their vision of the federal interest against state encroachment.
The usual repository of federal treaty authority is the President,
and dormant treaty power preemption seems indispensable to pro438
tecting his (and the Senate’s ) negotiating prerogatives. Certainly the
try’s trade policies toward countries with nasty human rights records—a debate that
the Clinton White House is not exactly eager to provoke. “Washington is scared to
death because it does not want to be accused of being soft on human rights,” noted
one Massachusetts official.
Spear, supra note 22, at 8. The more abstract constitutional arguments that Congress might muster in favor of the federal monopoly are not only tough sells in any particular context, but also
apply with some force against congressional involvement.
434. Cf. KOH, supra note 46, at 124-25 (describing cumbersome and ineffectual procedural
statutes for controlling foreign policy, such as the War Powers Resolution).
435. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1707-08.
436. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 AM. J.
INT’L L. 268, 268-69 (1966) (noting the near-desuetude of Logan Act and criticizing its constitutionality); Curtis S. Simpson III, Comment, The Logan Act of 1799: May It Rest in Peace, 10
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 365, 365-67 (1980) (same). As previously noted, however, the Act is important as an indication of early perceptions as to the negotiating authority. See Vagts, supra, at
269.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 102-19 (discussing Barclays Bank).
438. State activities might interfere with some segregable Senate interest, such as its instructions to the President to pursue certain policies in negotiations, or to refrain from negotiating on
certain matters or with certain sovereigns. Yet, the Senate has no authority to preempt state activities, save with the cooperation of the House, which cannot be regarded as a necessary participant in exercising the treaty power. See supra note 162 (noting that the Constitutional Convention rejected any role for the House in treaty-making). The President, in any event, is not
solely defending executive prerogatives. Unless presidential negotiating authority is plenary, the
Senate has engaged in de facto delegation of its authority to instruct, which has then by hypothesis been misappropriated—along with its statutory entitlement to notice from the Presi-
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conventional alternatives seem meager. The power to adopt preemptive rules or regulations is commonly considered to require prior con439
gressional authorization, and founding any such lawmaking on the
President’s independent constitutional authority might fare poorly
when confronted by contrary indications of congressional preference.440 Even were it authorized under the Treaty Clause itself, redent concerning significant developments in negotiations. See U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, 11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL ch. 700 (rev’d 1985) (Department of State Circular 175), reprinted in CRS, supra note 109, at app. 4 (detailing negotiating procedures, including the obligation to inform and consult with congressional leaders and
committees). But cf. Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMPLE
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 257, 301 n.389 (1994) (reporting the circumvention of Circular 175 procedures); Richard J. Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States Department of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 45 passim (1995) (describing formal and de facto exemptions to Circular 175 procedures); Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss,
The Role of the President, The Senate and Congress with Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 645, 648 (1991) (speculating that procedures
“probably do not have much impact on actual Executive branch decisions”).
439. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (holding that the exercise of
substantive authority having the force and effect of law “must be rooted in a grant of such
power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes”); United States v.
Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“[N]o undelegated power to regulate
commerce, or to set tariffs, inheres in the Presidency.”).
Congress has, in point of fact, entrusted the President with some powerful regulatory instruments. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), for example, permits the exercise of substantial authority over private economic activity. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(1994); see also KOH, supra note 46, at 48 (noting the possible abuses of IEEPA, including an
invocation by the President to overcome congressional resistance); Jules Lobel, Emergency
Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1414-18 (1989). The Secretary of State
also has some rather open-ended authority to regulate the State Department’s functions. See 22
U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(4) (1994) (delegating to the Secretary of State the powers to “promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Secretary of
State,” and the power to delegate any “authority to perform any of the functions of the Secretary or the Department to officers and employees under the direction and supervision of the
Secretary”). To the best of my knowledge, there is at present no general statutory authority that
would permit the President to regulate state diplomacy.
440. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (describing presidential authority as at “its lowest ebb” when it is contrary to the
established will of Congress, such that “he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter”). In Youngstown, Congress’s consideration and rejection of a proposal to seize the steel mills appears to have sufficed to signal its
will. See id. at 586. Irrespective of congressional preference, it may be doubted whether the
President has any solid basis for preemptive lawmaking of this kind. See supra text accompanying note 108 (describing the constitutional bases and the effect of independent executive
authority, as well as the conventional treatment of executive branch input in dormant foreign
relations preemption case law). Such authority may be present, however, were the premises of
Zschernig accepted. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 163 (claiming that, under the facts of Zschernig, “[n]o doubt, an act of Congress or a treaty, probably an executive agreement, perhaps an
official declaration, possibly even a rule made by the federal courts, could have forbidden what
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quiring that the executive branch engage in lawmaking to protect negotiating authority would plainly compromise the warrant for involving the President in the first place. (Surely the constitutional authority
to negotiate in secrecy with foreign powers, subject only to Senate
advice and consent, would be compromised by the need to anticipate
potential interference by rival state negotiators through publicly
441
promulgated rules. ) More flexible instruments, such as executive intervention in litigation, may offend norms against executive law
442
making or arrogation of the judicial function, and may not even be
443
conclusive. The best course, it would seem, is for the judiciary to
protect the President’s ability to exercise the treaty power, rather
than cobbling together authority of more dubious origins and efficacy.
C. The Dormant Treaty Power and the Proper Scope of State
Authority
As the preceding discussion suggested, the need for any dormant
foreign relations doctrine depends substantially on the constitutional
basis for federal authority. Congress’s ability to legislate on matters of
national concern may suffice to protect federal prerogatives under the
Commerce Clause; although a substantial body of case law suggests
that it is not always enough, even in a purely domestic context.444 The
treaty power, however, is a clearer basis for a dormant regime. The
Treaty Clause assigns constitutional responsibility to the President
and the Senate, raising serious doubts about the adequacy of Article I
safeguards for Article II authority.
The scope of the federal authority at stake is also germane, since
Oregon purported to do”).
441. Cf. Vagts, supra note 436, at 300-01 (proposing that “one might give the Executive
power to issue regulations forbidding intercourse with specific countries on specific sensitive
topics during particularly delicate times,” but noting that “[t]he authorities might, however,
shrink from putting themselves in a position where they would have to incur the onus of declaring an emergency,” and also that “[i]t might also seem dangerously like a censorship arrangement, viewed as a restraint on speech”).
442. See supra text accompanying note 110 (citing authorities).
443. Prior to the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-11
(1994), executive suggestions were often considered authoritative on sovereign immunity issues.
See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Henkin, Provisional Measures,
supra note 108, at 681-82; cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (failing to
extend immunity in the absence of presidential action). In other areas, like recognition matters,
executive suggestions were regarded as less conclusive. See Moore, supra note 110, at 293-96.
For consideration of their revival in connection with the dormant treaty power, see infra text
accompanying notes 455-58.
444. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 63.
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the judiciary’s function in any dormant regime may be problematic if
the authority in question is either too slight or too great. If the interests at stake are incidental, then positive political authority may yet
suffice: Congress may be an imperfect safeguard for the President and
Senate, but so too is the judiciary. For the reasons elaborated in Part
II, however, the dormant treaty power entails more than, say, preserving the President’s monopoly on diplomatic formalities. The
Framers intended to give the President substantive authority to determine the nation’s course of negotiations, subject to Senate instruction. They supported that objective by denying the states any corresponding authority—and by requiring that the states obtain
congressional consent before they negotiate toward, or enter into,
even lesser international pacts.445 This allocation of authority is anything but incidental, and seems to warrant judicial assistance.
On the other hand, if the dormant authority is substantial and
wide-ranging, the problem becomes how to constrain the judiciary, including by heeding customary separation of powers and federalism
446
considerations. These fundamental and continuing concerns, more
than the need to accommodate the states’ new toe hold on the global
stage, and they require careful tailoring of the judicial standard to its
constitutional basis.447 This approach rules out importing the traditional approaches to dormant foreign relations preemption, which are
hardly better suited to the Treaty Clause than to their other bases—
whatever those might be. At the same time, the potential
vulnerability and significance of the treaty power demands a more
active role for the courts in enforcing its dormant aspect than
revisionist critics of the federal monopoly have recognized.
1. Adapting Dormant Foreign Relations Preemption
a. Effects testing. Defining the dormant treaty power through
an “effects” test might reorient and recover the entire dormant
foreign relations preemption doctrine, but at the price of importing its
familiar and debilitating flaws. All state activities “intru[ding] . . . into
445. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; supra text accompanying notes 256-60.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 79 (noting bias against extra-constitutional exclusive
federal authority), 81-83 (noting bias against judicial authority over foreign affairs).
447. Cf. Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common
Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1127-31 (1978) (describing the tension between constitutional
common law and separation of powers and federalism principles); cf. also Merrill, supra note
420, at 54-59.
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448

the field of foreign affairs” —not just those attempting to conduct
foreign relations, as was the case under the facts of Zschernig
449
itself —might equally be regarded as interfering with the federal
negotiating authority by, for example, raising new and unwanted
subjects for discussion and settlement.450 Absent significant remedial
limitations,451 even state laws having no foreseeable effect on foreign
relations when adopted, but later flowering into a topic for
international bargaining, might be regarded as unconstitutional.
The near-inevitable process of balancing these effects with other
452
453
values would pose a textbook problem of incommensurability:
there is no obvious means of comparing the national interest in bargaining unity with the interests of individual states in autonomy. The
difficulty of evaluating an individual state’s interests is compounded
by the Treaty Clause’s premise that the states’ individual interests are
best promoted through national unity.454
448. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941)).
449. See id. at 437 (describing the Oregon statute, and judicial decisions applying it, as oriented toward accomplishing foreign objectives); supra text accompanying notes 52, 372-75.
450. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (“[T]he treaty power of the United
States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments of other nations.”); id. at 267 (citing cases); see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891)
(paraphrasing Geofroy).
451. Such as those suggested by the Solicitor General’s position in Barclays Bank. See supra
text accompanying note 111.
452. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 55, 57 (1997) (“Balancing is entailed by effects tests because as a logical matter most courses of action have some tendency to
contribute to a forbidden effect—or to undermine the pursuit of a required effect.”).
453. For introductions to the problem of incommensurability, see Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-812 (1994). See generally Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998). For
representative criticisms in the constitutional context, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the
Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1
(1987). For a relatively sympathetic view of balancing against its alternatives, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 78-83 (1997). While some incommensurability objections are clearly focused
on the difficulty of comparing governmental interests with individual liberties, see, e.g., Robin
West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 43, 47-48 (1990), one need look no further than interests analysis in the conflict of laws to
see comparable problems in weighing governmental or institutional interests. See Larry Kramer,
Note, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply
to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 755 (1995) (criticizing multifactored balancing in the choice-of-law context).
454. See supra text accompanying notes 268-74. The dynamic elements of any such balancing
approach may also be disabling. The notion that one state’s activities might be found unconstitu-
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The courts might ameliorate these drawbacks to adjudicating
foreign relations by entertaining executive suggestions, a procedure
that becomes more appealing when federal exclusivity is grounded in
the treaty power. Here, the President’s agents would be opining on
Article II authority, which reduces separation of powers concerns
about judicial abdication. Courts would not defer, in other words, in
the estimation that the issues are better “righted through diplomatic
negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceed455
ings” —itself a judicial judgment about the proper means of conducting foreign relations and not always a correct one456—but instead
because the Treaty Clause itself dedicates the matter to the President.
Still, many of the problems that dog executive suggestions, like
their ad hoc nature and lack of procedural protection for litigants,
457
would persist. And even if the President’s entitlement to opine is
clearer under the treaty power, its underlying rationale calls the wis458
dom of case-by-case defense into question. Routinely requiring executive input on specific matters of foreign relations, such as the
status of pending discussions between the United States and a foreign
nation, will either yield nothing of value or betray some of the virtues
originally driving the decision to invest the President with the treaty
power. A solution that suffers many of the disadvantages of prevailing
tional, while another state’s similar activities are sustained because the national interest shifted
somewhat over time, is likely to sorely test the integrity of executive branch submissions and
judicial review. Unless an unrealistic parity is maintained, the result may be to open up more
severe problems of federal-state relations than the underlying state activities could ever pose.
455. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
456. In point of fact, successful diplomatic negotiations may be spurred by the shadow of
judicial proceedings—see, for example, the recent negotiations involving reparations by German industry to survivors of the Holocaust—and diplomatic negotiations may determine that
judicial proceedings are the only appropriate solution. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 662-68 (1981) (describing the genesis of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
457. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1709-10; Moore, supra note 110, at 299302. These flaws might be partially addressed by routinizing the process through administrative
rules. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1710; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(4)
(1994) (authorizing the Secretary of State to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out
department functions). But cf. Moore, supra note 110, at 299 n.119 (“‘[I]f the State Department
were to set up a procedure for hearings, its exercise of a judicial function would merely be more
apparent.’” (quoting PHILIP JESSUP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-84 (1959))). It is
questionable, however, whether such a scheme could easily promote both certainty and procedural fairness at the same time, and the ultimate discretion of the Justice Department in representing U.S. interests in litigation may limit the State Department’s ability to manage matters
administratively.
458. As discussed at greater length below, the appropriateness of employing the treaty
power to permit case-by-case preemption of state activities depends to some degree on the default rule employed. See infra Part III.C.3.
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case law, and conflicts with its doctrinal raison d’être, seems like no
solution at all.
b. Purpose review. Other difficulties, though of a lesser
degree, afflict any attempt to focus exclusively on the purpose of state
459
activities. Tests turning on legislative motivation are in vogue
because they are thought to be more amenable to judicial
administration.460 But the challenge of determining legislative purpose
should not be too quickly discounted—if, indeed, one can speak
meaningfully of a unitary legislative intent in the first place.461 In the
foreign relations context, difficult matters of judgment would be
commonplace—such as whether reciprocal inheritance laws are aimed
more at fairness than at foreign relations, extending equal treatment
to aliens only to the extent that their home countries see fit to do
likewise, or whether state procurement policies aim at external
influence or just at avoiding moral taint and ethical compromise.462
459. For a tentative endorsement, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1711 (suggesting that, if positive political authority is insufficient, motive review may be the most appropriate solution, but noting the problem of identifying legislative intent).
460. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 297, 321-23, 353-56, 368 (1997); Richard Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 750 & n.105 (1994).
461. See Fallon, supra note 453, at 72-73. Professor Bhagwat, for one, does not consider the
issue at length, but claims that courts are relatively experienced at what he concedes may be an
essentially metaphorical inquiry. See Bhagwat, supra note 460, at 322-23; see also Fried, supra
note 452, at 59-66 (considering intent as related to constitutionally constituted bodies). Of
course, similar problems attend inquiries into the intent of a body of “Framers.” See Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212-17 (1980). As explained below, though, the alternatives to such an inquiry are more evident and more appealing
in the dormant foreign relations context.
462. For example, in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.
1986), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional the state’s refusal to accord
favorable tax treatment to South African Kruggerands, the only legislative history cited by the
court indicated that that state legislators wished to avoid association with the unpopular South
African regime. The court at one point read this to indicate that the “plain purpose behind the
exclusion was to avoid the appearance of encouraging South African investment,” id. at 302, but
later ventured that “[t]he undisputed purpose of the exclusion is to express disapproval toward
South Africa and to discourage investment in its products,” id. at 305. In contrast, the Maryland
Supreme Court concluded that “Baltimore City’s purpose in enacting [its anti-apartheid ordinance] was simply to ensure that the City’s pension funds would not be invested in a manner
that was morally offensive to many Baltimore residents and many beneficiaries of the pension
funds.” Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989).
In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, the legislation’s purpose seemed apparent.
The sponsor of the bill, Representative Rushing, had been explicit in proclaiming the legislation’s foreign-policy objectives; the lieutenant governor and governor had largely subscribed;
and Massachusetts cited no other objective in defending the legislation. See National Foreign
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Such inquiries would also be delicate. The ordinary sensitivity of
asking whether state and local officials purposefully violated the
463
Constitution might be compounded by the avowed reluctance of the
Supreme Court to probe similarly into congressional motivations
behind the invocation of the Commerce Clause.464
Such difficulties may be avoided only where the declaration of
purpose is explicit or nearly so. Focusing on such cases, though, raises
potential problems of fit and overbreadth. The clarity of a foreign relations ambition has no necessary connection with the risk of interfering with federal treaty functions. Many foreign-focused state and
465
local activities pose little risk of interfering with federal functions.
At the same time, focusing on explicit attempts to conduct foreign
relations raises concerns about encroaching on the speech interests of
466
state and local officials and in any event tends to earmark those
measures already likely to attract sufficient scrutiny from the political
branches.

Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). But it
would have been open to Massachusetts to disavow foreign-policy ambitions, in preference for a
desire to avoid immoral associations. In a 1998 letter, Secretary of State Albright had acknowledged that, “one voice” considerations aside, “President Clinton and I recognize the authority
of state and local officials to determine their own investment and procurement policies, and the
right—indeed their responsibility—to take moral considerations into account as they do so.” Jim
Lobe, Trade-U.S.: Clinton Backs Multinationals in Big Court Case, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb.
16, 2000, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file.
463. See Fallon, supra note 453, at 72.
464. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 5-3.
465. The city of Boulder’s decision to help build a Nicaraguan preschool, for example, was
sympathetically portrayed as an attempt to “challenge U.S. policies in Central America,” and it
was just one of “thousands of bilateral foreign agreements” that cities have negotiated that are
“tantamount to political treaties.” Shuman, supra note 20, at 161.
466. Professor Porterfield, for one, has argued that nonbinding state and local resolutions, as
well as restrictions on the expenditure of public funds, are protected from preemption by the
First Amendment. See Porterfield, supra note 18, at 2. For other invocations of free speech interests, see Bilder, supra note 5, at 829; Jay A. Christofferson, Comment, The Constitutionality
of State Laws Prohibiting Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism’s Purpose,
29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 351, 361-63 (1998). But see Natsios, 181 F.3d at 61 (rejecting an argument that Massachusetts’s free speech interests should influence the balance of interests in
Zschernig analysis). As Professor Porterfield acknowledges, the Supreme Court has never recognized that state or local governments have First Amendment rights, and lower courts have
split on the question. See Porterfield, supra note 18, at 32-35. One would have to take into account the risk that government speech may instead violate the First Amendment. See TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 12-4; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW,
AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 42-50 (1983) (considering, and rejecting, the case
for deeming governments to have free speech rights); Beth Orsoff, Note, Government Speech as
Government Censorship, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 243-47 (1993) (arguing against attributing free
speech interests to government entities).
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Finally, any purpose-dominated approach presupposes that we
can define the improper purpose with sufficient clarity and that the
motives constitute the constitutional wrong (or at least a good proxy
467
for it). Considering the question as it is usually framed—whether
468
the state aimed at conducting foreign relations —might be helpful if
the Constitution expressly established foreign relations as a prerogative of the national government. But the Constitution is not written in
these terms, and whether a state has a foreign relations purpose provides us with little useful insight into whether the dormant treaty
power has been offended. A governor’s blistering address on a matter
of international concern, for example, might create a fuss, inviting (or
derailing) treaty negotiations. So too, however, might a neighboring
state’s evenhanded but severe liability regime, and it is difficult to see
how one could competently distinguish in kind or degree among
these, and other, state activities. Globalization, presumably, will make
drawing such distinctions still harder. If states and localities can legitimately claim that they no longer enjoy any purely “domestic”
authority,469 attempts to distinguish improper foreign relations purposes, or even to define benign purposes,470 may become impossible,
especially if the judiciary defers to legislative expressions of pur471
pose.
At bottom, a purpose inquiry has the same problem as an effects
approach: before considering how much state activity is too much, or
what purposes are illegitimate, we must first establish more clearly
the constitutional basis for the claim of interference. If the premise
for the claim is the dormant treaty power, we need look no further
than the type of acts assigned to the President and Senate, together
with those acts denied the states.
467. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 460, at 332-37 (noting that the adequacy of the state purpose
may vary by context and that it must be closely tied to the underlying constitutional provision at
issue).
468. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1711 (citing Zschernig).
469. See supra Part III.A.
470. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The test of a legitimate state purpose must be whether it addresses valid state concerns.”); cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (citing cases and distinguishing between illegitimate government action “with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion” and
with legitimate secular purposes).
471. Keeping within the establishment context, see, for example, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 56 (1985) (requiring that “a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion”); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (confessing a “reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular
purpose for the State’s program may be discerned from the face of the statute”).
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2. An Act-Oriented Approach: Precluding State Bargaining. The
superior approach, both in terms of fidelity to the original
understanding and judicial manageability, is to proscribe a certain
class of state acts likely to interfere with the constitutional function of
the national government—an approach similar to that taken in recent
cases establishing the anticommandeering principle for the federal
472
government. An act-oriented approach tries to delimit a class of
activities that exceeds the limits of state authority under the
Constitution, eschewing any attempt at measuring effects, balancing,
or focusing on governmental purpose. As made clear in the next
section, such an approach may be tempered by the interests of the
federal political branches, but otherwise assumes that the positive
grants and negative limitations of the Constitution establish a rule for
judicial application.
The state activities conflicting with the dormant treaty power
might be imagined as three bands progressing outward from the positive grant of federal authority. The most proximate band consists of
conduct that would directly usurp the power given the President and
the Senate—the power to conclude agreements with foreign powers
on behalf of the United States. This unambiguously violates the constitutional text only to the extent that it results in treaties or unconsented compacts. But it is highly unlikely that the move from the Articles of Confederation was supposed to invest the states with
increased authority to send and receive ambassadors, and the federal
monopoly on diplomacy would mean little were individual states free
473
to hold themselves out as the United States.
A less proximate, but broader, second band of activities—trans472. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (holding that a balancing of interests analysis is inappropriate when a congressional act amounts to the commandeering of
state officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (defending “formalistic”
inquiries into whether federal measures, despite their “perceived necessity,” improperly deviate
from the form of government set forth in the Constitution). See generally Fallon, supra note 453,
at 67-68 (describing such principles as “forbidden-content” tests); id. at 83-84 (explaining why
forbidden-content tests play only a small role in constitutional decisionmaking when compared
to other kinds of tests); Fried, supra note 452, at 56-74 (distinguishing between “intents,” “effects,” and “acts” as bases for constitutional doctrine). Printz specifically rejects balancing as
“inappropriate” where “it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty . . . .” Printz,
521 U.S. at 932. As the remainder of the opinion makes clear, however, the “object” of the
law—apart from its form—is irrelevant. See, e.g., id. at 904 (emphasizing that “the Brady Act
purports to direct state law enforcement officers to participate . . . in the administration of a
federally enacted regulatory scheme”).
473. See supra Part III.B.2.
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parent attempts by states to fashion agreement in their own capaci474
ties—represents a more significant problem. Left unconstrained,
states occasionally perceive matters to be of local interest that in fact
implicate the national interest, or fail to realize opportunities that
would have been secured by the aggregation of state interests through
unified negotiation.475 The Constitution is best read as continuing the
prohibition in the Articles of Confederation on the sending or receiving of emissaries without congressional consent, and as requiring
in any event that agreements with foreign powers receive consent before they are effectuated, as well as vesting the authority for treaties
exclusively in the federal government.476
A third band encompasses implicit bargaining—ostensibly unilateral state measures, like the reciprocal inheritance statute at issue
in Zschernig or the procurement law in Natsios, that are in practice
contingent on the policy of foreign powers. It is unclear whether such
activities are generally more or less harmful than explicit bargains.
Ostensibly unilateral conduct does not raise the same risk of conflicting foreign engagements, or occasion as many disputes with foreign powers over breach. By the same token, however, such conduct
lacks some of the safeguards of more formal bilateral or multilateral
bargains. States pursuing an actual agreement might wish to enhance
the agreement’s legitimacy and efficacy by seeking approval as an Article I compact, which creates an incentive to conform with Congress’s
vision of the national interest.477 Actual agreements with foreign powers, constitutional or not, also require the other party’s consent, perhaps reducing the possibility of conflict.478
Whether or not their effects are strictly comparable, unilateral
but contingent state activities bear a strong functional resemblance to
explicit bargaining. The state of Washington, for example, would be
474. Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, foreign powers did not easily mistake
an individual state’s authority with the authority of the United States. See supra note 274-75 and
accompanying text.
475. See supra Part III.B.2.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60.
477. Unless adopted as a proper Article I compact, state agreements lack the force of federal law and may be more vulnerable as a consequence. But see New Jersey v. New York, 523
U.S. 767, 811 (1998) (explaining that “congressional consent ‘transforms an interstate compact
[from a creature of state law] into a law of the United States’” (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983))).
478. Ill-considered agreements with foreign powers would still risk disputes with third parties: a pact with Taiwan, for example, may be perfectly amicable, but it would tend to pose other
problems. In addition, the interests of the United States may be injured if the bargain was less
than what might possibly have been achieved.
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barred, even absent relevant federal enactments, from negotiating
479
toward an agreement with China on the subject of software piracy.
Similar collective action and externality problems would be raised,
however, were Washington instead to enact a measure that was expressly contingent upon China’s satisfaction of otherwise negotiable
conditions, such as by permitting state purchase of goods only from
countries that have satisfactory software policies (or by barring purchases from those that do not). The same issues would be raised, finally, even were a quid pro quo merely implicit—such as where
Washington imposed a flat procurement ban, but it could be discerned that the ban would likely be relieved were China to remedy
the basis for the state’s complaint.480
Under each of these scenarios, the state of Washington would be
implicitly or explicitly offering to alter state policy if a foreign government changes its policy. This is bargaining, in one form or an481
other, and has been recognized and reproved as such—important
479. Cf. James Kynge, China Throws Out Microsoft Piracy Case, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999,
at 6 (“Software piracy in China is rampant and independent analysts believe more than 90 per
cent of the software patented by Microsoft and other companies is pirated.”).
480. Distinguishing between such cases and “purely” unilateral conduct may appear to reintroduce troublesome issues of intent. It should be stressed, however, that intent is at issue solely
for purposes of determining whether the state conduct is bargaining in the first place, not for
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate motivations for identical conduct. Cf. Fried,
supra note 452, at 63 (explaining how consequences can be examined as inconclusive evidence
of intent, rather than as an independent or determinative effects inquiry). In practice, most of
the relevant legislation will be contingent in nature. Instances in which a state discriminates
against a foreign power without respect to its political character or policies—discriminating, as it
were, on grounds that are diplomatically immutable—should be relatively rare.
481. See WILLIAM C. MITCHELL, PUBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 383 (1971) (defining bargaining as “[a] means of exchange in which
the terms of settlement are within the control of the partners to the exchange”). The precise typology of these forms of bargaining has been considered by international lawyers. In the example employed in the text, Washington’s decision to condition eligibility for government procurement on establishing a satisfactory software policy might be characterized as a reciprocal
law—essentially, a contingent reward “mak[ing] the observance of a certain conduct by foreign
governments a condition for its operation.” Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a
Perennial Idea, 49 NW. U. L. REV. 619, 628 (1954). Its decision to bar procurement based on
explicit or implicit conditions could be characterized as “retorsion,” that is, contingent retaliation that attempts to “induc[e] another state to change a policy which is undesirable but not unlawful.” Id. at 629; see also id. at 630 (differentiating between reciprocal acts and those of retorsion).
The bargaining approach would ordinarily exclude, on the other hand, “reprisals,” which
are oriented solely toward past acts. While reprisals may incidentally influence future conduct,
they aim at reparation rather than at attempting to modify the other party’s acts, and are not
contingent upon any change. See id. at 629. In the context of interstate compacts, it has also
been suggested that reciprocal legislation does not in practice require much formal negotiation.
See Joseph R. Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21 MINN. L.
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exceptions like the Prussian life insurance saga notwithstanding. The
bar on state entreaties to foreign powers has always been construed
more broadly than as a mere proscription of state emissaries. Under
the Articles of Confederation, Virginia’s preferential treatment of
French brandy was permissible only to the extent that it could be con482
strued as purely gratuitous, rather than compensatory. Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion in Holmes v. Jennison later made clear that ostensibly unilateral bargains may fall within the Compact Clause, a principle largely consistent with subsequent decisions discussing the treatment of foreign compacts.483 And there is a significant and
unavoidable body of case law standing for the proposition that the
power to engage in foreign relations was generally denied the states.
The notion that both formal and implicit bargaining violate the dormant treaty power was most clearly, if unsuccessfully, captured in the
briefs in Clark v. Allen and Zschernig v. Miller, only to be swamped in
the Zschernig majority’s overbroad vindication of federal suprem484
acy.
So construed, the dormant treaty power may be regarded as either underinclusive or overinclusive. The bargaining approach certainly does not proscribe all state activities that may disrupt U.S. foreign relations, omitting in particular unilateral but noncontingent
conduct. Some activities—for example, Boulder’s donation of play485
ground equipment to the Sandinistas, or New York City’s renaming
of a city street corner near the Nigerian mission to the United Na486
tions —may or may not be sufficiently incendiary to be caught by an
REV. 371, 373 (1937). That overlooks the negotiating function of the legislation itself as well as
the possibility of iteration between sovereign authorities. For further discussion, see infra note
508.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 297-300. Those decisions have reflected Chief Justice Taney’s approach to the variety of bargaining even in the domestic context. In United States
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the Court regarded various “interstate agreements effected through reciprocal legislation without congressional consent,” id. at
469, as permissible not because they failed to meet the requisite form of compacts, but rather
because they did not enhance state power within the meaning of the test suggested by Virginia v.
Tennessee, see id. at 469-72. As noted previously, though, the Court appeared to accept that the
scope of the exemption owed harmless state compacts would differ in the context of foreign
compacts. See supra note 358.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 339-58.
484. See supra text accompanying notes 363-75.
485. See supra note 465.
486. See Opusunju v. Giuliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (Sup. Ct. 1997). Opusunju considered
New York City’s decision to name the street corner opposite the Nigerian Mission to the United
Nations for Kudirat Abiola, the slain wife of a Nigerian dissident. See id. Superficially, at least,
the city’s action seems best classified as a reprisal. See supra note 481. Were it apparent that
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effects-focused test, but even more clearly would not be deemed unconstitutional under the dormant treaty power. More prominent state
487
“Buy American” laws and tax laws impacting multinational corpo488
rations would similarly survive any dormant treaty power objection.
Such measures do not meaningfully attempt to alter the conduct of
foreign governments (which cannot, for example, easily become
“American” so as to satisfy a procurement statute). Perhaps surprisingly, such measures are generally excused under the prevailing effects-centered approach without serious contemplation of their potential impact, illustrating both the unpredictability of the effects
approach and the intuitive appeal of an alternative.489
New York City would rename the street corner in response to some accommodation by the Nigerian government, the matter might fall within the purview of the bargaining approach; the
best indications, however, are that the name change was intended to be permanent. See East
Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(describing various city naming initiatives and characterizing the Abiola street sign as “permanent”); Clyde Haberman, Spelling Out Foreign Policy in Street Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997,
at B1 (noting that Nelson and Winnie Mandela Corner remains so named even after the fall of
apartheid and the divorce of the eponymous activists). The Nigerian response was to rename a
street in front of the U.S. embassy in Lagos after Louis Farrakhan. See Political Street Game,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 7, 1998, at 13. Any explicit or implicit bargaining between the city of New
York and Nigeria would undoubtedly fall within the exceptions indicated below. See infra text
accompanying notes 507-14.
487. See supra text accompanying note 14.
488. See supra text accompanying note 73.
489. Thus, for example, while a California state court struck down the California “Buy
American” statute on Zschernig grounds primarily because of its potential overseas effects, see
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (Ct. App. 1969), similar
statutes were upheld at least in part because they were not contingent on foreign government
behavior—in addition to avoiding other behaviors criticized in Zschernig. See Trojan Techs.,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that, in contrast to Zschernig,
“Pennsylvania’s statute provides no opportunity for state administrative officials or judges to
comment on, let alone key their decisions to, the nature of foreign regimes”); K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 783-84 (N.J. 1977) (“Nor
is there any evidence to suggest that the political climate in a potential foreign bidder’s nation
has ever motivated the inclusion of the Buy American condition in an invitation for bids or that
its inclusion is predicated on an assessment of the internal policies of any foreign country.”);
North Am. Salt Co. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (observing that statutory provisions favoring in-state and U.S. purchasing “do not provide Ohio
officials with an opportunity to treat foreign nations differently based upon the ideological bent
of a nation’s government, or based upon any other factor. Rather, the provisions apply equally
to all foreign nations.”).
Courts have reached similar results with respect to state inheritance statutes not contingent on foreign-government conduct, even where the statutes do attempt to influence the conduct of foreign citizens or might be the basis for complaint by foreign governments. See Shames
v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Neb. 1971) (distinguishing state statute precluding nonresident aliens from inheriting a certain class of Nebraska land from Zschernig both on the
grounds of its benign application and because, “[u]nlike the Oregon statute, the Nebraska stat-
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For much the same reason, the bargaining approach would also
excuse most speech-tinged conduct by state officials. An inflammatory “sense” resolution, denunciation of a foreign leader, or other
490
one-time affronts might easily cause greater consternation than an
491
arid statute or judicial decision; if an effects approach is to distinguish such cases, it must depend on the tenuous First Amendment interests of governments and their officials.492 The dormant treaty
power, in contrast, naturally targets a narrower class of speech-related
493
conduct—bargaining —but disregards other speech without attempting to invoke the First Amendment.494
Finally, the dormant treaty power takes a relatively generous
view of state activities relating to private parties. States engage in a
wide variety of internationally oriented commercial activities involv495
ing domestic and foreign corporations. They also regulate the conduct of private individuals in a wide variety of ways, as Zschernig and
496
Barclays Bank illustrate. Under the orthodox federal monopoly, the
ute herein challenged does not contain such a reciprocity provision”). Compare Estate of Kraemer v. Kraemer, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding unconstitutional, on Zschernig
grounds, provisions of the California probate code that conditioned the inheritance of real
property on foreign reciprocity), with Estate of Horman v. State, 485 P.2d 785, 797-98 (Cal.
1971) (en banc) (upholding, against a challenge based on Zschernig, provisions of the California
probate code requiring that all nonresident aliens claim their interests in estates within five
years from the date of death).
490. See, e.g., FRY, supra note 5, at 98 (citing New York City’s removal of Yasser Arafat
from a public concert and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s welcome of the IRA’s Gerry Adams);
Palumbo, supra note 4, at 219 (citing Mayor LaGuardia’s criticism of Adolph Hitler); id. at 221
(citing Mayor Wagner’s conduct toward King Saud); Porterfield, supra note 18, at 7 (describing
state and local “sense” resolutions); Kevin Whitelaw, The Very Long Arm of the Law, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 14, 1996, at 57, 57 (reporting that “[a]t least one chamber of 42
state legislatures has declared support for U.N. representation for Taiwan”).
491. For example, were Oregon’s legislature to have adopted a resolution condemning Iron
Curtain governments, the risk of confrontation might well have exceeded those posed by lowvisibility declarations by the state’s probate courts on reciprocal inheritance rights.
492. See supra note 466 (evaluating First Amendment considerations).
493. Cf. Roth, supra note 326, at 270 n.102 (criticizing the draft of a Logan Act indictment of
Philip Agee but not the “much narrower and more compelling” case that might have been made
against Agee based on Agee’s offer of a specific quid pro quo: his betrayal of classified information about covert CIA operations in Iran in exchange for the Iranian release of U.S. hostages).
494. It is still possible, however, that such conduct would come under the Logan Act, see
supra notes 326, 434, or under other federal statutory provisions, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 954 (1994)
(criminalizing false statements made to influence a foreign government). Free speech objections
might be interposed in any such prosecution.
495. See generally FRY, supra note 5, at 66-100; HOCKING, supra note 382, at 70-99; John M.
Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State and Local Role in US Foreign
Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 105 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 49, 73.
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identity of the immediate target of state action was less significant
than whether such action might cause offense; state interaction with
private parties might be preempted given sufficient secondary consequences, such as where influential foreign complainants might realis497
tically enlist a foreign power in espousing their claims. Such an approach invites speculative and potentially self-fulfilling worst-case
scenarios, given the clear incentive, on the foreign entity’s part, for
saber-rattling. Courts have resisted this impulse largely on extrinsic
grounds, such as the domestic orientation of the state law in question,
or its evenhandedness, that have little to do with the prospect of foreign effects.498
The bargaining approach, in contrast, disregards not only noncontingent state conduct, but also state relations with foreign (and
domestic) private parties contingent on their conduct rather than that
497. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979) (projecting that “[t]he risk of retaliation by Japan [to a tax imposed on Japanese corporations] is acute,
and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole”); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (“Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest
moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another’s
subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”), quoted in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
441 (1968); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875) (speculating about potential retaliation by the British government to the application of a California statute respecting aliens);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (Ct. App. 1969) (speculating, in applying Zschernig, that the California Buy American Act invited retaliation by foreign
nations concerned by the state’s “selfish provincialism”); cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (noting, in addressing personal jurisdiction over a private defendant in a products liability matter, the relevance of “the Federal Government’s interest in its
foreign relations policies”); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting, after adverting to Zschernig, that for the purposes of forum non conveniens analysis,
“[f]ederal foreign policy interests do not disappear when purely private foreign parties come
before U.S. courts”); Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir.
1969) (Ely, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in light of Zschernig, “[i]f alien corporations are to be
made subject to the jurisdiction of American courts on the basis of an isolated transaction, then
that decision should be made as a matter of national policy, particularly in light of possible reprisals, political, economic, or legal”).
498. A federal district court concluded that the state of Washington’s rules relating to oil
spills did not interfere with federal authority by regulating foreign vessels because the rules
merely allowed the State to “exercis[e] its police power by regulating both foreign and domestic
tankers to protect the environment” and were not keyed to the worthiness of a foreign regime.
International Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1499
(W.D. Wash. 1996). In affirming in relevant part on appeal, the Ninth Circuit ignored the latter
consideration and focused on the fact that the state regulations operated within Washington’s
territorial limits and had only incidental or indirect extraterritorial impact. See International
Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1152 (2000). It should be
clear, however, that a foreign government’s ire will not necessarily be mollified by arguments
that a U.S. state treats all parties equally shabbily.
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of a foreign power. There is no hint that the Framers were concerned
about state agreements with private parties, domestic or foreign. To
the contrary, their use of the term “foreign powers” makes it clear
that they considered the forbidden counterparts to state compacts to
be precisely the same parties with which the national government
499
would be forging treaties. State activities like the funding of export
initiatives by local concerns, attempts to entice foreign direct investment, and regulation of foreign persons, will rarely offer any basis for
a court to infer an attempt to bargain with a foreign country, regard499. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The imbecility of our government even forbids [foreign powers] to treat with us. Our
ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22,
at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The want [of a power to regulate
commerce] has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign
powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in
all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at
452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
[t]he ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence
and respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of
weight or efficacy. . . . [T]he Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns . . . .
Accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(observing that “[t]he Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members”). Timothy Blank has argued that the shift from the Articles of Confederation’s
bar on agreements “with any King prince or state” and the similar dynamics involved with foreign trade groups, license treating at least some private foreign interests as “foreign powers” for
Compact Clause purposes. Blank, supra note 252, at 1075-89. For the reasons expressed above,
however, I find that argument unconvincing, not the least because it suggests that the federal
treaty power and the areas presumptively proscribed to the states are not coextensive. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 301(1) (defining an “international agreement” in relevant part as one “between two or more states or international organizations”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 8 I.L.M. 679, 681
(defining a treaty, for the purposes of the convention, as “an international agreement . . . between states”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, done Mar. 21, 1986, art. 2(1)(a), 25
I.L.M. 543, 545 (defining the scope of the Convention to cover “treaties between one or more
states and one or more international organizations”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 43, § 301 rptr. note 5 (defining a “negotiating state” as one that “takes part in drawing up
and adopting the text of a multilateral agreement”); id. § 312 (defining the responsibilities of
“negotiating states”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra, art. 2(1)(e), 8 I.L.M. at
681 (defining negotiating states); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States
and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, supra, art. 2(1)(e), 25
I.L.M. at 546 (defining negotiating states and negotiating organizations). While Arthur S. Miller
argued as long ago as 1960 that modern economic conditions demanded that the agreements
between American corporations and foreign nation-states be treated like international agreements of the United States, see Miller, supra note 383, at 1557-66, that advice has not been
heeded.
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500

less of the potential for controversy. In less transparent circumstances, attributes like evenhandedness can serve not merely as questionable proof that state conduct will not irritate foreign relations, but
rather as evidence that the state law is not in fact contingent on al501
tering foreign sovereign policies.
As these examples indicate, the bargaining approach’s lenity toward certain classes of state activities may in practice be nonunique,
with the only difference being the ability of that approach to explain
the omissions. Even if the result is unsatisfactory in some respects, insofar as it fails to preempt some potentially harmful state activities,
that is simply the result of deriving the limits on state authority from
the Constitution rather than from the pages of Foreign Affairs. Locating federal exclusivity in the principles of the Treaty and Compact
Clauses permits us to see that the constitutional value at stake is control over the beginning, middle, and end of negotiations, not control
over every possible topic of negotiation. Other mechanisms, too, may
license federal preemption. Established constitutional doctrine, such
as the prohibition on discrimination toward foreign commerce, would
continue to block certain kinds of state policy. The political branches,
moreover, are undeniably best able to protect their institutional interests in any cases causing genuine alarm.502
The more serious objection, it seems to me, is that the dormant
treaty power is overinclusive, in too broadly condemning the wide variety of arrangements that states may seek to strike with foreign powers. States may, of course, seek congressional consent for anything
short of a treaty—a class which Congress is substantially free to de503
fine. But it is by no means clear that “any agreement or compact”
500. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 252, at 1073-75, 1080-85 (describing agreements of Indiana,
Oregon, and Florida with Japanese corporations in which these states agree to repeal unitary tax
structures in exchange for promises of investment).
501. Applying this approach to New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on
Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977), for example, it would be permissible for New York
City to maintain its general ordinance prohibiting racial discrimination in employment advertising, even to the extent of inferring discrimination on the part of South African employers, so
long as the policy was not in fact an invitation to the South African government to revise its
practices. The New York Court of Appeals, in contrast, based its constitutional holding on the
ground that the municipal commission, in reviewing employment advertising by South African
firms, “conducted an inquiry that might have been considered offensive by the Republic of
South Africa and which might have been an embarrassment to those charged with the conduct
of our Nation’s foreign policy.” Id. at 969.
502. See supra Part III.B (discussing whether action undertaken by the political branches
renders judicial intervention unnecessary).
503. But see, e.g., Blank, supra note 252, at 1068 n.8 (suggesting that all agreements between
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was supposed to comprise all pacts between states and foreign powers. Certain instances of bargaining—for example, negotiations by
Virginia with the Kingdom of Belgium to open a foreign trade office
504
in Brussels —are obviously unworthy of congressional attention.
Distinguishing such circumstances threatens to involve the judiciary
in freewheeling effects testing, or requires importing other possible
505
bases for exemption, such as one for state proprietary activities, that
506
may be neither doctrinally sound nor easy to administer.
A focus on the externality and collective action rationales for the
dormant treaty power permits some intuitively appealing linedrawing. Typical purchasing or investment agreements between a
state and a foreign power are not contingent on the foreign power’s
affairs of state, or, if they are, they pose no appreciable risk of altering those conditions for other states or municipalities—such agreements are exchanges purely on economic terms, seeking a transac507
tion-specific economic response. Under these circumstances, such
states and foreign nations are “absolutely forbidden”).
504. Cf. Liner, supra note 384, at 11 (updating the impact of Virginia’s choice to place an
economic development office in Brussels); see also Brenda S. Beerman, Comment, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as
It Pertains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 187, 206 (1995) (describing
the state of North Carolina’s activities).
505. See supra note 67 (discussing the relevance of the market-participant doctrine to dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis and to Zschernig).
506. Given a market-participant exception, the decision by certain states to pull Soviet
vodka from state liquor store shelves after the Soviet Union shot down flight KAL-007, or Oregon’s attempt to dun the Soviet Union for costs it had incurred after Chernobyl, might be suspect, while the purchase by Oregon of Soviet-made nuclear reactors would have been unlikely
to attract scrutiny—even if the former activities were no more governmental in character, and
the reactor purchase no less fraught with potential foreign policy complications (perhaps for
relations with third countries downwind). A similar distinction may be extracted from treaty
law, which traditionally regards commercial agreements between states, governed by some body
of contract law, as something less than an international agreement or treaty. For example,
[a]n international agreement, as defined, does not include a contract by a state, even
with another state, that is essentially commercial in character and is intended to be
governed by some national or other body of contract law. Examples include a loan
agreement, a lease of a building, or a sale of goods.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 301 cmt. d. But nothing in the commercial character
of such agreements is inimical to resolution by treaty, and they may take that form. See 14
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-11 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970) (citing authorities).
507. Thus, if Oregon had elected to buy Soviet nuclear reactors, it would have influenced
the Soviet Union only to the extent of encouraging the production of nuclear reactors. The purchase would not, in the ordinary course, have sought more broadly to compel a shift in Soviet
energy policy or to deprive the other states of reasonably equivalent economic opportunities.
Likewise a typical sister-city relationship. Such agreements do not, to put the matter formally,
create any cognizable externalities of the kind warranting the federal monopoly and its dormant
component.
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activities cannot be said to produce externalities of the kind that the
508
treaty power was intended to avoid.
State bargaining may also involve zero-sum situations—where
the risk posed by one state’s bargain with a foreign power is solely to
another state’s opportunity to engage in precisely the same conduct.
In these conditions, the opportunity for collective-action gains are
likely to be minimal. If, in fact, there is jockeying for the singular right
509
to open a trade mission, or to become a sister city, the purposes of
Contractual relations may, of course, presuppose certain background political conditions;
a state government might for example insist on an escape clause to protect itself against dramatic shifts in foreign exchange rates or political regime. But such ancillary terms can be easily
distinguished from the primary conditions indicated by typical sanctions legislation, and they
would moreover be exempted under the exceptions described below.
508. A further example concerns state law relating to the reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments, a complicated issue that can only briefly be sketched. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895), a diversity case, the Supreme Court suggested that federal law—informed by “the
structure of international jurisprudence”—required a rule of reciprocity. Id. at 227. It is unclear
whether Hilton is still good law in the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 98 cmt. e (1971) (querying whether reciprocity continues to be an obligatory consideration); LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 885-86 (4th ed. 1995) (same); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.35 (2d ed. 1992) (same). Further doubt has been sown by Zschernig,
compare Eugene F. Scoles & Laila E. Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judgments: California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 OR. L. REV. 377, 381 (1978) (suggesting
that, given Zschernig, state courts may no longer apply reciprocity requirements, even where
required to do so by a state statute), and Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 70
n.90 (1991) (same), with BRILMAYER, supra, at 885-86 (indicating the uncertainty regarding the
scope of Zschernig), and SCOLES & HAY, supra, § 24.35, 1000 n.5 (same), and by the appreciation that the reciprocity aspect of Hilton was “magnificent dictum,” Johnston v. Compagnie
Générale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926). The result is that some states either
disregard the requirement or enforce it solely as a matter of state law. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling
Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 691 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that Illinois law does not
recognize a reciprocity requirement); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(considering it unlikely that federal or D.C. law mandates a reciprocity inquiry); Chabert v.
Bacquié, 694 So. 2d 805, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that, under Florida law, reciprocity is a permissive, but not a mandatory, precondition for recognizing a judgment).
But if reciprocity is otherwise relevant under state law, see, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour
Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1990), or under international law incorporated as federal common law, see Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227; cf. Her Majesty, Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1979) (assuming, without deciding, that reciprocity may be
required either by federal or state law), would it violate the dormant treaty power? In form, yes.
But mere reciprocity—absent any procedure for evaluating and inspiring other change in the
content of foreign law—seems to impose no externalities. The United Kingdom’s decision to
recognize the laws of Ohio does not in any way diminish the prospect that it would also recognize the laws of Kentucky. Accordingly, state adoption of a reciprocity requirement would not
violate the dormant treaty power, whether or not it would have violated Zschernig.
509. Sister City International (“SCI”) insists that a foreign jurisdiction have “only one sister
city, county, or state in the US,” though it is not clear whether SCI’s threat to withhold recogni-
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the federal monopoly are not obviously implicated. While the states
might benefit from collusion, or the federal government might wish to
intervene for distributive reasons, either possibility assumes a situa510
tion in which American governments possess near-monopoly power.
Distinguishing cases where externalities or collective action advantages are absent is by no means easy, and it impairs the analytic
clarity of the bargaining approach. Yet such difficulties are more defensible than the line-drawing problems characterizing a pure effects
test. Unlike an effects approach, the basis and limits for which do not
appear in the Constitution, the dormant treaty power and its exceptions are derived from the convergence of the Treaty and Compact
Clauses. The grant of the treaty power was coupled with the understanding that federal authority was conferred to help the states avoid
the externalities and collective-action problems that persisted under
the Articles of Confederation, rather than to remedy “‘whatever con511
cerns [the states] alone.’”
Similarly, whatever the scope of the Compact Clause, it does not
appear to have been contemplated that it would extend to state activities of no national interest. This is the thesis, at any rate, of the litmus
512
test proposed in Virginia v. Tennessee, where the Court described
the interstate compacts of significance under the Compact Clause as
those leading to “the formation of any combination tending to the intion has any real effect. SCI Affiliations Policy (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http://sister-cities.
wego.com/go/wego.pages.page?groupId=10442&view=page&pageId=17772&folderId=17188&p
anelId=-1&action=view&JServSessionId=3fef9dccfb8101ff.6796.952313303413> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
510. Such a “beggar-thy-neighbor” scenario, in which one state is pitted against the other,
should be distinguished from collective action benefits that might occur by coordinating foreign
offices, not to mention the externalities that the former may impose as a result of inconsistencies
with national policy. See, e.g., HOCKING, supra note 382, at 79-84 (describing the problems with
coordinating foreign investments). The political alternative to judicial intervention in these circumstances may be especially attractive: not only could Congress preempt disruptive or otherwise counterproductive state competition, but the political branches could indicate that borderline state conduct should be exempted from dormant treaty power scrutiny. See infra Part
III.C.3 (discussing the benefits of positive political authority).
511. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 n.11 (1941) (“‘My own general idea was, that the
States should severally preserve their sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and
that whatever may concern another State, or any foreign nation, should be made a part of the
federal sovereignty.’” (quoting a 1787 letter from Jefferson to George Wythe)). One of the singular appeals of the federal monopoly, it must be recalled, is its claim to defend the interests of
the states as participants in a federal system, not just the interests of the national government
writ large. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European
Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing that the European Court of Justice must
take a similar approach in assessing “federal” benefits of uniformity).
512. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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crease of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
513
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” One would
anticipate that few cases falling below this threshold would even be
subjected to challenge.514
Neither exception would redeem, however, the Massachusetts
legislation on Burma presently before the Supreme Court. The Massachusetts statute falls squarely within the bargaining approach to the
dormant treaty power. While the immediate objects are corporations
doing business in Burma, the statute is unambiguously conditioned
not just on their behavior, but on the present regime’s indefensible
conduct. (Were a democratically legitimate government to succeed to
power, and the expected reforms to ensue, one might safely assume
the legislation would be repealed—a matter confirmed by evidence of
515
Massachusetts’s objective. ) The state legislation evidently seeks to
alter conditions for all manner of interactions with Burma and could
scarcely be said to be devoid of externalities, or to create externalities
solely appreciable by a rival for the very same bargain.
This conclusion does not, it must be said, mean that all nonfederal protest against Burma is unconstitutional. To the contrary, the
bargaining approach more clearly delineates permissible alternatives
than does the effects-oriented approach of Zschernig and its “one
voice” proxy. Massachusetts officials may deliver speeches condemning Burma, even if the disruptive effect of such speeches is far
516
more severe than the effects of the state’s procurement policy. Perhaps more significant, procurement policy may properly make doing
business with the state contingent on a corporation’s compliance with
standards governing its own conduct, so long as those standards are
not a pretext for effecting change by a foreign sovereign. An even513. Id. at 519; accord United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452,
472-73 (1978) (endorsing this approach).
514. One reason that a state might refrain from challenging such arrangements, of course, is
that a challenge would not only be an indictment of its own right to participate, but would also
establish precedent limiting its own opportunities on future occasions.
515. See supra notes 23, 462; see also text accompanying notes 479-80 (describing the use of
legislative purpose to provide evidence of bargaining).
516. Those espousing the orthodox approach to dormant foreign relations preemption make
similar claims, though it is by no means clear why. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H.
McCall, States’ Rights and Foreign Policy: Some Things Should Be Left to Washington, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 13-14 (2000) (suggesting that the Constitution allows state officials to
pass nonbinding resolutions or to lobby congressional representatives in order to effect changes
in national foreign policy). A difficult case for the bargaining approach would be raised under
certain circumstances, of course—for example, were Massachusetts to adopt a law requiring gubernatorial protests against Burma unless and until a change in the regime transpires.
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handed policy concerning respect for worker rights, for example,
would ordinarily be unobjectionable. Internationally oriented requirements reasonably consistent with foreign power policies—such
as state requirements that companies doing business in Northern Ire518
land refrain from religious discrimination —would also past muster,
so long as they are consistent with other federal law. Finally, as described below, state activities caught by the bargaining approach may
be excused by the federal political branches, including the President,
under circumstances appropriate to the administration of the treaty
power.
3. The Judicial Function of Positive Political Authority. As
others have observed, one of the failings of the present dormant
foreign relations doctrine is that it “prompts judicial intervention by
the same trigger that induces political response,” namely observable
foreign effects.519 This point is easily overstated, even in regard to the
present doctrine. Neither the courts nor Congress are self-starting,
and the effective power in either quarter of foreign complainants,
particularly those espousing the national government’s rights against
520
the states, has not been overwhelming. But the claimed redundancy
between the political process and judicial doctrine is certainly
worsened when the prospect of political participation in litigation is
considered. Not only is judicial intervention stimulated as the political
branches are prompted, but the executive branch is given the
opportunity, however tenuous, of applying its resources in lobbying
the judiciary—rather than the legislature, the American public, and
the foreign governments concerned.521 The appeal of removing the
judicial option from the equation is apparent.
To a degree, the dormant treaty power’s bargaining approach
avoids this problem: because it focuses on the act of state bargaining,
517. See supra note 501 (describing New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission
on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977)).
518. See Kline, Continuing Controversies, supra note 13, at 116; Cities Slap Sanctions Against
Foreign Powers, TELEGRAPH HERALD, Apr. 15, 1998, at C7.
519. See Goldsmith, The New Formalism, supra note 29, at 1414 (discussing the dormant
Commerce Clause and quoting Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 YALE L.J. 425, 436 (1982)).
520. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25.
521. The problem is all the more acute on those occasions when members of Congress participate in judicial proceedings as amici—as quite a few did in both the lower court and Supreme
Court proceedings in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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rather than foreign effects, executive branch expertise is less obviously relevant. But it also possible, in my view, to rationalize political
participation in the judicial process without estranging it. Under the
bargaining approach, a more productive task for the executive branch
lies in determining when the rule’s application is too severe. One
means by which that might be accomplished is through congressionally authorized rules or regulations delineating certain types of acts
which, in the President’s view, do not amount to proscribed bargaining. Barring that, the executive branch might be permitted to submit
its conclusion, without elaboration, that a given state activity does not
interfere with the performance of the treaty power and to require that
the judiciary treat a timely submission to that effect as dispositive in
the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Permitting this sort of executive branch involvement has several
compelling virtues. First, it ameliorates the potential severity of the
dormant treaty power for state bargaining activities bearing on foreign relations—though, for the reasons described above, the bargaining approach is more predictable, and less broad in certain re522
Second, permitting executive
gards, than its alternatives.
submissions provides a limited check against judicial overreaching, by
allowing low key executive intervention as an alternative to the definitive lawmaking characteristically required to overcome a displeasing court decision. Although the resulting rule does not go
nearly so far as the judicial abdication proposed by some,523 it serves
522. In some cases, accordingly, the bargaining approach’s severity is no greater than the
orthodox federal monopoly shorn of ad hoc exceptions. For example, both the bargaining approach and Zschernig are bedeviled by potentially positive practices like the state recognition of
foreign judgments. As Justice Harlan observed in Zschernig, if inquiry into the administration of
foreign law is prohibited to the states, then the provision of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act (which is identical to the current version, see UNIF. FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOG. ACT § 4(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986)) permitting nonrecognition
of judgments “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law” is presumably unconstitutional—
a conclusion Justice Harlan found difficult to believe was intended by the majority. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 461-62 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971) (predicating the recognition of foreign judgments rendered “after a fair trial in a contested proceeding”). Perhaps other federal law validly
dictates such considerations, as Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), once suggested. See id. at
202 (suggesting general conditions for recognition). But see supra note 508 (noting the questionable authority of Hilton in light of Erie and Klaxon). In any event, such an awkward result exemplifies the need for permitting political intervention, a function difficult to reconcile with the
conventional bases for the federal monopoly. See supra Part I.C.2 (noting that because the
Court has found the federal monopoly to be derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause, it
tends to ignore the executive’s input in these matters).
523. See supra note 29.
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the political branches better by allowing the judiciary to protect their
prerogatives while permitting the low-cost correction of judicial error.
The resulting burdens on the executive branch would not likely
be ruinous. A rule or regulation exempting certain types of state activities from automatic preemption, on grounds that they do not pose
serious risk of externalities or afford collective action advantages,
may be less controversial than requiring executive-led preemption in
the throes of a particular controversy. The alternative, executive
submission, may occasion more frequent and divisive dispute. At the
same time, voluntary and programmatic executive branch intervention would run little risk of compromising the national interest in the
confidentiality of negotiations (or the lack of negotiations) with foreign powers. The relatively small class of cases subject to the bargaining approach as compared to, say, cases involving a potential defense of foreign sovereign immunity, should also help ensure that the
524
burden is manageable. Of course, to the extent that the executive
branch prefers not to have the option of submission, it is free to adopt
a conservative approach, or even an administrative rule to the effect
that the participation will be systematically declined.525
Nor would executive submission in this context unsettle the separation of powers between the President and the courts. To be sure,
such submissions encroach on the judicial function, in the sense that
they deny to judges the sole power to determine outcome. Any procedural doctrine permitting waiver, or statutory restriction on stand526
ing, does much the same thing. Assigning an outcome-determining
role to the executive branch alone is more the crux of the problem,
527
but that is hardly unique in constitutional or statutory matters.
524. But cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (describing
the political pressure placed on the State Department by foreign nations seeking immunity prior
to the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976).
525. Such “housekeeping” rules would not present the same potential difficulties as administrative rules directed at primary state conduct. But cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1,
at 1710 (proposing the consideration of administrative rules as an alternative to judicial intervention).
526. See, e.g., supra note 264 (citing Uruguay Round Agreements Act provisions limiting
causes of action against states for breaches).
527. The dormant Commerce Clause, for example, may be characterized as a rule precluding the states from certain types of regulations while permitting the Congress to override the
principle as it deems fit, see Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1975), or as one invalidating state regulations in the relevant areas absent congressional authorization, see Merrill, supra note 420, at 56 & n.239; Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 447, at 1138-41. An analogue of the purely statutory front might be the procedure for
approving antitrust consent decrees prior to the enactment of the Tunney Act, see Antitrust
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Critically, moreover, it is appropriate given the structure of the treaty
power. One may well question an outcome in which the President assumed the authority to preempt, by brief, an individual state’s laws;
this would exceed the President’s authority under the Treaty Clause
itself, since a negotiated treaty has preemptive effect only after the
Senate has consented and the President afterward ratified. With the
dormant treaty power as the preemptive backdrop, however, the
President’s decision to exempt certain state acts from scrutiny is precisely as broad as his plenary authority to prevent national treaties
from being negotiated. In authorizing state participation in world affairs, the President is really doing no more than exercising his prerogative to cash in the national chips.
Finally, there would be little if any harm done to the separation
of powers between the President and the legislature. Executive submissions have the beneficial function of signaling, however obliquely,
the direction of the President’s management of foreign relations; either the Senate or Congress may, within the constraints of the Treaty
Clause, informally intervene to direct or correct the executive branch
judgment. Equally important, Congress retains the power to dictate
the permissible scope of state activities, thereby relieving the states
not only of dormant treaty power concerns but also, at the same
stroke, of uncertainties created by the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause and statutory preemption. The importance of the treaty power
requires, of course, that the legislative authorization or acquiescence
in state activities should not lightly be inferred. Barclays Bank, properly understood, was less a wholesale rejection of dormant foreign
relations preemption than an indulgent reading of congressional dele528
gation to the states. The Court’s reasoning, however defensible in
purely Foreign Commerce Clause terms, plainly does not consider the
effect on the President’s treaty power—authority that congressional
inaction cannot, under any view, divert to the states.

Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), and perhaps even afterward, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a
“public interest” inquiry under the Tunney Act entails limited judicial review).
528. Compare Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1994) (discussing the congressional tolerance of state initiatives), with id. at 329 (noting the possibility for
congressional delegation to the executive branch), and National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 71-77 (1st Cir.) (concluding that Congress had not implicitly assented to state
regulation touching on Burma and had instead delegated its authority to the President), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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CONCLUSION
Viewed through the lens of the dormant treaty power, the flowering of state foreign relations activities is less a source of constitutional dissonance than an opportunity to revitalize neglected doctrine,
doctrine that was itself inspired by intensive state activities in the late
eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The grounding of the dormant treaty power in the Constitution, political branch practice, and
case law interposes a powerful constraint on latter-day efforts to retreat wholesale from the federal monopoly orthodoxy.
At the same time, the dormant treaty power, and the bargaining
approach it commends, does not lightly dismiss the normative virtues
of localism. Instead, it attempts to respect one of the central insights
of the Founding—namely, that state bargaining generates disadvantages for the collective interests of the states that are best avoided by
centralizing the conduct of international negotiations in the Senate
and the President. Understanding the treaty power as the source of
dormant federal foreign relations authority not only explains why
some dormant doctrine is necessary but also frees states and localities
to engage in a wide range of activities regardless of their consequences. If a constitutional struggle remains, it is between state activities and the terms of the Constitution, not the struggle of a house divided.

